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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and United Kingdom both frame the threat posed by pandemic disease and
biological weapons as a national security concern. The United States’ most recent National
Security Strategy, for instance, released in May 2010, highlights the dangers posed by weapons of
mass destruction, pandemic disease, natural disasters, terrorism, transnational crime, and large-
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scale cyber attacks.1 The United Kingdom’s first National Security Strategy, released in March
2008, similarly recognizes that the Cold War threat has been replaced by concerns about
“international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics, and
trans-national crime.”2 The Cabinet Office explains,
Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to
our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state. That is why this strategy deals with transnational crime, pandemics and flooding – not part of the traditional idea of national security, but clearly
challenges that can affect large numbers of our citizens, and which demand some of the same responses as more
traditional security threats, including terrorism.3

In both countries, moreover, identifying and responding to the threat posed by, on the one hand,
naturally-occurring disease and, on the other, man-made biological agents or weapons, are linked.
The reasons for this are straightforward. According to the UK, substantial loss of life may
accompany any outbreak of disease—regardless of its origin.4 The scale and speed of the risk each
threat poses could result in equally devastating consequences.
[O]ur approach to them – to assess and monitor the risks, to learn from experiences at home and overseas, to
develop capabilities to minimise the risks and the potential harm, and to absorb whatever harm does occur and
then return to normality as soon as possible – is similar to our approach to other national security challenges,
including terrorism.5

Institutions used in response thus provide a dual function. In 2000, the Royal Society explained,
“Detection of BW attacks should be based on the existing civil arrangements in the United
Kingdom for dealing with natural outbreaks.”6
Statutes and policy documents in the United States similarly link disease and weapons in terms
of institutions, authorities, and approach. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, for example, focuses on preparedness for public health
emergencies and biological terrorism.7 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 claims that
the traditional public health approach is no longer sufficient. Health care providers and public
health officials are among the first lines of defense to counter the biological weapons threat.8 A
new biodefense program thus combines (and strengthens the state’s ability to respond to) natural
disease and biological weapons.9 National Security Presidential Directive 33, released in April
2004, similarly focuses on “21st Century Biodefense.” Included in the concept are improvements to
capabilities “not only against threats posed by terrorists, but for medical response in the wake of
natural catastrophes and in response to naturally-occurring biological hazards such as SARS.”10
Myriad further examples present themselves.11


1

United States National Security Strategy, at 8, 18 (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
2
THE CABINET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2008, Cm 7291, at 3, available at
http://interactive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/documents/security/national_security_strategy.pdf.
3
Id., at 3-4.
4
Id., at 14-15 (“We estimate that a pandemic could cause fatalities in the United Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000, although both
the timing and the impact are impossible to predict exactly.”).
5
Id., at 14-15.
6
Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons (Royal Soc’y., London, England) Jul. 2000, available at
http://royalsociety.org/Measures-for-controlling-the-threat-from-biological-weapons-full-report/.
7
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 294 (codified in
scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
8
Biodefense for the 21st Century, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10, Apr. 28, 2004, [hereinafter HSPD 10] available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-10.html.
9
Id.
10
Biodefense for the 21st Century, National Security Presidential Directive 33, Apr. 28, 2004, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/biodef.html.
11
See, e.g., National Response Framework, Dep’t. Of Homeland Sec., at 74 (Jan. 2008), available at
        (noting that both the National Institutes of Health and the National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasure Center at the Department of Homeland Security will focus on biological weapons as well as pandemic
disease); Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security, cover letter (Oct. 2007), at 1, 10, 16, 27 (bundling
biological weapons and pandemic disease); Dr. Jeff Runge, DHS Chief Medical Officer on Pandemic Preparedness, Press Briefing on
National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan: One Year Summary (Jul. 17, 2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/07/20070717-13.html (“We at DHS are focused on multi-use institutions that we can
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Where the United Kingdom and the United States part ways is in what they see as the role of
the central government and most effective response to the twin threats. U.S. federal law and policy
anticipates the federal imposition of quarantine and isolation.12 The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, for instance, streamlines and clarifies
quarantine provisions.13 In 2003 the Department of Health and Human Services amended its
regulations to incorporate any quarantinable disease listed by Executive Order, bypassing
rulemaking requirements.14 CDC’s proposed regulations establish new periods of quarantine and
the procedure to be followed in the event of its implementation.15 The agency explains:
Quarantine of exposed persons may be the best initial way to prevent the uncontrolled spread of highly
dangerous biologic agents such as smallpox, plague, and Ebola fever….Quarantine may be particularly
important if a biologic agent has been rendered contagious, drug-resistant, or vaccine-resistant through
bioengineering, making other disease control measures less effective.16

CDC, accordingly, expanded the number of domestic quarantine stations.17
Quarantine similarly lies at the core of the U.S. Pandemic Influenza Strategy Implementation
Plan, which was issued by HHS as a blueprint for how agencies will respond in the event that
Avian Influenza becomes human-to-human transferrable—despite the document’s admission that
influenza is one disease for which quarantine is likely to be particularly ineffective. Nevertheless,
it refers to quarantine 138 times, and in a manner of consequence, detailing the use of quarantine
both at ports of entry and in the execution of geographic quarantine (cordon sanitaire).18 The
criteria adopted for determining whom to quarantine is broad: anyone showing signs or symptoms
of pandemic influenza, or who may have been exposed to influenza within 10 months.19 The
framework calls for the use of local law enforcement to execute quarantine.20 Where states may be
unable either to implement quarantine or to maintain law and order, the government will fall back
upon federal law enforcement and the military.21 Even if unsuccessful, “delaying the spread of the
disease could provide the Federal Government with valuable time to activate the domestic
response.”22


put into place for whatever emergencies arise.”). See also remarks of Dr. Venkayya, Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, at
id., (suggesting that the purpose in releasing the document was to re-define public health as a national security priority).
12
The federal government also has provided the lead to state governments in updating and strengthening their laws governing quarantine
and isolation. The President’s 2002 National Strategy for Homeland Security listed review of quarantine authority as a priority for state
governments. Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Jun. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf. CDC, in turn, funded the Center for Law and the Public’s Health at
Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Universities to develop a Model State Emergency Health Powers Act. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY
HEALTH POWERS ACT (2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/MSEHPA/MSEHPA.pdf. By 2006 the Act had been
introduced in whole or part via 171 bills or resolutions in forty-four (44) states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariannas
Islands. Center for Public Health and Law, Legislative Status Update (Jul. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/ModelLaws/MSEHPA.php.
13
The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act makes quarantine applicable at an earlier stage by
replacing language that previously required that the disease be “in a communicable stage” with a measure allowing quarantine “in a
qualifying stage.” 42 U.S.C. § 264.
14
42 C.F.R. §§ 70.6 and 71.3 (2003). The White House expanded the list of quarantinable diseases to include SARS (April 2003) and
pandemic influenza (April 2005). Exec. Order No. 13,295, 68 Fed. Reg. 17,255 (Apr. 9, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,375, 70 Fed. Reg.
17,299 (Apr. 5, 2005).
15
42 C.F.R. Pt. 70 and 71, under Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 264-271); Proposed under 25 U.S.C. §§ 198, 231, and 1661;
42 U.S.C. §§ 243, 248, 249, 264-272, and 2007; 70 Fed. Reg. 71,892-71,948 (Nov. 30, 2005).
16
70 Fed. Reg. 71,892 (Nov. 30, 2005).
17
CDC’s Airport Quarantine Stations Designed to Halt Disease Epidemics, Airport Security Report, Vol. 12, Issue 8 (2005). See also
Institute of Medicine, Report: Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public’s Health, Sept. 1, 2005 (calling for a stronger
quarantine regime at ports of entry).
18
U.S. Homeland Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza: Implementation Plan (May 2006), available at
        
     [hereinafter Implementation Plan]. See also U.S. Homeland
Security Council, National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, at 7 (recommending the isolation of ill and the quarantine of non-ill
passengers); Id., at 77-78 (recommending that inbound flights be funneled to facilitate the mass quarantine of travelers); Id., at 159
(discussing domestic travel restrictions); Id., at 108 (anticipating the use of cordon sanitaire).
19
Id., at 91.
20
Id., at 12.
21
Id., at 13. See also Id., at 153.
22
Id., at 108. The decision whether or not to cordon off certain geographic areas would depend on a number of variables, such as the
area and population affected, whether implementation is feasible, the likely success of other interventions, the ability of authorities to
provide for the needs of the quarantined population, and other geopolitical considerations. Id., at 109.
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The influenza framework introduces a range of initiatives that demonstrate how seriously
quarantine is considered a potential response.23 It builds the execution of quarantine into incident
command.24 It directs state, local, and tribal entities to prepare to “address the implementation and
enforcement of isolation and quarantine.”25 Within 72 hours of the initial outbreak, HHS will issue
guidance on geographic quarantine.26 HHS, along with DHS, DOD, and mathematical modelers,
are to complete research on strategies for home quarantine.27 The plan considers the impact of
cordon sanitaire, discussing the interruption of transportation, distribution of food and medicine,
and other essential services.28 Consular communication is taken into account.29 Private industry
and schools are to consider mitigation strategies to counter prolonged absences.30 The document
goes so far as to address the mental health concerns that may arise in the event that quarantine is
used.31 Such provisions, considered at such length in regard to influenza, are even more relevant
for other types of biological threats, particularly where highly virulent or no known vaccination
may exist.32
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom, from the perspective of both law and
policy, does not appear to consider the national imposition of quarantine to be a viable option.
Government Ministers, although recently granted more legal authority, still do not have the same
breadth of power to implement quarantine as that provided to their U.S. counterparts.
The United Kingdom’s legal stance is grounded in history: more than a century ago, Great
Britain removed explicit quarantine power from its public health laws, as the 1896 Public Health
Act repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825.33 The statute remained largely unchanged until the
Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984 and the Public Health (Infectious Disease)
Regulations of 1988.34 Updated by the Health and Social Care Act of 2008, the statute gives the
Secretary the authority to place international travelers in quarantine. But it prevents the national


23

See, e.g., US National Security Strategy for Pandemic Influenza – Containment Plan, at 47, 131 (listing school closures, snow days,
and quarantines as examples of social distancing measures). See also Implementation Plan, supra note 18, at 100 and 37 (advocating
social distancing measures and noting that the immediate response for overseas outbreaks will be to activate domestic quarantine stations
and to begin quarantining passengers).
24
Id., at 155.
25
Implementation Plan, supra note 11, at 110. See also Id., at 155. HHS, coordinating with DHS, DOT, Education, DOC, DOD, and
Treasury, is to give State, local, tribal entities guidance for execution of quarantine during emergency. Id., at 130.
26
Id., at 131.
27
Id., at 131.
28
Id., at 80. For a discussion of the long-term impacts on the transportation sector see Id., at 97.
29
Id., at 52-53.
30
Id., at Appendix A, at 183, 185, 188, 192.
31
Id., at 111.
32
Implementation Plan, supra note 11, at 109. Notably, the Department of Homeland Security—not the Department of Health and
Human Services—has taken a leading role. See, e.g., Homeland Security Act of 2002 §421, Pub.L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 745, (amending 6
U.S.C. 231 to transfer agricultural, entry inspection functions previously given to Secretary of Agriculture under Animal Health
Protection Act, to DHS; these provisions can be used to stop humans as well.); Memorandum of Understanding Between Dep’t of Health
and Human Serv. and the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., (Oct. 19, 2005) (signed by HHS and DHS to coordinate border screening
activities/information for sharing contact tracing during outbreak of communicable disease (preliminary to quarantine provisions),
available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/hhs_dhs_mou.pdf; National Biosurveillance Integration System (created by DHS to
collect, integrate, analyze domestic and international all-source information); BioSense Real-Time Clinical Connections Program
(allowing real-time surveillance of disease in communities; extended to all 31 Bio Watch communities). U.S. Panflu National Plan, p.
22. It could be argued that the contemporary emphasis in the United States on quarantine is simply an effort to clarify quarantine
authorities – that quarantine is, essentially, a relic of the past and that, perhaps even as evidenced by the recent Avian influenza outbreak,
the government has no intention of actually imposing widespread measures. I am not convinced by this argument. It is irrelevant to
claim that such powers will never be used. During high-level exercises, frequent recourse to quarantine is made: in the TOPOFF
exercises in Denver, Colorado, for instance, CDC advised for the entire state to be cordoned off “to limit the futher spread of plague
throughout the United States and other countries. Colorado officials express[ed] concern about their ability to get food and supplies into
the state.”
Briefing Memo for Subcomm. On National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International Relations,
http://www.house.gov/reform/ns/web_resources/briefing_memo_july_23.htm.. The fact that such powers are on the books, moreover,
and expanding, justifies taking a closer look at these authorities. And even if the current office holders do not intend to use them
(although this could be questioned), different individuals will eventually come to office, in which case such powers will be available.
33
An Act to Make Further Provision with Respect to Epidemic, Endemic, and Infectious Diseases, and to Repeal the Acts Relating to
Quarantine, 1896, 59 & 60 Vict. c. 19, [hereinafter Public Health Act, 1896] (repealing An Act to Repeal the Several Laws Relating to
the Performance of Quarantine, and to make other Provisions in Lieu Thereof, 1828, 6 Geo. IV, c. 78).
34
Health (Control of Disease) Act, 1984, c.22 (U.K.); Public Health (Infectious Disease) Regulations, 1988, S.I. 1546 (U.K.).
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government from taking local action. Instead, the provisions require that a Justice of the Peace, on
application from a Local Authority, sign any Order requiring an individual to submit to medical
examination, be removed to or detained in a hospital or other suitable place, or be kept in isolation
or quarantine.35 The decision ultimately rests with local officials.36
It is not just British statutes that depart from the American model: as a matter of policy,
despite considerable concern in the United Kingdom about pandemic disease and biological agents,
for neither threat is quarantine looked to as a first line of defense. In 1999, for instance, the
Ministry of Defence issued a paper, Defending Against the Threat from Biological and Chemical
Weapons.37 It highlighted specific steps to respond to biological weapons threats, without once
discussing the potential use of quarantine or isolation.38 Three years later, the Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs presented a report to Parliament on how to counter the threat
from biological weapons. The document focused, inter alia, on strengthening the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention and creating a new Convention to criminalize the use of biological
weapons.39 Despite the UK’s international treaty obligations, it did not consider quarantine.40
Even for influenza which, according to the UK’s National Security Strategy, “could cause
fatalities in the United Kingdom in the range 50,000 to 750,000”41, ministers explicitly reject
quarantine. “Mandatory quarantine and curfews,” the Department of Health writes, “are generally
not considered necessary and are not currently covered by public health legislation.”42 The
government explains,
There is some evidence that big gatherings of people encourage spread, and measures to flatten the epidemic
curve can helpful [sic.] in easing the most intense pressure on health services. In general, however, quarantine
has been ineffective, at the most postponing epidemics of influenza by a few weeks to 2 months and even the
most severe restrictions on travel and trade have gained only a few weeks.43

For influenza and “other forms of infectious disease”, documents emphasize other responses, such
as the use of vaccines, international disease monitoring, and resilience.44
Why is it that the two countries, both of which consider pandemic disease and biological
weapons to be a national security concern—and, indeed, link them in terms of potential
identification and response—have such different approaches to the threat? This article suggests
that the answer is deeply historical, shaped by each country’s unique experiences with disease, as
well as each country’s constitutional framework. Careful examination of the evolution of public
health law suggests that the two countries have followed distinct—and essentially reverse—


35

Health and Social Care Act, 2008, c. 14, §45(d)(3) (U.K). See also Public Health Etc. (Scotland) Act, 2008, (A.S.P. 5) for the
equivalent statute in Scotland.
But see discussion, infra, regarding the Civil Contingencies Act, 2004, c. 36, §19(1) (U.K.).
37
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEFENDING AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, 1999, available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/issues/cbw/index.htm. See also SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE,
STRATEGIC DEFENCE REVIEW, 1998, available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/wp_contents.htm.
38
Id., see, e.g.,id. c. 7 (discussing the development of vaccines, procurement of the next generation of equipment for detecting,
identifying and monitoring biological hazzards, and establishing a joint nuclear, biological and chemical regiment). See also Scientific
Aspects of Control of Biological Weapons, (Royal Soc’y, London, England) Jul. 1994, available at
http://royalsociety.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=5946. (omitting reference to quarantine); Measures for Controlling the threat
from Biological Weapons, supra note 6 (omitting reference to quarantine).
39
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, STRENGTHENING THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS
CONVENTION: COUNTERING THE THREAT FORM BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, 2002, Cm 5484, (U.K.) available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/other/fcobw.pdf.
40
Id. See also HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS GREEN PAPER, FIRST REPORT OF
SESSION 2002-3, H.C. 150, at 5-6, available at http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-archive/foreign-affairscommittee/fac-pn-19-0203-/.
41
UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2 at ¶3.22, at 14-15.
42
2005: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU: UK INFLUENZA PANDEMIC CONTINGENCY PLAN, (Oct. 2005), at 49, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_10_05_bird_flu.pdf. See also 2007: DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, PANDEMIC FLU: A
NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONDING TO AN INFLUENZA PANDEMIC, (Nov. 2007), at 39 (arguing against both home quarantine and
cordon sanitaire). See also 2008 UK Int’l Preparedness Strategy, 13, at
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_089527.
43
Id.
44
See, e.g., UK NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 2, at ¶¶4.56-4.57, 4.58, 4.59, pp. 42-43.
36
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trajectories, which continue to influence the manner in which current law and policy has evolved in
respect to pandemic disease and biological weapons. Constitutional constraints played a key role
throughout.
In the United States, what started during the colonial period as a decidedly local authority
evolved, post-Revolution, to be both a local and a state authority. For more than a century, the
federal government proved reluctant to interfere. It was not that disease did not pose a severe
threat – or, indeed, that it was never used as a weapon. To the contrary, the colonies and, later, the
states, had significant concerns about the effects of disease and, even during the Revolutionary
War, there was evidence and widespread belief that the British used smallpox as a weapon. During
the Civil War as well, there were several reported efforts by the Confederates to use biological
weapons against Union forces. But the federal government did not adopt quarantine laws.
Quarantine was widely regarded as a central tenet of state police powers.45 It was so decidedly
local, that many states explicitly gave towns the authority to exclude any persons or goods believed
to carry sickness—even if they traveled or were transported from other U.S. cities or states. Towns
and local health boards could indefinitely imprison anyone within their bounds. They could coerce
doctors, nurses, and caregivers into treating those who fell ill, and they could introduce a range of
other measures to try to stem the advance of disease.
During the late nineteenth century, however, the balance of power subtly shifted. The federal
government avoided a direct Commerce Clause assertion and, instead, began to use the power of
the purse to buy up local and state ports, transferring their operation to federal control. Federal
statutory and regulatory authorities followed. By the end of the twentieth century, federal
quarantine law—at least in respect to inter-state travelers and those entering or leaving the
country—had become firmly established. By the early 21st century, policy documents had begun to
refer to the potential use of quarantine to respond either to pandemic or targeted attacks, shifting
the discussion from Commerce Clause considerations to Article II and foreign affairs. National
security demanded a federal, not a state, response. Post-Hurricane Katrina, an even more visible
discussion emerged, tied to the precise role of the military in enforcing domestic provisions.
The United Kingdom, in contrast, developed in the opposite direction. The first recorded
quarantine orders, issued under Henry VIII, demonstrate a monarch willing to use the military to
exercise his Royal Prerogative. As the constitutional structure of the country changed, the manner
in which quarantine was accomplished altered. With the Stuarts’ realization that quarantine could
be wielded as a powerful political tool, use of the provisions led to greater friction with Parliament.
The Privy Council reformed its approach, seeking statutory authorization prior to issuing orders.
The demise of the Council and transfer of public health authorities to Parliament led to the
abandonment of broad quarantine power. Commercial interests lobbied it out of existence. Aided
by medical treatises, the 19th century sanitation movement, and the growth of a professional
bureaucracy, local port authorities and public health provisions took their place. Accordingly, by
the early twenty-first century, no broad quarantine laws existed, and such policy documents as
were issued to outline the government’s response in the event of biological weapons or pandemic
disease specifically noted that quarantine would not be used.
These important differences have almost entirely escaped academic notice. Secondary
materials that discuss the history of quarantine law qua quarantine law tend to draw broad brushstrokes over its appearance globally.46 There are very few works that carefully consider the
evolution of quarantine law on either side of the Atlantic, much less in juxtaposition to the other


45

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 at 203 (1824).
See, e.g., Joseph B. Topinka, Yaw, Pitch, and Roll: Quarantine and Isolation at United States Airports, 30 J. LEG. MED. 51, 53-57
(2009) (discussing broadly the appearance of quarantine provisions in Egypt, Marseilles, and Venice); Brock C. Hampton, Development
of the National Maritime Quarantine System of the United States, 55 PUB. HEALTH REP. No. 28 Jul. 12, 1940, at 1241 (discussing the
development of a quarantine station in Marseilles and Venice); DOROTHY PORTER, HEALTH CIVILIZATION AND THE STATE: A HISTORY
OF PUBLIC HEALTH FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES (1999).

46
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country.47 Instead, accounts tend to be regional and episodic: they focus on particular states,
regions, or quarantine stations,48 or on particular plagues or pandemic diseases, drawing attention
to the virulence of the disease, the state’s immediate response, and the political, social, and
economic consequences.49 There are no accounts available on the US response to biological
weapons that connect the history of quarantine provisions to the contemporary response; nor are
there similar studies on the British side. Resultantly, not only have key differences between the
countries been missed, but no explanation as to why such differences mark the two states’
approaches has been suggested.
This article presents a new and detailed history of quarantine provisions in the two countries,
offering in the process a novel explanation as to why we continue to see disparate approaches to the
use of quarantine for natural disease as well as deliberate attack. It may be that there are other
explanations for the current biodefense stance in both countries. Indeed, the simple conjunction of
historical precedent and contemporary approaches would, alone, be insufficient explanation. It is
my argument, however, that there is considerably more than this in the historical record and the
influence of constitutional constraints on either side of the Atlantic, which continues to shape the
contemporary dialogue. Threading through each account is the importance of the type of threat
faced. For the specific diseases each country confronted, which differed, played a key role in
shaping subsequent measures. The United States struggled with yellow fever, smallpox, and
cholera. The United Kingdom developed its law primarily in response to plague. This influenced
the contours of the measures and the groups most impacted by quarantine, leading to a tolerance of
such provisions on the American side of the Atlantic, and a rejection of the same on British shores.
II. STATE POLICE POWERS AND THE FEDERALIZATION OF U.S. QUARANTINE LAW
Prior to the founding the American colonists routinely used both land and maritime quarantine to
respond to disease. Three key observations about these measures can be made. First, such early
efforts often were not successful, leading many of the colonial and early state statutes to begin by



See, e.g., Krista Maglen, The First Line of Defence: British Quarantine and the Port Sanitary Authorities in the 19th Century, 15 SOC.
HIST. OF MED. 3, 413, 414 (2002) (writing about the United Kingdom: “[T]he policies and practices which operated to intercept the
importation of infectious diseases at the ports have attracted little more than a handful of articles and sections of book chapters.”).
48
See, e.g., Howard Markel, A Gate to the City: The Baltimore Quarantine Station, 1918-28, 110 PUB. HEALTH REP. 2, 218 (1995); Jo
Ann Carrington, Impact of Yellow Fever on Life in Louisiana. 4 J. OF THE LA. HIST. ASS’N., 1 (1963); Susan Wade Peabody, Historical
Study of Legislation Regarding Public Health in the States of New York and Massachusetts, J. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, 1, 1-151 (Suat
No. 4, 1909); M. DUREY, THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE: BRITISH SOCIETY AND THE CHOLERA, 1831-2, (1979); N. LONGMATE, KING
CHOLERA: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A DISEASE (1966); R.J. MORRIS, CHOLERA, 1832: THE SOCIAL RESPONSES T O AN EPIDEMIC (1976); M.
PELLING, CHOLERA, FEVER AND ENGLISH MEDICINE 1825-1865 (1978); W. COLEMAN, YELLOW FEVER IN THE NORTH: THE METHODS
OF EARLY EPIDEMIOLOGY 139-167 (1987).
For works on specific time periods, see P. BALDWIN, CONTAGION AND THE STATE IN EUROPE, 1830-1930 (1999); JOHN BOOKER,
MARITIME QUARANTINE: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE C 1650-1900 (2007); J.L. BRAND, DOCTORS AND THE STATE: THE BRITISH
MEDICAL PROFESSION AND GOVERNMENT ACTION IN PUBLIC HEALTH, 1870-1912 (1965); G.C. COOK, FROM THE GREENWISH HULKS
TO OLD ST. PANCRAS: A HISTORY OF TROPICAL DISEASE IN LONDON (1992); Anne Hardy, Public Health and the Expert: London
Medical Officers of Health, 1856-1900, in, GOVERNMENT AND EXPERTISE—SPECIALISTS, ADMINISTRATORS AND PROFESSIONALS,
1860-1919 128-42 (R. MacLeod ed., 1988); A. Hardy, Cholera, Quarantine and the English Preventative System, 37 MED. HIST. 250,
250-269 (1993); J. C. McDonald, The History of Quarantine in Britain in the Nineteenth Century, 25 BULL. OF THE HIST. OF MED. 22,
22-44 (1951); The First Line of Defence, supra note 47 at 413-428.
49
See, e.g. J.B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TOWN OF BOSTON, 1630-1822 (1959); D.M. REESE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE EPIDEMIC
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Sciarrino: The Grapes of Wrath & the Speckled Monster (Epidemics, Biological Terrorism and the Early Legal History of Two Major
Defenses—Quarantine and Vaccination), Part I, 7 J. MED. & L. 119 (2003-03); The Grapes of Wrath, Part II, 8 J. MED. & L. 1; and The
Grapes of Wrath and the Speckled Monster, Part III: Epidemics, Natural Disasters and Biological Terrorism—the Federal Response,
10 MICH. ST. U.J. MED. & L. 429 (2006). There are biographical works on public health reformers (e.g., S. Jarcho, John Mitchell,
Benjamin Rush, and Yellow Fever, 31 BULL. HIST. MED. 132-36 (1957)), and historical accounts of the evolution of public health
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lamenting the continuing and devastating effect of disease.50 This lack of effectiveness proved
critical in generating later support for federal control.
Second, the components of disease which now place it within a national security framework
were present from the founding: disease took an incredibly high toll in terms of human life and, at
times, threatened the very foundation of government. It also was used as a weapon—by criminals
and by other countries. Thus, despite scientific advances that contribute to the current biological
weapons threat (such as biological engineering), the idea of disease as a weapon, which could be
used against individuals or the country itself, is not new and was considered and confronted by
early American measures.
Third, unlike English law, which was shaped primarily by concern about plague, colonial—and
later state—measures tended to focus on smallpox and other contagious disease.51 By 1721,
quarantine became paired with inoculation as response to smallpox in particular.52 When Yellow
Fever became epidemic in late 18th century, it quickly became linked to sanitation, spurring new
legislation to mitigate nuisances and continuing the use of quarantine. Cholera later became
epidemic.53 This is not to say that plague played no role; it did have some impact. But plague
provisions often merited their own legal response, while the core provisions continued to be
shaped, in the main, by other infectious diseases. This mattered because the emphasis was on
individuals carrying the disease, and not on items of commerce, such as silk, wool, and linens—
widely believed to carry plague and thus subject, across the Atlantic, to disinfection procedures that
often destroyed the goods in question. As a practical matter, what this meant was that the strong
commercial lobby in Britain that opposed the use of quarantine provisions was not mirrored on the
American side of the Atlantic. To the contrary, it was the immigrant community, and not shipping
interests, that was most often affected by the provisions. A tacit acceptance of the measures
followed.
A. Early Colonial Quarantine Provisions
The American colonies maintained quarantine provisions to counter the threat of disease.
Massachusetts Bay,54 New York,55 the Province of Pennsylvania,56 New-Castle upon Delaware,57
Maryland,58 Rhode Island,59 South Carolina, and Virginia entertained provisions that imposed
harsh penalties—such as death without benefit of Clergy—on those refusing to abide by the law.


50

See, e.g., Act to Prevent the Coming of Sickly Vessells, &c., Abstract or Abridgment of the Laws made and past by William Penn
Absolute Proprietary, and Governour in Chief of the Province of Pensilvania and Territories there unto belonging, with the Advice and
Consent of the Free-men thereof in Generall-Assembly mett at New-Castle, Oct. 14 1700-Nov. 27, 1700, *26. See also Blake, Yellow
Fever in Eighteenth Century America, supra note 49, at 674.
51
Peabody, supra note 48, at 46.
52
Id., at 47.
53
See, e.g., Joseph K. Barnes and John Maynard Woodworth, et al. The cholera epidemic of 1873 in the United States. Washington DC:
Government Printing Office, 1875; John Odin Jensen, The unwanted: cholera, immigrants, and national public health in 1892. Thesis
(M.A.): East Carolina University, 1992.
54
See, e.g., RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND, VOL. II, 1642-1649
(Nathaniel B. Shurtleff MD, ed. , 1853); ACTS RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF QUARANTINE OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM THE
SETTLEMENT OF THE COLONY OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY TO THE PRESENT TIME (Boston, MA Board of Health, 1881), at 5.
55
See, e.g., An Act to prevent infectious Distempers being brought into this Colony, and to hinder the spreading thereof, (1755) Act
XIII, in Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, and constitutions, Ordained, Made and Established by the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty, of
the City of New-York, Convened in Common Council for The good Rule and government of the Inhabitants and Refidents of the said
City, Nov. 9, 1762.
56
See, e.g., An Act to prevent sickly Vessels coming into this Government, The Laws of the Province of Pennsilvania Collected into
One Volumn, By Order of the Governour and Assembly of the said Province, 1714, c. LXII, p. 19.
57
An Act to prevent sickly Vessels coming into this Government, Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex, Upon
Delaware, 1752, *67
58
See, e.g., An Act to oblige infected ships and other vessels coming into this province to perform quarantine, Lib. HS. Fol. 655, Ch.
XXV, Nov. 1766, in The Laws of Maryland to which are Prefixed the Original Charter, with an English Translation, the Bill of Rights
and Constitution, 1799. See also Charles V. Chtion of the State, Vol. I, 1799.apin, History of State and Municipal Control of Disease, in
A Half Century of Public Health 143 (1921); RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE: 1798-1950
63 (1951).
59
See, e.g., An Act to Prevent the Spreading of Infectious Sickness, 1712, Acts and Laws of His Majesties Colony of Rhode-Island, and
Providence-Plantations in America, at 63-64 (on file with author).
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Such measures tended to be reactive and temporary. Initially, they focused on maritime trade, as
reports of disease abroad resulted in orders placing vessels under quarantine. Local quarantine
proved the first (and last) line of defense; accordingly, steep penalties accompanied failure to
observe the law. With Britain’s trading interests implicated by commercial delays that ensued, the
Privy Council in England did not always look kindly on provisions originating in the new world.

1. Massachusetts Bay
From the earliest days, townsmen in Boston passed orders regulating the town’s internal
health.60 Yet initially neither the government of Boston nor the colony’s General Court took steps
to prohibit the landing of vessels carrying infectious disease or arriving from infected ports.61 In
1647, however, the colony of Massachusetts Bay received reports that the “plague, or like grievous
[in]fectious disease” had broken out in the West Indies.62 John Winthrop, who that year became
governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, described the devastation:
After the great dearth of victuals in [the West Indies] followed presently a great mortality, (whether it were the
plague, or pestilent fever, it killed in three days,) that in Barbados there died six thousand, and in Christophers,
of English and French, near as many, and in other islands proportionable. The report of this coming to us by a
vessel which came from Fayal, the court published an order, that all vessels, which should come from the West
Indies, should stay at the castle, and not come on shore, nor put any goods on shore, without license of three of
the council, on pain of one hundred pounds nor any to go aboard, etc., except they continued there, etc., on like
63
penalty.

The General Court subsequently passed an order instituting maritime quarantine against all vessels
arriving from the West Indies.64 The order required:
[A]ll (our own) and othr vessels comeg from any pts of ye West Indies to Boston harbor shall stop (and come to
an) anchor before they come at ye Castle, undr ye penalty of 100£, & that no pson comeing in any vessel from
the West Indies shall go ashore in any towne, village, or farme, or come within foure rods of any othr pson, but
such as belongs to the vessels company yt hee or shee came in, or any wayes land or convey any goods brought
in any such vessels to any towne, village, or farme aforesaid, or any othr place wthin this jurisdiction, except it
be upon some iland where no inhabitant resides, wthout license from ye councell, or some three of them, undr ye
65
aforesaid penalty of a hundred pound for evry offence.

Not only were individuals on board ship prohibited from coming ashore, but all persons residing
within Massachusetts Bay Colony were prohibited from boarding any ships or vessels arriving
from the West Indies, or from buying any goods or merchandise from such vessels, without a valid


60

Shurtleff, supra note 54; BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5. Such powers fell well within local authority. See
1635 Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England.
Id. The government of Boston was a separate municipal entity, subordinate to the colony of Massachusetts Bay. The General Court
served simultaneously as a legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative body.
62
Order regulating the quarantine of vessels from the West Indies, (March) 1647-48, *200, reprinted in Shurtleff, supra note 54 at 237.
63
JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649, Vol. 2, 321 (James Kendall Hosmer, ed. 1908) (Winthrop chosen
Governor in 1647); id., at 329 (Quarantine order issued).
64
Id. There is discrepancy in the secondary literature about the exact date of the Massachusetts Bay order; some put it at 1647, others at
1648. Compare, e.g., RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE: 1798-1950 (1951), at 65; LAWRENCE
O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 205-206 (2000); Richard A. Goodman, Paul L. Kocher, Daniel J. O’Brien,
and Frank S. Alexander, The Structure of Law in Public Health Systems and Practice in LAW IN PUBLIC HEALTH PRACTICE 46-51, 263
(Richard A. Goodman et al, eds. 2007); with CHARLES V. CHAPIN, HISTORY OF STATE AND MUNICIPAL CONTROL OF DISEASE, IN A
HALF CENTURY OF PUBLIC HEALTH 133 (1921). The original writes “March 1647-1648”. At the time, the start of Britain’s
governmental year did not line up with the Gregorian Calendar (dating from 1582), but, instead, it coincided with the Julian Calendar,
which began each year on March 25. By implication, this suggests that the discussion regarding quarantine and the subsequent order
took place between January 1, 1648 and March 24 1648, making 1648 the more likely date of the first quarantine order issued by the
American colonies. The English government did not switch to the Gregorian Calendar until 1752. See HANDBOOK OF DATES FOR
STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY 6-11 (C.R. Cheney ed., 1978). See also First Order of General Court, regulating Quarantine of vessels
passed at a session of the General court the first month (March) 1647-48, *200, reprinted in Shurtleff, supra note 54 at 237; BOSTON
MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5.
65
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 5-6. See also Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in
New England, Vol. 2, p. 237; Hampton supra note 46 at 1245. Hampton cites to John Winthrop’s History of New England and Susan
Wade Peabody’s “Historical Study of Legislation Regarding Public Health in the States of New York and Massachusetts.” J. Inf. Dis.,
Suat No. 4, Feb. 1909. According to Hampton, the New York colony may have also implemented quarantine in the same year. For other
sources citing the MA Bay Colony order, see Sidney Edelman, International Travel and our National Quarantine System, 37 TEMPLE
LAW QUARTERLY 28, 29 (1963).
61
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license.66 The penalty for violating the order was £100.67 Infractions fell subject to the law.68 The
colony repealed the order May 2, 1649, when the yellow fever epidemic ceased.69
It was not until October 1665 that the settlement again imposed quarantine on vessels, this time
in response to the “great plague” in London (later determined to be typhus).70 The order required
that permission be obtained from the governor or council to land either passengers or goods
arriving from England.71 Like the first order, it was intended to be temporary in nature, and in
October 1667 the General Court repealed the provision.72
Following the outbreak of yellow fever in Philadelphia in 1699, Massachusetts tried to deal
with the threat posed by the disease by passing a permanent and particularly stringent Quarantine
Act.73 No vessel carrying smallpox, or any other contagious sickness, would be allowed within
half a mile of shore, without first obtaining a license from the governor or commander-in-chief of
the province, or from two justices of the peace if the harbor was located more than ten miles from
the governor’s home.74 Neither goods nor passengers could be conveyed to land without such a
license, with any violation of the provision earning the master of the vessel a £100 fine.75 The
1699 statute required the captain of the vessel to inquire into the health of all passengers and to
keep a record of any sicknesses on board.76 Any passenger or sailor breaking quarantine would be
isolated and imprisoned, held responsible financially for any costs thereby incurred by the colony,
and fined a further £20.77
England did not always acquiesce in the colonial provisions. The charter of 1691 retained a
check on Massachusetts Bay. The Privy Council had three years, from the moment it obtained a
copy of the colonial measures, to declare them void.78 Quarantine here proved particularly vexing:


66

BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 6. See also Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in New
England, Vol. 2, p. 237.
67
Id. The Order made arrangements for promulgation locally and to any vessels affected by its provisions. Id
68
Winthrop recounts that Goodman Dell of Boston, having been informed of the order, simply lied, saying he had not been in the West
Indies. He was later found out and bound over to court to answer for contempt. JOHN WINTHROP, HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND supra
note 63, at 329.
69
Records of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay in New England, Vol. 2, p. 280 (“The Courte doth thinke meete that the order concerning
the stoping of West India ships at the Castle should hereby be repealed, seeing it hath pleased God to stay the sicknes there.”) See also
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at; Order that stopt [sic.] the West Indy ships at the Castle repeld [sic.], May 16,
1649, *235; reprinted in Records of the Governor and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, Ed. By Nathanial B.
Shurtleff, Vol. III, 1644-1657 (1854), at 168. See also Records of the Col. Of Mass. Bay in New England, Vol. 2, *280, West India
Ships, May 2, 1649, reprinted in BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7 (“The Courte doth thinke meete that the
order concerning the stoping of West India ships at the Castle should hereby be repealed, seeing it hath pleased God to stay the sicknes
there.”) £100 in 1647 amounts to 114.46 times that amount in 2009; i.e., ~£11,446. Roughly translated at the current exchange rate of
0.65, this comes to $17,609. For rates of inflation and exchange see http://www.measuringworth.com/datasets/ukearncpi/result.php. In
terms of earnings and purchase power, however, the number increases to some $244,000 today. Susan Wade Peabody, an early 20th
century scholar, identifies the epidemic as yellow fever. See Peabody, supra note 48, at 41.
70
Record of the Order Establishing Quarantine, Oct. 11, 1665 reprinted in Records of the Governor and Company of the Mass. Bay in
New England, Vol. 4, pt. 2, 1661-1674 (1854), at 280. See also Order from the General Court, Oct. 11, 1665, reprinted in BOSTON
MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7.
71
Order from the General Court, Oct. 11, 1665, reprinted in BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7-8.
72
Order for stopping of shipps [sic] at ye Castle repealed, Oct. 9, 1667, reprinted in Records of the Colony of the Mass. Bay in New
England, Vol. 4, pt. 2, p. 345. See also Order for stopping of ships at ye Castle repealed, Oct. 9, 1667, reprinted in BOSTON MA
BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 8. The Records of the Governor and company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England, ed.
By Dr. Shurtleff, terminated in 1686; there was a period of six years before the Governor authorized publication of the Acts and Laws of
Massachusetts Bay. For much of the intervening period, there are few records, and none, in the State Library, that contain reference to
quarantine law. See BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 8. In 1678 a Salem Massachusetts ordinance again
addressed smallpox.
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An Act for the Better Preventing of the Spreading of Infectious Sicknesses, July 18, 1699 (Massachusetts-Bay), 11 Wm. 3. See also
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 9 (reprinting Act in full). The act itself singled out smallpox, but included
other infectious disease, whether carried by persons or goods; its introduction was specifically in response to the Yellow Fever outbreak.
BOSTON MA BOARD OF HEALTH, supra note 54, at 7.
74
An Act for the Better Preventing of the Spreading of Infectious Sicknesses, July 18, 1699 (Massachusetts-Bay), 11 Wm. 3, §1.
75
Id.
76
Id., §2.
77
Id., §3.
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1 POORE’S CHARTERS 952 (1877). For most of the other colonies, there was no limit to the time period within which the Privy Council
must either accept or disallow new laws. The effect of an Order in Council disallowing a statute was to repeal it, effective from the time
the colonial governor received notice of the order. Dudley Odell McGovney, The British Privy Council’s Power to Restrain the
Legislatures of Colonial America: Power to Disallow Statutes: Power to Veto, 94 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 73-74 (1945-1946). See also ACTS
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it fed into a broader concern held by English statesmen that “the uncontrolled manner in which the
Colony was exercising its powers was becoming increasingly detrimental to the economic welfare
of England and the Empire.”79 Being able to retain a ship, indefinitely, simply because of the
presence of any contagious disease, coupled with a significant fine for failing to observe such
measures, fell beyond the Pale.80 At the request of the Lords of Trade, the Privy Council refused to
allow the 1699 statute to stand.81 The Lords of Trade, however, did not long prevail.
In 1701 the General Assembly passed another statute that became the basis for Massachusetts’
quarantine law.82 Instead of applying to any contagious disease, the act targeted plague, smallpox,
and pestilential or malignant fever.83 The statute contained two parts. The first focused on cordon
sanitaire, the removal of individuals from towns, and isolation of the ill. It authorized selectmen to
remove and isolate any persons either ill or “late before have been visited” with plague, smallpox,
pestilential or malignant fever, “or any other contagious sickness, the infection of which may
probably be communicated to others.”84 A justice of the peace was to produce a warrant to secure
housing, nurses, and other necessities. Expenses, where possible, were to be paid by patient;
otherwise, by the town in which the ill person lived.
The second part of the statute focused on maritime quarantine. The act empowered justices of
the peace to prevent persons coming on shore from any vessel on which sickness was present.85
Information about the sicknesses were to be transmitted to the Governor, or commander in chief,
who was empowered “with the advice and consent of the council, to take such further orders
therein as they shall think fit for preventing the spreading of the infection.”86
Although the 1701 statute provided a general authority to quarantine individuals coming from
places where plague was or had been present, the colony at times passed measures focused on
certain countries or regions. In 1714, for instance, the General Assembly passed an act specifically
targeting all ships coming from France and other parts of the Mediterranean.87 In keeping with
European standards of the day, upon arrival in Massachusetts Bay, the ships were to be isolated for


OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL OF ENGLAND, COLONIAL SERIES, VOL. II, A.D. 1680-1720,
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79
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Id., at §4.
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forty days.88 Severe penalties met any commander refusing to observe the period of quarantine:
namely, death.89 Anyone coming ashore without express license from the Governor and council
would be imprisoned for three years.90
Prior to this time, the province of Massachusetts Bay had not maintained a quarantine
hospital.91 Accordingly, on June 11, 1716, a committee began investigating where such a facility
ought to be built.92 Five months later, the committee concluded that one was, indeed, necessary,
and recommended a suitable site.93 The House of Representatives voted to purchase the land
outright and to allot an additional sum of £150 to build the appropriate facilities.94 The measure
proved to be controversial. Inhabitants of Dorchester, Braintree, and Milton strongly objected to
the erection of a facility for infectious disease in their midst.95 The House of Representatives thus
withdrew its order to purchase the land, and in April of 1717 formed a new committee to consider
anew where, exactly, such a facility should be located.96 By August the treasurer had conveyed
£100 for the purchase of the southerly end of Spectacle Island.97
Troubles continued to assault efforts to build a new hospital. The project ran over budget.98 In
the interim, passengers landed for purposes of quarantine burdened landowners and destroyed
adjacent properties.99 But in 1717 new legislation continued to rely on quarantine to answer the
threat of disease.100 To encourage complicity with the statute’s provisions, any informer would be
granted one-third of the fines paid over to the Province.101
The act, set to expire in May 1723, was to continue in force for five years.102 Upon expiration,
however, the act was continued for a further five years, and in 1728 it was continued until 1738
“and no longer”.103 In the interim, the province made provision for its judicial and legislative
bodies to convene outside infected areas, in the event that smallpox took hold.104
The 1717 act was not adequate to cover all circumstances—namely, those presented by plague.
When the disease did appear, it fell subject to separate, and particularly harsh, measures. The
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primary threat came from ships having contact with the Mediterranean. Thus, in September 1721
the General Court enacted a new statute that again required ships coming from France or the
Mediterranean to undergo 40 days’ quarantine.105 As in 1714, failure to observe the rules carried
the penalty of death.106 Any individual breaking quarantine would be imprisoned for three years
without bail—considerably longer than the two months that operated under the non-emergency
provisions.107 The penalty for unloading goods was £500, with half of the proceeds paid to any
informer, plus an additional three years’ imprisonment without bail.108 The statute was to be in
force for three years.109
Massachusetts Bay, like many colonies, continued to maintain a quarantine hospital. The
location of the hospital, and the authorities extended to hospital and health personnel, shifted over
time.110 Each time the hospital moved, new legislation outlined the appropriate authorities and
penalties for violation, consistent with the acts of 1701 and 1718.111 Gradually, the quarantine
provisions became more detailed, providing, for instance, for medical personnel for care of the
sick.112 Although in most cases the measures were temporary, they tended to be renewed until
made indefinite.113
Massachusetts Bay also continued to pass new quarantine measures targeting vessels arriving
from specific regions or particular diseases that caused concern. These measures took on an
intensely local character. In 1739, for instance, the General Assembly passed an act to prevent the
spreading of smallpox.114 This measure required any individual coming from any region where
smallpox was rampant to report within two hours of their arrival to one or more Select Men or the
Town Clerk. Failure to do so carried a fine of £20.115 Smallpox presented a particular threat and
was dealt with through temporary means. In 1742, for instance, a similar statute, which was to
remain in force “for the Space of seven Years, and no longer.”116 This statute, re-printed in 1746,
gave the Justice of the Peace within the county, or the Select-Men of the Town, the power to obtain
a warrant to remove any persons arriving from “infected Places”.117
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As for individuals within the colony who fell ill, special duties were placed on the Head of the
Family:
[I]mmediately upon Knowledge thereof, the Head of the Family in which such Person is sick, shall acquaint the
Select-Men of the Town therewith, and also hang out a Pole at least six Feet in length, a red Cloth not under one
118
Yard long and half a Yard wide, from the most Publick Part of the infected House.

The flag was to remain in place “’till the House in the Judgment of the Select-Men is thoroughly
[sic.] aired and cleansed, upon Penalty of forfeiting and paying the Sum of fifty Pounds for each
Offence, one Half for the Informer, and the other Half for the Use of the Poor of the Town where
such Offence shall be committed.”119 Refusal or inability to pay the fine was punishable by
whipping, up to thirty stripes.120 In the event that more than twenty families in the town had
contracted smallpox, however, the requirements were lifted.121
2. New York
Other colonies – even from their earliest days – considered and adopted quarantine provisions.
Like the Massachusetts Bay measures, these laws were intensely local in nature and became
increasingly extreme over time.
Secondary sources suggest that in 1647, under Dutch rule, New York took steps to adopt its
first restrictive measures.122 Further orders appear to have been issued under English rule, by the
Governor and Council.123 Municipal ordinances providing for quarantine appeared in East
Hampton and Long Island in 1662, banning Indians with smallpox, and whites who visited them,
from entering the town.124 New York passed a similar ordinance in 1663, forbidding anyone ill
with smallpox from entering the city.125
By the late-17th century concern throughout the colonies had expanded from smallpox to
yellow fever. Epidemics of the disease broke out in Boston, Charleston, and Philadelphia.126 When
yellow fever reached New York in 1702, isolation efforts proved unsuccessful.127
Yellow fever, along with smallpox and other infectious diseases, proved formative in New
York’s quarantine law. In 1755 the legislature introduced a colony-wide maritime statute.128 The
legislation required that any vessels with smallpox, yellow fever, or other contagious diseases
anchor at Bedlow Island, and there be quarantined, with heavy penalties for disobedience.129 Any
person coming ashore could be compelled to return to the vessel or “dispose[d] of…in some other
Place, in order to prevent the Infection.”130
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The following year the colony introduced a subsequent measure, to ensure that all individuals,
regardless of how they had fallen victim to disease, could be treated in like manner.131 Similar
provisions were continued in 1757, to be in continuance for five years.132
3. The Province of Pennsylvania and County of New-Castle
Like Massachusetts Bay and New York, from its earliest days the Province of Pennsylvania,
granted to William Penn and his assigns, made use of quarantine. The measures initially adopted
though seem to have been somewhat softened by the views of the colony’s founder.133
Nevertheless, close inspection shows a pattern consistent with the other colonies in regard to both
the intensely local nature of the provisions and the increasingly stringent measures adopted.
Penn himself had witnessed the savage destruction of disease as well as the devastating impact
of strict quarantine law. He was a student at Lincoln’s Inn when the great plague hit London.134
Death rates rapidly escalated and commerce came to a halt. “[T]he streets,” one historian recounts,
“were filled with mournful cries—of the painfully stricken, the grief stricken…”135 The Crown’s
Draconian quarantine measures served to increase the suffering:
Families with plague cases were boarded up into their houses for forty days without sufficient resources. Door
upon door bore the great placard with its red cross and the plea, “Lord have mercy upon us!” The spotted death
swept through the city killing so many so rapidly that there weren’t enough burying grounds; great pits had to be
dug wherever there was waste ground and bodies brought in great wagon loads. The madness of pain and fever,
mass hysteria ruled London life that summer…The Great Plague claimed an estimated seventy thousand
Londoners before it receded.

Penn saw the impact of quarantine laws on the poor, and witnessed the role played by Quakers in
administering to those in need, despite continued religious persecution of the sect by the Crown.136
His experience with disease continued: on his first voyage to America, his ship, the Welcome,
fell subject to smallpox, in the process losing one-third of those it carried.137 Penn, immune owing
to childhood contact with the disease, cared for those aboard who fell ill.138 For the next two
decades, Penn continued to help and financially support the sick.139 He felt it his duty, writing in
his Reflections and Maxims, “They that feel nothing of charity are at best not above half of kin to
the human race.”140
In 1684 Penn returned to England. In his absence, the provincial assembly grew in power,
perhaps contributing to its later willingness to adopt broader laws.141 Penn himself found in
London a healthy dose of realpolitik and returned to his colony in 1699—having escaped the
Tower and barely gained the favor of William of Orange—determined to answer charges of failing
to pass strong enough laws.142 His arrival coincided with that of the “pestilential fever”—a disease
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believed to have been imported from the West Indies.143 Quickly dubbed the “Barbados
distemper”, the yellow fever outbreak killed 6-8 people per day for several weeks.144
To counter this dreaded disease, in 1700 the General Assembly at New Castle introduced An
act to prevent Sickly vessels coming into this Government.145 The new provisions sought to
minimize the devastation, but they did not go so far as to shut people in their homes, as the English
measures to which Penn had been a witness—or, indeed, the Massachusetts Bay and New York
measures—had done. Instead, the statute focused on maritime provisions. It prohibited “vessels
coming from any unhealthy or sickly place whatsoever” from coming closer than a mile from land,
absent a clean bill of health.146 Passengers or cargo could only come ashore with a permit from the
local authorities.147
As with all laws passed by the province, such measures had to be laid before the Privy Council
within five years of their passage; upon receipt, the council had six months to declare such
measures void.148 The council made liberal use of its veto power in regard to the private colony,
disallowing in excess of fifty provisions within just a five year period (1700-1705)—including one
measure requiring all masters and commanders of vessels to report at New-Castle.149 Such
decisions appear to have been influenced in part by complaints emanating from the Board of Trade
that Pennyslvania, one of the most important colonies, was engaged in illegal trade.150 Coupled
with the colony’s failure to crack down sufficiently on piracy,151 trade concerns prompted the
crown to retain control of all matters relative to military power, admiralty, and customs.152
Despite its concerns, however, the Privy Council left the 1700 quarantine law intact.153 The
statute remained in force for nearly three-quarters of a century, without amendment, until its repeal
in 1774.154 That year, a new statute took its place.155 From 1755, similar provisions marked NewCastle, Kent and Susssex, upon Delaware.156 Finally, upon the Declaration of Independence, the
General Assembly of Pennsylvania passed a statute continuing all the laws in force on May 14,
1776.157
4. Rhode Island
The General Assembly of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations at Newport also passed
colonial quarantine measures that demonstrate the decidedly local nature of such laws. The
measures targeted contagious disease broadly. They, too, steadily became more extreme. And
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they demonstrated a provincialism that would persist beyond the country’s founding, empowering
local towns to exclude individuals from other American colonies based on the threat of disease.
A 1719 act prevented any vessels carrying any contagious disease from anchoring within one
mile of any landing place.158 The statute required license to land from the Governor of the Colony,
or in his absence, from one or more justices of the peace, with failure to obtain such a license
before landing carrying a penalty of £100.159 In the event that passengers or sailors came ashore,
the Justice of the Peace was empowered to confine them “to any such Place, as to him shall seem
convenient, for to prevent the spreading of any Infection.”160 Like the Massachusetts Bay act of
1699 (rejected by the Privy Council), such individuals would be subject to a further fine of £20.161
The statute empowered the Naval Officer became to send medical personnel aboard any ship
believed to have sickness on board to investigate.162 The ship bore the responsibility of paying for
any costs thus incurred.163
Smallpox in particular continued to be a problem for Rhode Island—and not just when
imported from abroad. In 1721 the colony responded to an outbreak of smallpox in Boston by
passing a statute that targeted goods and passengers from Massachusetts Bay.164 All goods, wares,
and merchandise originating in the diseased colony was to be transferred to islands offshore to be
exposed to the elements for six to ten days, before being permitted to enter the colony.165 Criminal
penalties applied.166 The law also required innkeepers to report ill lodgers, the justice of the peace
being authorized to remove the sick “to any such Place as they shall think needful to prevent the
spreading of the same.”167 In 1722 the General Assembly continued this act.168
Less than a decade later, the colony issued another statute to stem the spread of “Contagious
Distempers”, preventing any vessels carrying smallpox, or originating in any region (including the
Americas) in which contagious distemper “is brief or prevalent” to anchor their ship one mile from
shore.169 Any person coming ashore without explicit license from the Justice of the Peace could be
returned to the vessel or “to any such Place, as to [the Justice of the Peace] shall seem convenient,
for to prevent the spreading of any Infection.”170 The person transferred would be required to
reimburse the colony and to pay an additional £20 fine.171 The statute authorized Naval Officers to
board vessels and to assign a doctor to do the same in the course of medical investigations.172
Unlike the earlier law, the 1730 act also made provision for individuals initially allowed into the
colony, who later took ill, to be removed by the local Justice of the Peace “to such convenient
Place, as shall to them appear to be necessary, to prevent the spreading thereof.”173 The cost, again,
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would be borne by the individual who fell ill, unless such person was a slave, in which case the
owner would pay.174
Despite these provisions, disease continued to plague Rhode Island generally and Newport in
particular. The laws came to be seen as too intricate and convoluted. And their effectiveness left
something to be desired: disease proved devastating for trade, deadly for the colonists, and
expensive.175
Accordingly, in 1743 the colony repealed and re-issued substantially revised quarantine
provisions.176 No ship, from any port, with any person ill from any contagious disease would be
allowed within one mile of shore.177 The standard penalty of £100 for the master of the vessel and
£20 for any individual breaking the quarantine applied.178 The governor and justices of the peace
had the authority to send medical personnel aboard any vessel to confirm the health of the
passengers.179 Town councils would secure the vessel and control all communications with shore,
as well as direct the goods and merchandise to undergo 6-10 days of cleansing in the islands off
Newport.180 A full two-thirds of any penalty exacted for breaking quarantine would be given to
any informers who alerted the authorities.181 All costs associated with addressing sickness on
board the vessel—including the cost of ammunition for guns firing at the vessel to prevent it from
coming into the harbor—was to be paid for by the vessel itself.182
As for the health of the towns on shore, not only did the owners of public inns become required
to report on the health of their inhabitants, whom the justices of the peace could then remove, but
any individual ill with smallpox could be taken from their own home by a Justice of the Peace and
placed in the local quarantine facility, “or any other convenient Place, in order to prevent the
Spreading of the Infection, or otherwise at their Discretion, to place a Guard round the Dwelling
House of the infected Person, as to them shall seem necessary.”183 This measure effectively
established the mechanisms to impose geographic quarantine within the colony. The restrictions
went both ways: not only were guards to be placed to keep those within the dwellings from
leaving, but, under the law, no person could enter such homes without a license from the town
council or two or more Justices of the Peace.184 A fine accompanied any infractions, with half to
be paid to any informers.185
The Newport colony also evinced concern about the deliberate spread of disease, reserving the
post serious punishments for such acts. It became a crime to willfully or purposely spread
smallpox within the colony.186 Anyone found guilty of the offense would be put to death, without
the benefit of clergy.187 Any attempt to spread disease would be countered by thirty-nine lashes,
six months imprisonment, and hard labor.188
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Despite having introduced a comprehensive statute, gaps in the law remained. In 1747 the
General Assembly introduced further provisions.189 The purpose appears to have been to provide a
legal mechanism for the collection of debt associated with quarantine. For those entering the
colony from elsewhere, the statute gave the General Treasurer the authority to recover such costs
by an Action of Debt at any inferior court of common pleas within the colony.190 For colonists
themselves, the Town-Councils became empowered to set the cost of cleaning the dwellings of
those removed.191 The following year the General Assembly passed further provisions, noting that
although the 1743 law had empowered the government to employ doctors to investigated and
respond to sickness, there were no penalties attached for physician or surgeons’ refusal to obey.
Accordingly, in 1748 a new act provided for the Governor or Deputy Governor, or any two
Assistants, Justices, or Wardens, or any Town-Council, to compel doctors “to do any Duty relating
to prevent the Spreading of the Small-Pox, or executing any Part” of the statute.192
B. The Revolutionary War and its Aftermath
Massachusetts Bay, New York, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island were not unique in their
introduction of quarantine provisions, despite the fact that many of the colonial quarantine
initiatives were reactive, temporary, incomplete, and not particularly effective. In part this was
because some of the diseases at which the measures were directed were simply endemic to the new
world.193
Smallpox, in particular, continued to batter the colonies, becoming epidemic during the War of
Independence, in the course of which more than 130,000 colonists died from the disease.194
Historian Elizabeth Anne Fenn reports on the widespread belief at the time that the British
deliberately engineered the outbreak.
Many on the American side believed that the expulsion of the black loyalists was a deliberate British attempt to
spread smallpox to the continental forces, the militia, and the civilian population. Whig sympathizers had
accused the British of utilizing biological warfare as early as the siege of Boston, and in Virginia it seemed that
their fears were finally realized. On June 24, 1781, the Connecticut soldier Josiah Atkins stated his opinion that
Cornwallis had ‘inoculated 4 or 500 [blacks] in order to spread smallpox thro’ the country, & sent them out for
that purpose.”…The eviction of pox-covered black loyalists from Yorktown in October drew similar charges.
James Thacher, a surgeon’s mate in the Continental army, believed the terrified former slaves had “probably”
been sent to the American lines “for the purpose of communicating the infection to our army.”195

The charge that the British were using Smallpox as a weapon echoes in contemporary accounts.
The Pennsylvania Gazette, for instance, wrote, “Lord Cornwallis’s attempt to spread the smallpox
among the inhabitants in the vicinity of York, as been reduced to a certainty, and must render him
contemptible in the eyes of every civilized nation.”196 Benjamin Franklin referenced the same in
his Retort Curteous..197 Fenn writes, “It would be easy to dismiss these accusations as so much
American hyperbole. But evidence indicates that in fact, the British did exactly what the



189
An Act in Addition to an Act, made and past by the General Assembly, in the seventeenth Year of the Reign of his present Majesty,
intituled, An ACT to prevent the Spreading of the Small-Pox, and other contagious Sickness, in this Colony, reprinted in Acts and Laws
of His Majesty’s Colony of Rhode-Island, and Providence-Plantations, in New-England, from Anno 1745 to Anno 1752, Newport,
Franklin, 1752,
190
Id.
191
Id.
192
An Act in Addition to an Act, made and past by the General Assembly, at their Session, by Adjournment at South-Kingston, the
fourteenth Day of February, in the seventeenth Year of his present Majesty’s Reign, entituled, An ACT to prevent the Spreading of the
Small-Pox, and other contagious Sickness, in this Colony, reprinted in Acts and Laws of His Majesty’s Colony of Rhode-Island, and
Providence-Plantations, in New-England, from Anno 1745 to Anno 1752, * 54.
193
In 1721, for instance, more than half of those living in Boston contracted smallpox, with hundreds dying of the disease on a cyclical
basis. Peabody, supra note 48, at 44.
194
ELIZABETH ANNE FENN, POX AMERICANA: THE GREAT SMALLPOX EPIDEMIC OF 1775-82 273 (2001). In autumn 1777, Valley Forge
became the site for general inoculation. FRANCIS RANDOLPH PACKARD, THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES 264, 283,
315 (1901).
195
FENN, supra note 194, at 131.
196
Quoted in Fenn, Id., at 131.
197
Discussed by Fenn, id., at 131; see also Benjamin Franklin, The Retort Courteous, in THE WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, VOL.
10, at 111 (Albert Henry Smyth, ed., 1907).



19

Americans said they did.”198 Robert Donkin, for instance, a British officer in New York, explicitly
directed the use of Smallpox as a weapon, writing “Dip arrows in matter of smallpox and twang
them at the American rebels, in order to inoculate them; This would sooner disband thee stubborn,
ignorant, enthusiastic savages, than any other compulsive measures. Such is their dread and fear of
that disorder!”199 Later in the war, General Alexander Leslie sent a letter to Lord Cornwallis,
indicating his plan to distribute sick soldiers throughout the “Rebell Plantations.”200
The colonies responded by issuing public statements meant to shame Britain in the eyes of
other nations, and by introducing new measures to take advantage of what little was known,
scientifically, about the disease. In Massachusetts, for instance, laws were passed by the legislature
to empower justices of the court of general sessions in any county to allow for inoculating hospitals
to be established.201 A special statute focused on Boston: after a certain period, those who had not
contracted the disease were forbidden to enter, until Boston was declared free from the disease.202
In Rhode-Island a similar statute permitted for widespread inoculation for smallpox.203 The
disease was decimating the Revolutionary Army at a critical time.204 The new statute authorized
the erection of one hospital in each country in the colony. Guards would be placed two hundred
yards outside such hospitals in every direction to prevent anyone from entering or leaving hospital
grounds.205 Once admitted for inoculation, criminal penalties applied for leaving without a doctorissued certificate of health. The physicians themselves would be held responsible for anyone
leaving with a certificate, who subsequently spread smallpox to others (either by way of personal
contact or through his or her belongings).206 Every item of clothing, linen, or sheets removed from
the hospital also had to be accompanied by a certificate.207 The statute gave particularly broad
authority to Towns establishing such hospitals.208 Any measure thus passed would have the same
force and validity as if it had been enacted by the General Assembly.209
Concern about the devastating affects of disease continued well beyond the Revolutionary
War. Major port cities, such as Baltimore, Boston, New York, and Philadelphia warranted special
attention. The states in which these ports were located devolved broad authorities down to a local
level, giving effect to two major legal frameworks: quarantine and sanitation. In both spheres
public health trumped commercial considerations. States and local governments became
empowered to exclude all people and goods from elsewhere in the United States, solely on the
grounds of public health.
Closer examination of the four states governing the largest ports on the Eastern seaboard
(Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania), coupled with Connecticut’s somewhat
unique approach, provide an example of both the depth and breadth of the newly-minted country’s
approach to disease. They also illustrate the degree to which quarantine law lay at the heart of state
police powers.
1. Maryland
Following the Revolution, states transferred colonial regulations governing quarantine into
state law – some going so far as to enshrine the authorities into their state constitutions. Maryland
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proves a good example. The colony, which had introduced quarantine regulations in 1766,
continued its measures in 1769, 1773, 1777, 1784, 1785, 1792, and 1799.210 Maryland also wrote
quarantine authorities directly into its state Constitution.211
Even with the carry-over, concern quickly arose as to whether its quarantine provisions were
sufficient to meet any exigency that might arise.212 Subsequent legislation thus expanded the
governor’s authority: from 1793 the governor’s powers in regard to any malignant contagious
disease included the authority not just to stop vessels, goods, or individuals from coming into port
or reaching shore, but to prevent “all intercourse or communication”, over land or water, between
Maryland and any region where such sickness was present—either in the United States or
overseas.213 This effectively gave the governor the power to cut off relations with other states and
localities. Quarantine was not just outside the federal domain. It was so decidedly local that it
overrode national interests.
Even as it established its broad authority to isolate the state from other cities and states,
Maryland made arrangements for the appointment of a local health officer in Baltimore.214 The
officer could impose quarantine of people and goods 10-20 days, with additional extensions of up
to 10 days each.215 The penalty for masters violating quarantine was set at $1000, with any effort
to conceal sickness on board the vessel set at $300.216 The statute further authorized the creation of
a hospital for individuals placed in quarantine.217 Local ordinances rounded out the state
authorities. Thus, the City of Baltimore passed measures in 1797, 1798, and 1800, making
extensive provision for both the authority to quarantine people and goods, as well as to establish a
lazaretto to perfect the same.218
2. New York
New York followed a similar pattern in responding to the threat posed by disease. Like
Maryland, the state legislature incorporated colonial provisions directly into law. It then expanded
its authorities, giving rise to two bodies law: an increasingly robust quarantine establishment, and
an ever more stringent sanitary regime. Even as the two sets of authorities evolved within the
broad limits set by the state, each remained decidedly local in character. For the city of New York,
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as for other port cities subject to significant human and commercial traffic, the state legislature
passed special measures.
Following the war, in 1784 the state legislature re-enacted and expanded colonial quarantine
measures.219 Quarantine was to be performed wherever, and in whatever manner, the Governor
directed.220 The governor became empowered to appoint a physician to inspect all vessels
suspected of having disease on board.221 Any attempt to interfere with the physician in the exercise
of his duties carried a penalty.222 The statute authorized the governor to take over Nutten Island—
also known as “Governor’s Island”—for quarantine purposes.223
The end of the 18th century saw a sudden upswing in attention to disease. In 1794 the New
York legislature passed a measure giving the Governor the authority to build a hospital on the
island.224 Then, starting in 1796 under John Jay’s governorship, the legislature passed six laws in
six years, each focused on stemming the spread of disease. These measures, local in nature,
steadily expanded the coercive nature of state authorities and introduced further innovations related
to geographic, seasonal, and merchandise-related quarantine.
The series began in 1796 with legislation that repealed the earlier act.225 The new statute
created a more robust regime, providing for the appointment of a health officer and health
commissioners for New York City, authorizing construction of a lazaretto, enabling the governor
and health officers to enact maritime and domestic quarantine, and eliminating nuisances.226 The
law required that all vessels carrying forty or more passengers, having on board any person with a
fever, arriving from a place where sickness where an infectious disease at the time of departure
prevailed, or having lost anyone en route due to sickness, to undergo quarantine.227 The statute also
gave the governor the authority to designate specific regions, such that any vessels arriving from
these areas would automatically undergo quarantine until cleared by the health officer for entry.228
Like Maryland, New York gave its governor the power to cut off commerce and travel
connecting the state with the rest of the Union—again emphasizing the local character of
quarantine.229 Full authority was given to the health officer to direct where quarantine would be
performed, who would undergo quarantine, and what articles would be quarantined, cleaned, or
destroyed.230 Failure to answer the health officer’s inquiries honestly amounted to perjury.231 The
1796 statute also created a health surveillance system: it required physicians to report any fevered
patient considered to be infectious; a penalty of £50 accompanied each infraction.232 The statute
also gave broad powers to the Mayor, Aldermen, and Commonalty of the City of New York,
convened in common council, to introduce sanitary provisions to alter any lots within the city, to
clean streets, alleys, passages, yards, cellars, vaults, and other places, and to regulate a range of
industries giving rise to sanitary concerns (e.g., glue, leather, soap, candles, and the like).233
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Owners and businesses would be compensated for any losses; failure to reach agreement would
result in the empanelment of a jury, within three weeks, to set the amount.234
The year after passing this broad quarantine act, the legislature amended it to restrict the
number of health commissioners from seven to three.235 Quarantine would henceforward continue
“for as many days as the commissioners shall deem necessary.”236 It also established specific areas
within which certain industries, involving starching, fermenting, melting fat or tallow, boiling soap,
or curing hides, would not be allowed.237 No vessel arriving in the port of New York, which would
otherwise be subject to quarantine, could be exempted by reason of having previously entered any
other port in the United States, unless such ship had remained in port for certain number of days.238
In 1798, the state passed a new omnibus law, expanding the commissioners’ authority and
appointing a physician to serve as health officer for the city of New York.239 The statute dealt with
urban nuisance and maritime quarantine, even as it explicitly reserved traditional remedies against
nuisance under common law.240 To the Governor of the State or the Mayor of New York went
further powers to issue orders relating to domestic quarantine.241 The act also provided for the
construction of a lazaretto on governor’s island.242 Any persons or things within the city of New
York, infected by or tainted with “pestilential matter”, could be sent by the health commissioners to
the lazaretto.243 In 1799, the legislature designated Staten Island—six miles away—to be home to
anchorage grounds and a new Marine Hospital.244 To the health officer was conveyed full
authority to confine and release individuals from the medical facility.245 By 1801 the quarantine
establishment was completed. It remained there for 60 years.246
New York law not only allowed the governor to discriminate against persons and goods from
other countries or, indeed, elsewhere in the U.S., but it created an annual schedule for doing so.
The 1799 statute introduced graduated geographic quarantine with seasonal constraints: all vessels
arriving from the East or West Indies, Africa, the Mediterranean, the Bermuda Islands, or any other
place in the south Seas or south of Georgia, between the end of May and the end of October, would
automatically be subject to quarantine and examination.247 All vessels arriving south of Sandy
Hook from any other domestic port would be subject to quarantine from the first of June until the
first of October.248
In 1800 the New York legislature passed yet another measure, which directly targeted
commercial goods.249 The statute straight out banned certain items (i.e., cotton, hides, coffee, or
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peltry) from being brought into the city of New York between June and November.250 Any goods
sent into the city in violation of the statute could be seized by the health commissioners, with the
proceeds going to the benefit of the health office.251 (Indeed, all fines paid under the legislation
would be used to offset the health office’s expenses.252 )
Finally, in 1801, the legislature passed provisions requiring that the health officer reside at
Staten Island, the resident physician in New York City, and the other commissioner at or near the
Marine Hospital or in the city.253 That act effectively completed New York’s quarantine system,
which remained in place, with minor amendments, until 1850.254
Having established broad state power, the legislature then began to push decisionmaking
authority down to a local level.255 Commercial considerations paled in the face of public health.
Section 3 of the 1850 act, for instance, gave local boards the power “To regulate and prohibit or
prevent all communication or intercourse by and with all houses, tenements and places, and the
persons occupying the same, in which there shall be any person who shall have been exposed to
any infectious or contagious disease.”256
From a constitutional perspective, the fact that state measures should so directly impact interstate commerce was of little consequence. Justice Grier explained in 1854 that internal police
powers, which included every law introduced for the preservation of public health, “are not
surrendered by the states, or restrained by the Constitution of the United States, and that
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unqualified, and
conclusive.”257 No federal regulation could “supersede or restrain their operations, on any ground
of prerogative or supremacy.”258 And quarantine, whatever its impact on commerce, lay at the core
of state police power:
[Q]uarantine laws, which protect the public health, compel mere commercial regulations to submit to their
control. They restrain the liberty of the passengers, they operate on the ship which is the instrument of
commerce, and its officers and crew, the agents of navigation. They seize the infected cargo and cast it
overboard. The soldier and the sailor, though in the service of the government, are arrested, imprisoned, and
punished for their offenses against society….All these things are done not from any power which the states
assume to regulate commerce or to interfere with the regulations of Congress, but because police laws for the
preservations of health, prevention of crime, and protection of the public welfare must of necessity have full and
free operation according to the exigency which requires their interference.”259

The exigencies of the social compact required that such state laws “be executed before and above
all others.”260 Thomas Cooley later explained, “Numerous …illustrations might be given of the
power in the States to make regulations affecting commerce, and which are sustainable as
regulations of police. Among these,” he continued, “quarantine regulations and health laws of
every description will readily suggest themselves, and these are or may be sometimes carried to the
extent of ordering the destruction of private property when infected with disease or otherwise
dangerous.”261 Such regulations, at least with regard to Commerce Clause considerations,
“generally passed unchallenged.”262
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Where limits did apply, however, was in the local execution of state provisions. For while the
state authorities were broad, they constrained the extent to which local entities—operating on the
basis of enumerated authorities—could act. One of the most important New York cases on this
point came in 1856, when Judge Birdseye entertained a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from
an individual restrained under a local health regulation.263 While the ensuing decision limited the
local exercise of public health law, it did not question the state’s authority to legislate in this realm;
nor did it entertain the possibility of federal preemption, despite open acknowledgment of the effect
of such provisions on commerce.
The facts of the case proceeded thus: the town of Castleton, having established a cordon
sanitaire, forbade all persons from passing from within the enclosure to any other part of the
town.264 One Peter Roff had apparently knowingly and willfully violated the relevant regulation.
Facing criminal charges and lacking sufficient funds to post bail, Roff was jailed and filed a writ of
habeas corpus to challenge his imprisonment. Judge Birdseye examined the relevant provisions of
the revised statutes, which provided that any two Justices of the Peace could remove individuals to
whatever place was deemed appropriate for the preservation of the public health.265 Birdseye found
that while the powers granted to the local authorities were Constitutional, the manner in which the
board had exercised its authorities brought it into conflict with the state, thus voiding the local
regulation.266 Specifically, the prohibition on passing from the quarantine enclosure into other
parts of the town proved too sweeping: north and east of Castleton lay the main channel of the bay
and harbor of New York, making it hard to ascertain what portion of the lands and waters covering
them, between the shore and the middle of the channel, fell within the enclosure. Ships thus
directed by the state officers to proceed through this channel would be acting in accordance with
state measures, but fall afoul of local regulations.267
Birdseye dwelled on the indefinite nature of “the public good” as a rationale for such severe
measures—noting that allowing the definition to rest on the shoulders of a handful of people in
every town risked bringing state public health mechanisms—and, indeed, commerce—to a
standstill.268 Those working in the hospital or reporting to the quarantine officers upon arrival
would be prevented from entering Castleton.269 Yet the state statute required their movement, in
order to fulfill their obligations under the law.270 The problem was also one of precedent: “And
where shall this state of things stop? Clearly, if it may exist in Castleton, it may in every town
between that and Canada. The result shows the entire absurdity of the attempt to assume such
powers. It shows that the decision of the proper officers in Quarantine is final and conclusive.”271
Birdseye turned then to rights considerations—not on federal commerce clause authorities—as
a limit on the exercise of quarantine itself:
[The local] regulation sentences all persons, well or sick, whether exposed to infection or not, to an unlimited
imprisonment. That imprisonment, too, it may be added, is not such a one as any quarantine law can adjudge to
be valid. For it is one where the restraining power does not take, and cannot by possibility take, any measure
whatever either to support the life or improve the health of the party confined, or to free him from infection; that
at some future period he may again enjoy the privileges of a member of society.272

The local approach stood in stark contrast to that adopted by the state, which had demonstrated a
commitment to the comfort of patients and attention “to their prompt restoration to sound health
and to their duties in society.” The local approach was “at war with the whole policy of the State
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from its foundation.” To sustain the assumptions of the local ordinances would be “to create in
every town in the commonwealth an irresponsible tribunal, whose only rule of action shall be what
in their opinion ‘the public good requires.’” Birdseye explained,
The public health is doubtless an interest of great delicacy and importance. Whatever power is in fact necessary
to preserve it, will be cheerfully conferred by the Legislature, and carried into full effect by the Courts. But it
can never be permitted that, even for the sake of the public health, any local, inferior board or tribunal shall
repeal statutes, suspend the operation of the Constitution and infringe all the natural rights of the citizen.273

Limits existed in the local exercise of quarantine law; but those very limits were established by the
states, thus underscoring the extent of state sovereignty in this public health domain.
3. Massachusetts
A decade after the Constitutional Convention, Massachusetts introduced legislation to provide
for maritime quarantine and the domestic removal and isolation of any sick persons by the
Selectmen of the town.274 Removal had to be given effect in the “best way” possible, “for the
preservation of the inhabitants, by removing such sick or infected person or persons, and placing
him or them in a separate house or houses, and by providing nurses, attendance, and other
assistance and necessaries for them.”275
Like Maryland and New York, Massachusetts drew a line between the state and the rest of the
country. Towns could require out-of-state visitors coming from infected regions to report to the
Selectmen within two hours of their arrival, under threat of a $100 fine.276 Justices of the Peace
could return visitors to the state whence they arrived, with a $400 penalty in the event that the
individual returned without permission.277 Any inhabitant who entertained a visitor for more than
two hours after the warrant to depart had been issued would be fined $200.278 Massachusetts gave
similar powers to local authorities to prevent any diseased goods from entering, or remaining
within, local bounds.279 Inter-state commerce figured not at all in the legislature’s calculus.280
Massachusetts emphasized the importance of local authorities with regard to quarantine and,
like Maryland and New York, passed special measures for its largest port city. The newly-formed
board of health in Boston was to inquire into all nuisances “and such sources of filth as may be
injurious to the health of the inhabitants of said town.”281 After obtaining a warrant, members of
the board could forcibly enter dwellings to carry out their duties.282 The manner of quarantine was
left entirely in the board’s hands.283 Criminal penalties for failing to abide by the board’s
determinations applied.284 The statute further required that keepers of lodging houses report sick
travelers to the Board of Health within twelve hours of them falling ill.285
While Boston warranted special attention, Massachusetts extended similar authorities to
Salem.286 Soon powers of both maritime and domestic quarantine extended to the selectmen of
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other seaports and towns.287
applied.288

Similar penalties for refusing to acknowledge local ordinances

4. Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania took a course similar to New York. Most of its measures contained sunset
clauses, but more often than not, the state legislature simply reintroduced—and expanded—the
relevant authorities.289 By 1799 the state had created a detailed quarantine regime and sanitary
framework, targeted at preventing smallpox and yellow fever from taking hold.290 Like
Massachusetts, the state created a robust board of health, as well as health commissioners and a
quarantine master.291 The board was to govern the marine hospital and to create a new lazaretto for
the performance of quarantine.292
Like the city of New York, Philadelphia created a temporal maritime regime, requiring every
ship arriving between April and October to submit to examination.293 All vessels carrying
contagious disease became required to obtain a certificate of health before passengers and goods
could come ashore.294 To the physician and the quarantine master were given the broad authority
to detain and purify both passengers and cargo.295 Far from avoiding any impact on inter-state
commerce, to the Board of Health was given further authority to make regulations preventing the
transport of specified commercial goods into the city of Philadelphia—regardless of their origin.296
Quite apart from the port city’s regime, the state itself maintained a geographic maritime
quarantine, requiring all vessels arriving from specified places, between mid-May and early
October, to discharge their cargoes and ballast, together with the bedding and clothing, to be
cleaned and purified.297 In parallel provisions, Pennsylvania did not distinguish between foreign
and domestic travelers and goods. Between specified dates, all persons, goods, merchandise,
bedding, and clothing entering the state was to undergo at least 30 days quarantine, under penalty
of $500 and forfeiture of goods and merchandise, with half of the resources thus obtained to be
given to the informer.298
Pennsylvania, again like New York, instituted a public health surveillance system, further
requiring the board of health to inquire into any outbreaks of contagious disease in the United
States, or on the continent of America, and to report their findings to the Mayor of Philadelphia.299
Gone was William Penn’s more measured approach. Citizens could be shut up in their own
homes, refused any visitors, and removed at the board of health’s discretion.300 Substantial criminal



287
An ACT in Addition to an Act, entitled, “An Act to prevent the spreading of contagious Sickness,” Feb. 26, 1800, reprinted in The
Perpetual Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, from the Establishment of its of its Constitution in the year 1780, to the end of
the year 100, Vol. III, containing the Laws from January 1799 to November 1800, March 1801, at 70-71.
288
Id., §2.
289
See, e.g., An act for establishing an Health-office, and for otherwise securing the city and port of Philadelphia from the introduction
of pestilential and contagious diseases, and for regulation and importation of German and other passengers, April 22, 1794; An Act to
Amend and Repeal Certain Provisions in the Health Laws of this Commonwealth, April 4, 1796; An Act to Alter and Amend the Health
Laws of this Commonwealth, and to Incorporate a Board of Managers of the Marine and City Hospitals of the Port of Philadelphia, and
for other purposes therein mentioned, April 4, 1798; An Act for Establishing an Health Office for Securing the City and Port of
Philadelphia from the Introduction of Pestilential and Contagious Diseases, Apr. 11, 1799 (to remain in force for three years).
290
An Act for Establishing an Health Office, for securing the city and port of Philadelphia, from the introduction of Pestilential See also
Resolve 51, 21 Sept. 1793.
291
Id., §1.
292
Id., §2.
293
Id., §3.
294
Id., §4.
295
Id., §4.
296
Id., §§10-11.
297
Id., §5.
298
Id., §§6-7.
299
Id., §18.
300
Id., §19. (“all communication with the infected house or family, except by means of Physicians, nurses or messengers to convey the
necessary advise [sic.], medicines and provisions to the afflicted, accordingly as the circumstances of the case shall render the one or the
other mode, in their judgment, more conducive to the public good with the least private injury.”)



27

penalties applied.301 All fines thereby obtained would be used to finance the board of health.302
The statute explicitly addressed the potential conflict of interest that might arise: no citizen would
be disqualified from sitting as judge or juror, or from giving testimony, in cases that might arise
under the act “by reason of his, her or their common interest in the appropriation of the sum or
penalties imposed for such offence.”303 Pennsylvania also established sanitary provisions, dealing
with “all nuisances which may have a tendency [in the opinion of the board of health] to endanger
the health of the citizens.”304 The statute provided for the construction of a new lazaretto, which
would be supported by a new tax.305
5. Connecticut
Some state measures went well beyond the quarantine laws introduced in Maryland, New
York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania. Connecticut provides a good example and merits brief
discussion, if for no other reason than it illustrates the seriousness with which the new states treated
the threat of disease.
In 1794, for instance, the state legislature passed An Act Providing in Case of Sickness,
empowering the Selectmen of any town, with a warrant from two justices of the peace, to remove
sick or infected persons.306 The statute applied to any person who “may justly be suspected to have
taken the Infection” of Smallpox or any other contagious sickness, where such infection “may
probably be communicated to others.”307 Where suitable “nurses or tenders” might not be present,
a warrant could issue from the infected town to other towns in Connecticut, requiring them to
provide the necessary assistance.308 Refusal to nurse individuals back to health carried a fine.309
Whenever any individual within the state became infected with smallpox, or any other
contagious disease, it became the duty of the head of the family, or master of the vessel, to mount a
white cloth signaling the presence of disease.310 Such signal could only be removed by a Justice of
the Peace or a Selectmen of the town.311 Domestic pets received their fair share of attention: the
state went so far as to require, wherever infectious disease raged, that “all owners of Dogs shall
destroy their Dogs or cause them to be killed; and in Neglect thereof, it shall be lawful for any
person to kill the said Dogs.”312 Any person bringing goods, wares, or merchandise infected with
disease into any town in Connecticut, either by land of water, would be fined.313 It fell entirely to
the Selectmen to determine the length and manner of airing all commercial items.314
The 1794 act also criminalized the direct or indirect transfer of Smallpox between individuals,
even as it shifted the burden of proof to the individual thus accused.315 The statute allowed,
however, for the accused to counter the accusation by swearing to the court that he or she did not
voluntarily, directly, or indirectly give or receive the infection.316 Smallpox inoculation required a
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certificate from the civil authority—but such programs first required a two-thirds vote of the
selectmen to begin.317
In summary, while some states, like Connecticut, took public health measures to an extreme,
the salient point is that following the Revolution, public health was firmly in the hands of state
legislatures.
Like Maryland, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut,
Delaware,318 South Carolina,319 Rhode Island, and Virginia320 introduced quarantine laws. The
state legislatures, in turn, delegated considerable authorities to the local entities, in whose hands lay
not just the decision to quarantine individuals entering their bounds (either by land or sea), but the
contours of how to give effect to quarantine. While some state provisions limited the extent of
criminal culpability for breaking quarantine, they almost universally left the prosecution and
operation of quarantine in the hands of local towns and municipalities. Local authorities were so
firmly in the lead, that many states gave cities and towns the authority to cut off all communication
and commerce with any part of the United States.321
C. Federal Forays
With the strong local character of quarantine in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that the federal
response to the yellow fever epidemic at the end of the eighteenth century (particularly when it hit
Philadelphia) was to duck. The 1794 statute authorized the President to convene Congress outside
of the capitol, in the event that “the prevalence of contagious sickness” or “other
circumstances…hazardous to the lives or health of the members” should occur.322 (This statute is
still in effect).
In other words, Congress’ first response to the devastating epidemic was not to take charge or
even to act in the realm of public health. Indeed, that same year, in accordance with Constitutional
restrictions on the states, Congress acquiesced in the appointment of a health officer in Maryland
for the Port of Baltimore and approved the levy of a tonnage tax for a limited period to allow
Maryland to offset the cost.323 But it was a state appointment, keeping public health firmly in the
state domain. Federal involvement was limited to the revenue questions thereby incurred.
It was not until twenty years after the Revolution that Congress introduced a federal statute
addressing quarantine.324 Repealed three years later, the legislation subordinated the federal
government to state authority: it merely empowered the President to offer assistance to states in
enforcing quarantine, if they requested it.325 The legislation was preceded by much hand wringing
in Congress about the extent of states’ rights and concerns about giving too much authority to the
Executive.326
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The offensive language that sparked the debate would have created a “National Executive
power to locate all quarantine stations.” Members of the House strongly objected to taking such
authority away from the states.327 The question was not the role quarantine played role in
commerce, but the impact it had on public health.328
[T]he regulation of quarantine had nothing to do with commerce. It was a regulation of internal police. It was
to preserve the health of a certain place, by preventing the introduction of pestilential diseases, by preventing
persons coming from countries where they were prevalent. Whether such persons came by land or by water,
whether for commerce or for pleasure, was of not importance. They were all matters of police. 329

And practical reasons undergirded leaving such authority in the hands of the states. Georgia, for
instance,
was one thousand miles from the seat of Government, and from their situation with respect to the West Indies,
they were very subject to the evil of vessels coming in from thence with diseases; and if they were to wait until
information could be given to the President of their wish to have quarantine performed, and an answer received,
the greatest ravages might in the mean time, take place from pestilential diseases.330

It was precisely because of such practical concerns that states had long been “in the habit of
regulating quarantine, without consulting the General Government.”331 States, on the front line of
defense, were “better calculated to regulate quarantine.”332 Such power was akin to the states’ right
to self-preservation.333 And history proved instructive: the very fact that the states had already
acted in this area demonstrated that quarantine was a state power.334 Representatives were uneasy
at the prospect of the Executive overriding state decisions as to where and when to execute
quarantine and the manner in which it would be implemented.335
The few Representatives that spoke in favor of stronger independent federal authorities located
quarantine within Congress’ commerce powers.336
Gentlemen might as well say that the individual States had the power of prohibiting commerce as of regulating
quarantine: because, if they had the power to stop a vessel for one month, they might stop it for twelve months.
This might interfere with regulations respecting our trade, and break our Treaties.337

For them, only the federal government had the coercive authority—and resources—to enforce such
measures.338 In the end, the House of Representatives decided 46-23 to strike the “National
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Executive power” language, requiring instead that the federal government act in aid of the States in
their performance of quarantine.339
The federal government’s subservient approach continued. Two years after the national
executive power controversy, President John Adams signed a law creating the first hospital as part
of the U.S. Marine Hospital Services.340 The legislation placed the hospitals under local control.341
In 1799 Congress repealed the Act and gave the Secretary of the Treasury the power to direct that
officers of the United States abide by rules and assist in executing quarantine laws consistent with
State health laws.342 Subsequent orders issued by the Secretary of the Treasury reiterated that
Marine Hospital Service Officers, customs officials, and revenue officers were to cooperate in
enforcing local quarantine law and regulations.343
With the federal government clearly in a support role, debates in Congress did not revolve
around states’ rights.344 Instead, new measures focused on areas where the federal government
exercised plenary power. The 1799 statute specifically noted, for instance, that any changes with
regard to duties of tonnage would require Congressional approval.345 It also created a federal
inspection system for maritime quarantine.346 This system allowed the federal government to begin
gathering information about illness. Treasury provided financial assistance and direction. The
statute empowered the federal government to purchase and erect warehouses to examine goods and
merchandise entering any port.347 Five years after granting the same powers to the legislature and
Congress, the legislature ensured that the federal government could remove federal officers,
prisoners, and executive and judicial officers, and re-locate them, in the event of epidemic.348
1. Foreign Affairs, Commerce, and Efficacy Concerns
However much quarantine powers might be central to the state’s ability to protect the health
and welfare of its citizens, the economic impact of quarantine—as a domestic matter and as a dent
in U.S. foreign trade (particularly when other countries imposed quarantine on U.S. vessels)—
could hardly be ignored. Faced by foreign retribution, Federal interest in expanding its role in the
quarantine realm grew.
The states’ failure to stem yellow fever towards the end of the 18th Century, for example,
prompted a series of orders in England targeted at U.S. vessels.349 These measures significantly
disrupted foreign trade. In 1793, for instance, the Privy Council issued an order imposing two
week quarantine on all ships arriving from Philadelphia, Delaware and New Jersey.350 Soon seen
as unnecessary, the Council subsequently revoked the order.351 In its place, England adopted
sanitary measures, requiring airing and cleansing of the vessels and the destruction of the personal
effects of any person who died during the voyage. The following year, the Privy Council again
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responded to the American yellow fever epidemic with 14 days’ quarantine for ships arriving from
Baltimore.352 As the yellow-fever scare subsided, the Council revoked the order.353 Thus began a
pattern that continued through 1799: in response to outbreaks of disease in the U.S., the Privy
Council would issue orders targeting certain ports and delaying or destroying the transport of U.S.
goods.354
New legislation specifically targeted at the United States rode the crest of these regulations and
entered into law. The problem was the nature of the disease: the application of existing English
law to yellow fever was questionable. The governing statutes authorized orders to be issued in
response to “plague”, the definition of which had to be substantially relaxed to incorporate different
diseases. The Privy Council sought to avoid a conflict by simply referring in their orders to a fever
“of the Nature of the Plague.” Initially, this sleight-of-hand did not cause much concern. As one
historian explains, “the national mood was to put the health of the public before ambiguities of
language.”355 But when the Master of an American ship, Thomas Calovert, under letter of the law,
answered in the negative as to whether plague was onboard, the Law Officers of the Crown
indicated to the Privy Council that they could not enforce penalties against him: “A paradoxical
situation had therefore been reached in which quarantine regulations were justified by virtue of the
vague meaning of ‘plague’, but that same imprecision provided a perfect defence against
allegations that the rules had been breached.”356
The Privy Council immediately wrote to George Rose, secretary to Treasury, requesting that
Parliament entertain a bill that would widen the definition of diseases against which quarantine
might be enforced.357 Accordingly, on April 5, 1798 the government introduced new quarantine
legislation specifically to meet American yellow fever concerns.358
The United States complained loudly and frequently to England about the use of quarantine
against American ships. Britain remained unmoved: the country did not trust American bills of
health. The government had received reports that people traveling from the West Indies to
Philadelphia had been allowed to land, while possibly diseased vessels were quickly turned around
and sent toward Britain.359
Congress thus confronted two problems: first, as a matter of foreign relations, friction with
European powers as to whether domestic provisions were sufficient to stem the spread of disease—
with significant economic costs to the country. Second, on the domestic front, the continuing
yellow fever epidemics demonstrated the gross inadequacy of state quarantine regulations.360
Members of the House began to lament the tendency of local entities to assume that disease was
imported, and never native in origin.361 They denounced state authorities as provincial and
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scientifically-backwards. Illness on board vessels had more to do with sanitation than with where
the ships might have visited on their travels.362
Considering the magic influence of names, it were to be wished that the term quarantine should be erased from
the statute books of the Union, and of each particular State. Regulations, precise and explicit, should, in the
opinion of your committee, be formed to prevent foul and infectious vessels, with sickly crews, from entering
our ports, or proceeding on any voyage in that situation.363

The solution was not to allow each state to respond in the manner they deemed most expedient, but
to establish uniform federal regulations which ensured that all sea vessels be subject to sanitary and
hygienic procedures, thus greatly reducing incidents of disease—and preempting foreign actions
against U.S. trade.364
Thus far, in the Constitutional realm, police powers had trumped commerce. But quarantine,
and proper sanitary provisions, cost money.365 Treasury was to prove the thin end of the wedge, as
Congress steadily allocated ever-greater resources to stop the spread of disease.366
2. The Growing Debate
Even as Treasury began to direct more resources towards stopping the spread of disease,
disagreement about whether quarantine should be in state or federal hands grew.367 Consistent with
the earliest debates in Congress, states claimed quarantine authority under their police powers,
while federal authority derived from its authority to regulate interstate commerce.368 Federal and
state courts initially weighted the scales in favor of state power. Thus, in 1824, Chief Justice
Marshall famously enumerated quarantine as at the heart of those authorities reserved to the state:
That immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a State, not surrendered to
the general government: all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection
laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State…369

Marshall’s position in Gibbons v. Ogden came to dominate the federal interpretation of state police
powers. Indeed, five years later, when the Secretary of the Treasury asked the Attorney General,
John M. Berrien, whether Treasury could itself issue quarantine regulations, Berrien replied that,
under Gibbons, it could not.370 Until the close of the Civil War, this position remained
unchallenged. State judicial bodies shared Marshall’s view. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine,
for instance, focusing on the City of Rockland’s quarantine provisions, held that while the town
officers could not appropriate a vessel and turn it into a hospital, it was entirely within their
authority to place it in quarantine.371
As a practical matter, a number of local boards of health controlled quarantine. Philadelphia
(1794), New York (1796), and Boston (1799) provide salient examples.372 But not all localities had
boards. Between 1800 and 1830, for instance, there were only five permanent boards of health.
Nevertheless, the trend had begun. By 1873, more than 30 boards of health had formed, with the
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power to exercise quarantine, mitigate nuisances, and pursue sanitary reform.373 Sped by the
writings of prominent medical reformers such as Benjamin Rush, dirt and disease became
increasingly linked. Accordingly, states began integrating sanitary reform into law. The
Massachusetts Public Health Act of 1797 became a model for other states—almost none of whom,
at the close of the 18th Century, had public health organizations.374 For the next seventy-five years,
municipal cleanliness was seen as the key to public health.375
Miasmic theories of disease transmission paralleled the sanitary reforms.376 Nevertheless, the
use of quarantine—and the enforcement of local quarantine provisions—did not disappear. They
continued to be an automatic (and reactive) response to public health emergencies. In 1804, for
instance, New Orleans appointed a board of health.377 When the emergency ended, the state
abolished the board. In 1818 New Orleans re-constituted the board, again giving it the power to
impose quarantine.378 Abolished in 1819, the board resurrected in 1821 to counter yellow fever.
By 1825 the city’s business lobby had again succeeded in obtaining the board’s dismissal.379
The local boards of health were not above using their powers to target other cities and ports in
the United States—and, based on dubious scientific understandings, were often unsuccessful in
their efforts to stem the advance of disease. In 1821, for instance, Andrew Jackson established a
Board of Health at Pensacola “’to take active oversight of the quarantine and health
regulations.’”380 The following year, the Pensacola Board of Health announced the existence of
yellow fever, and warned “’all inhabitants to remove, to retire to the country.’” The Pensacola
Floridian cited the “[e]xposure to the sun, consumption of green fruit, and intemperance” as
“among the causes for the fever cases originating locally.” In addition, the paper indicated that
“fear itself was the most contributing cause of fever.”381 By 1825, the Pensacola Board of Heath
had imposed quarantine measures against all vessels arriving in the port from Mobile and New
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Orleans.382 By October 1825, yellow fever was rampant in the region.383 Further outbreaks in
1830, 1846, and 1847 occurred.384
The system, of questionable effectiveness and significant cost, could not be sustained. A series
of National Quarantine and Sanitary Conventions accompanied the march to Civil War.385 The
purpose of the conventions was to reform the current system of quarantine. The question was what
direction to take.
The two principal reform groups at the time, otherwise diametrically opposed, shared a strong
interest in establishing a national quarantine system. Contagionists, believing that disease spread
by contact between individuals, sought a more uniform, national system to halt public exposure.386
Anti-contagionists, believing that disease spread by other means and that sanitation was far more
important, sought an end to what were perceived as ineffective, and possibly harmful, local laws.387
Both looked to the federal government for the final word. The Commerce Clause provided a hook.
Reporting in 1860, the Committee on External Hygiene explained:
We consider that quarantine from its close connection with the U.S. Revenue Department, and the important bearing
which it has upon commerce (which Congress alone can regulate) and upon travellers soon to be disperse throughout
different and distant States of the Union, is a national, rather than a State concern, and we cannot conceive that a
uniform system of quarantine can be established throughout the Union unless it be organized…as a national
institution.388

Of particular concern was the politicization of local measures. Lamenting the state of New York,
one reformer argued
They all tend in one direction; they all look towards the increase of perquisites, and the increase of that personal and
political power which is sure to be abused. …Our Quarantine laws are inconsistent, they are more than barbarous;
they are oppressive; they are not arranged, in any respect, with reference to the exact and absolute necessities for
sanitary protection, much less for commercial and public convenience.389

Before the reformers could enter the political arena to advance their cause, however, the Civil War
broke.
The course of the war underscored the extent to which the states were dependent on other
localities to stem the tide of disease.390 Naturally-occurring disease, however, was not the only
threat. Reports suggest that Confederate forces attempted to use disease against soldiers and
civilian populations.391 In 1862-63, plans to use bodies and garments infected with Yellow Fever
to spread disease among the northerners emerged.392 Other plots involved infecting clothing with
smallpox and then selling the clothes to the Union soldiers.393 On several occasions Confederate
forces contaminated wells and ponds with poisons and dead animals.394 The northern forces
refused to follow suit: War Department General Orders No. 100, issued in 1863, stated, “The use
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of poison in any manner, be it to poison wells, or food, or arms, is wholly excluded from modern
warfare.”395
The war underscored the country’s vulnerability to disease as well as the difficulty of
amassing, at a state level, the resources necessary to combat it. When cholera hit in 1865, New
York failed in its effort to obtain assistance from the Secretary of the Navy.396 A number of states
refused to introduce quarantine. And so a wartime bill took the bull by its horns, seeking the
transfer of quarantine to federal hands.397 The bill would have empowered the Secretary of War,
with the assistance of the Secretaries of the Navy and Treasury, to enforce quarantine at all ports of
entry, as well as to establish cordon sanitaire in the interior.398
Senators balked. Henry B. Anthony (R-RI) pressed Senator Zachariah Chandler, chair of the
Commerce Committee, on the extent of the Secretaries’ authorities to enforce quarantine. “[A]ll
the powers at their command may be used if necessary,” Chandler replied.399 Shocked, Anthony
asked if they could impose martial law. Chandler answered that they could “use any power
requisite to stop the cholera.” Anthony protested, “I would rather have the cholera than such a
proposition as this.”400
Even in the wake of war, with the enemy forces employing disease as a weapon, legislators
proved reluctant to transfer state authority to the federal government. For despite calls for more
vigorous national action, as Historian Les Benedict explains, “most Americans still regarded
general police regulation—the ordinary day-to-day legislation affecting crime, health, sanitation,
personal property, etc.—to be the responsibility primarily of the states.”401 State quarantine
authority existed separate and apart from Congress’ enumerated powers.402 Lot M. Morrill (R-ME)
adopted the prevailing view, “All sanitary regulations touching the health of this country within the
jurisdictional limits of the several States are matters of police regulations.”403 The Civil War thus
may have marked an important shift in the development of American federalism, but it was not one
immediately reflected in the quarantine realm.
D. Shifting Federal Role
Immediately following the Civil War, the national government still had to walk a fine line. It
remained constrained by state police powers, but it nevertheless began to expand into the realm of
infectious disease and to begin drawing on its spending power to encourage states to turn over
quarantine facilities to federal control.
In 1878 Congress introduced a new statute, for the first time creating federal authorities with
regard to infectious disease.404 The statute gave the Marine Hospital Service the power to adopt
rules and regulations to govern vessels arriving from overseas.405 Such measures must still defer to
state law.406 The statute also created a worldwide surveillance system, requiring consular officers
to send weekly reports on the state of health in foreign ports and to inform the Supervising Surgeon
General of any infectious or contagious diseases abroad.407 The statute further reflected the
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growing emphasis on science prevalent in the reformers’ movements:
Congress made
appropriations for “investigating the origin and causes of epidemic diseases, especially yellow
fever and cholera, and the best method of preventing their introduction and spread.”408
The following year, Congress repealed the sections of the statute empowering the Marine
Hospital Service to make rules and regulations independent of state boards.409 The repeal,
however, was scheduled to sunset after four years, at the close of which the repealed provisions of
the 1878 act went back into effect.410 The 1879 statute created criteria for sanitation on board ships
and expanded the number of federal quarantine stations.411 It also created a national board of
health. Again, its powers were circumscribed: the members were to cooperate with and to help the
local and state boards of health—not supplant them. Their remit was limited to cholera, smallpox,
and yellow fever, for which they were to consider the need for a national quarantine system. A
subsequent resolution freed up resources for the federal government to take a stronger national
lead: it required that the Secretary of the Navy place vessels not required for other purposes at the
disposal of the commissioners of quarantine, when requested by the National Board of Health.412
The statute also authorized the appointment of medical officers to overseas consulates and to
supervise the enforcement of sanitary measures for ships leaving for U.S. ports.413
Perhaps most importantly, quarantine stations were expensive to operate and maintain, and
following the Civil War, few states had extra resources at their disposal. The solution was at once
elegant and powerful: the 1879 statute made it possible for local ports to relinquish their quarantine
facilities to the federal government—which would then reimburse them and take responsibility for
preventing the importation of disease. This provision proved central in paving the way for the
transfer of state power to federal hands. The statute also gave the federal government the authority
to make additional rules regulating inter-state quarantine, in the event that local regulations were
found to be inadequate. In 1882, Congress further enabled federal expansion in this area, creating a
fund for state and local entities to obtain assistance for suppressing epidemics.414 The President
could, at his discretion, respond to an actual or threatened epidemic by appropriating up to
$100,000.415
With these changes, the federal government found itself in a new role, which it appeared to
perform better than could the states acting alone. The Marine Hospital Service (MHS) proved a
rising star, with a series of highly visible successes. In 1882, for instance, Texas found itself
threatened by a yellow fever epidemic. MHS provided assistance to maintain a cordon sanitaire
around Brownsville, calming concerns in the bordering areas. Widely hailed as a success, in 1883
the service established quarantine stations for the detention and treatment of infected ships at Ship
Island (for Gulf Quarantine) and Sapelo Sound (for South Atlantic Quarantine).416 It expanded in
1887 to build a laboratory on Staten Island—an institution that gradually morphed into what is now
the National Institutes of Health.
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1. Regional Initiatives
Regional initiatives soon emerged with a goal of standardizing quarantine laws and ensuring
notification across state and international lines. These conferences played a key role in developing
a broader consensus about the form quarantine ought to take and the appropriate role for the federal
government. Their occurrence was aided by the ascendancy of the theory of contagion and
growing agitation within the medical community for better standards.
One of the earliest meetings took place in 1886, when the International Conference of the
Boards of Health met in Toronto, Canada and resolved that each state and provincial board of
health, and where no state board of health existed, the local board, would notify the other boards in
the event of cholera, yellow fever, or smallpox.417 Responding to concerns that accurate reporting
might be influenced by commercial interests, the conference resolved that, where rumors suggested
the presence of pestilential disease in any State or Province, and definite information one way or
the other could not be obtained from the proper health authorities, “the health officials of another
State are justified in entering the before-mentioned State or Province for the purpose of
investigating and establishing the truth or falsity of such reports.”418 The following year the
International Conference of State Boards of Health met in Washington.419 This meeting reaffirmed
the Toronto principles, further resolving,
That in the instance of small-pox, cholera, yellow fever and typhoid fever, reports be at once forwarded, either
by mail or telegraph, as the urgency of the case may demand; and further, that in the instance of diphtheria,
scarlatina, typhoid fever, anthrax or glanders, weekly reports, when possible, be supplied, in which shall be
indicated, as far as known, the places implicated, and the degree of prevalence.420

In 1889 Alabama similarly called for a regional conference to harmonize southern quarantine
laws.421 The meeting took place in the shadow of a recent, devastating yellow fever epidemic in
Florida.422 Alabama invited delegates from Texas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina,
North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Illinois.423 With the Civil War fresh in the
minds of participants, papers prior to conference evinced concern about preserving state rights.424
But the papers also expressed concern that the southern states were particularly vulnerable:
inconsistent laws and commercial corruption blighted the system. Variation in maritime measures
resulted from politics—not geography, climate, or science.425
Geographic quarantine and enforced isolation generated particularly heated debate. There was
little patience for giving the government the authority to take people from their own homes.
Further, efforts to depopulate entire areas might lead to panic.426 Accordingly, the conference
resolved:
In the beginning of an outbreak of yellow fever there is no need of depopulation at all, except of infected
houses, or infected districts; but if people who are able to afford the expense desire to leave they should do so
quietly and deliberately, and no obstacles should be placed in their way; and those who leave healthy districts
of the city or town should go wherever they please, without let or hindrance. 427

Those departing should only be allowed to leave “under such restrictions as will afford reasonable
guarantees of safety to the communities in which they find asylum.”428 Where depopulation may
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be necessary, detention should be limited to ten days.429 To address corruption, the conference
shifted the emphasis from local authorities to state authorities.430 And it adopted standard rules for
regulation of railroads, balancing the interests of commerce against the demands of public health.431
Finally, the conference made specific demands of the Federal government: first, that the
Federal government disinfect all mail.432 Second, that the Secretary of the Treasury increase
revenues for the patrol service on the coast of Florida to the extent necessary to prevent
smuggling.433 Third, the conference requested that the U.S. government enter into negotiations
with Spain with view towards placing U.S. sanitary inspectors at Spanish ports with such legal
jurisdiction as would be necessary for the enforcement of health regulations.434 Delegates were
particularly concerned about the threat of yellow fever from Cuba, the “fountain head” of the
disease.435
In concert with regional meetings, calls for federal regulation began echo within the fields of
medicine and industry. Discoveries by Louis Pasteur, Ferdinand Cohn, and Robert Koch gave birth
to modern microbiology, in the process verifying the germ theory of disease.436 These advances
propelled quarantine from being seen as a reactive, politically-sensitive model, to one driven by
rationality. Attention expanded to those who had come into contact with the ill. Prominent
medical personnel argued that by aligning detention to the incubation period of the disease, and by
instituting sterilization of medical tools, efforts to contain sickness would obtain more success.437
In 1888 the Philadelphia College of Physicians issued an influential report, asserting that a
national system of maritime was the only way to secure the United States against the importation of
disease.438 Resources mattered: “Such necessary uniformity can be obtained by no other
arrangement, for the reason that the National Government is alone able to defray the expense of
complete quarantine establishments at every port, according to the requirement of each and without
regard to the revenue derived from the shipping of any.”439
The College of Physicians identified a number of problems with the current system. First, as
both a substantive and a procedural matter, the rules were reactive: “They have seldom or never
been drafted with a full recognition of the need of adequate and constant protection of the health of
the general public.”440 The national government, moreover, depended upon states requesting
assistance, which meant that they did not become involved until the middle of an emergency—
rather late in the game to prevent an epidemic.441 Second, health laws were focused on local
interests and corrupted by “the commercial interests of rival ports, the partisan struggles of
opposing political factions, and the heedless parsimony with which money has been doled out for
the execution of such health laws as exist.”442 Third, the failure of ports of entry to stop disease
ended up hurting the inland areas the most—which meant that the ports did not have any direct
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incentive to observe strict measures.443 Fourth, the current federal authorities were inadequate.
While sanitation mattered, it was also insufficient. Reference to the United Kingdom would be
misplaced: Great Britain had fewer people, a smaller territory, significant resources, fewer
immigrants, and atmospheric conditions not favoring disease.444 Fifth, as for the commercial
impact, the problem in America was people, not cargo.445 Much would be gained by detaining the
“immigrant classes”, who, in light of the advantages they were about to receive—could hardly
begrudge the small sacrifice.446
It is important to note here that in the communities most affected by quarantine provisions, the
United States differed greatly from the United Kingdom. In England in particular, the primary
concern had historically been with plague—a disease carried by wool, silk, and other goods. Thus
it was the merchant class, not the immigrant class, which was most affected by restraints on travel
and trade. Resultantly, the English shipping industry took a strong interest in the question of
quarantine and, as soon as it was constitutionally viable, lobbied national quarantine authority out
of existence. In contrast, no organized lobby stood ready to defend immigrants arriving in the
United States. Indeed, the almost redemptive quality of cleansing came to justify and reinforce
quarantine at the borders.
The College of Physicians noted the advantages of a national approach. A federal system
would create uniformity and distribute the costs evenly among the states. In this manner, the
federal government could afford better training. By stopping disease at the ports, a national system
would prevent inter-state quarantines, which hurt trade in the interior. The government could shift
resources between ports when necessary, in the process freeing quarantine from local politics.447
The physicians were not unaware of state concerns about federalism, but necessity overrode the
traditional police powers reserved to the states.448 Congress must pass new legislation.449
Industry, like the medical community, came to support the shift, and gradually the states, too,
began to come around.450 Many of them had already begun transferring their quarantine stations to
federal control. A paper from New Orleans, circulated to the Southern states, explained: “[T]he
time has come when Federal Resources and Federal power should be organized and exercised to
regulate and control Inter-state as well as foreign quarantine, and to prevent the introduction and
extension of contagious and infectious diseases in the United States.”451 Congress should pass
legislation for the appointment of a Chief Commissioner of Health, charged with the collection and
distribution of infectious disease information.452 A new federal health commission would divide
into six sections, each focused on the prevention of a different disease: yellow fever, cholera,
typhoid, scarlet fever, small-pox, and diphtheria.453
The Federal Government quietly drove the discussion, encouraging regional agreement and
standardization. The Alabama conference, for instance, may have been technically organized by a
state—indeed, only state delegates had a vote. But the role of the Surgeon General could hardly be
ignored: it was he who set the agenda.454
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2. Judicial Reflection: Morgan’s Steamship
In the midst of these developments, a timely case led the courts to uphold quarantine as within
state police powers, but it also raised the possibility of federal preemption. The case stemmed from
the Louisiana legislature’s decision in 1882 to authorize the construction of a quarantine station in
New Orleans. A subsequent statute required vessels and passengers entering the Mississippi River
through the station to pay a fee and undergo examination.455 Morgan’s Steamship Company
challenged the statute, saying that it violated the Constitution by imposing tonnage duties and
interfering in the federal regulation of commerce.456
The Supreme Court disagreed. The precautions taken by Louisiana were “part of and inherent
in every system of quarantine.”457 They differed “in no essential respect from similar systems in
operation in all important seaports all over the world, where commerce and civilization prevail.”458
Justice Miller, writing for the Court, added, “If there is a city in the United States which has need
of Quarantine laws it is New Orleans.”459 Not only was the city on the front line of defense, but
New Orleans served as a funnel through which trade to the interior flowed. While quarantine laws
impacted interstate commerce, it was better to reserve such matters to the states—at least until
invalidated by Congress:
[I]t may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide for the commercial cities of the
United States a general system of quarantine, or shall confide the execution of the details of such a system to
a National Board of Health, or to local boards, as may be found expedient, all State laws on this subject will
be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent. But until this is done, the laws of the State on this
subject are valid.460

The court noted that for nearly a century, Congress had refrained from directly regulating
quarantine; nor had it passed “any other law to protect the inhabitants of the United States against
the invasion of contagious and infectious diseases from abroad.”461 Nevertheless cholera and
yellow fever raged.
During all this time the Congress of the United States never attempted to exercise this or any other power to
protect the people from the ravages of these dreadful diseases. No doubt they believed that the power to do
this belonged to the States. Or, if it ever occurred to any of its members that congress might do something in
that way, they probably believed that what ought to be done could be better and more wisely done by the
authorities of the States who were familiar with the matter.462

The Court found it unlikely that this practice, widely accepted for a century, violated the
Constitution.463 While the states might still have quarantine authority, however, the possibility of
federal preemption now presented itself.
3. Federal Legislation in the wake of Morgan’s Steamship
For the next five years, federal quarantine measures followed Morgan’s Steamship, almost on
an annual basis. The first one, in 1888, was relatively minor: it simply introduced penalties for the
violation of quarantine laws and regulations.464 In 1890, however, Congress began to flex its
muscles, passing a statute that authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to develop rules and
regulations to prevent the interstate spread of disease.465 Hitherto such authorities applied only to
the nation’s ports. The statute specified cholera, yellow-fever, small-pox, and plague, stating that
whenever the President was satisfied as to its presence, “he is hereby authorized to cause the
Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate such rules and regulations as in his judgment may be
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necessary to prevent the spread of such disease from one State or Territory into another…”466 The
concentration of these authorities in the Secretary of the Treasury underscored the nexus between
commerce and disease. The statute made it a misdemeanor for any officer or agent of the U.S. at
any quarantine station, or any other person employed to help prevent the spread of disease, to
violate quarantine laws, with a fine of up to $300 and imprisonment up to 1 year upon
conviction.467 Common carriers were treated more severely, with any violation earning a fine of up
to $500 or imprisonment for up to two years.468
In 1891 a new Immigration Act expanded border inspection and quarantine authority.469 The
following year, with the Chicago Exposition rapidly approaching, cholera arrived in American
seaports and a potential epidemic loomed. The President sent a telegram to the Department of
Justice, inquiring about the extent of federal authority to issue quarantine regulations. The
Solicitor General replied the following day, saying that under the 1878 statute, the federal
government was prohibited from interfering with State or municipal quarantine authorities. This
did not, however, mean that the national government could not introduce new regulations where
none existed; nor did it mean that Federal regulations could not be more stringent than local
regulations.470 Stricter measures would not, in the Solicitor General’s view, “conflict with or
impair” local sanitary regulations:
A State might be without the machinery to enforce a safe quarantine; its officer might through mistaken
opinions or corrupt motives fail in his duty. It is not to be tolerated that an entire people possessing a
government endowed with the powers I have enumerated should be exposed to the scourge of contagion and
pestilence through such causes.471

So, where state measures were found inadequate, the federal government could act.
Accordingly, in 1893, Congress repealed the 1879 legislation, expanded the Marine Hospital
Service responsibilities and provided for further federal authorities in support of state quarantine
efforts.472 The supervising Surgeon-General of the Marine-Hospital Service became required to
examine all state and municipal quarantine regulations and, under the direction of the Secretary of
Treasury, to cooperate with and help state and municipal boards of health in the execution and
enforcement of their rules and regulations—as well as Treasury’s rules and regulations—to prevent
introduction of contagious and infectious diseases into the United States or between U.S. states or
territories. All quarantine laws in force would be published.
The 1893 statute neither eliminated nor took over the state role, but it gave the Secretary of the
Treasury the authority to enact additional rules and regulations to prevent the introduction of
diseases, foreign and interstate, where local ordinances either did not exist or were inadequate. The
regulations must apply uniformly. State and local officers would enforce federal measures where
they were willing to act; if they refused or failed to do so, the federal government would assume
control.473 Warehouses, purchased by Treasury, would be used for merchandise subject to
quarantine “pursuant to the health-laws of any State”.474 The Secretary of Treasury could prolong
the period of retention, subject to State law.475 As in earlier legislation, where contagious disease
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raged and presented a danger to officers of the revenue, the Secretary of the Treasury had the
authority to remove them to a safer location so they could continue their duties.476
The 1893 statute was the first national legislation to require a bill of health from all vessels
arriving in the United States—centuries after the same had been required in England. Failure to
arrive with a clean bill of health carried a fine of up to $5,000 per ship. Subsequent regulations
required that bills of health be obtained for vessels arriving from European, Asiatic, African, South
American, Central American, Mexican, and West Indian ports.477 (They exempted domestic
vessels engaged in trade on the North American coast and inland waters, as long as the ports were
free from infection.478 ) The bills were somewhat detailed, although not as specific as their
corresponding British regulations.479 Inspection had to be conducted within six hours of
departure.480
The statute also strengthened the country’s international disease surveillance program,
requiring consular officers to make weekly reports to Treasury on the state of disease abroad—
instead of only reporting epidemics once they had taken hold.481 The consular reports would, in
turn, be provided to home ports.482 When infected vessels arrived in the United States, Treasury
could remand the vessel, at its own expense, to the nearest quarantine station.483 The President
obtained the further power to designate countries gripped by infectious or contagious disease, and
to prohibit the introduction of persons or property from such regions.484 Finally, the legislation
further smoothed the material transfer of quarantine structures to the federal government,
authorizing Treasury to receive buildings and disinfecting apparatus and to pay reasonable
compensation to the state.485
D. Police Powers, Preemption and the Spending Clause
By the turn of 20th century, the federal government had made some advances into the quarantine
realm, but it had yet to preempt the states. State quarantine was alive and well. In December 1899,
for instance, plague broke out in Chinatown and other parts of Honolulu. Eventually, the city of
Honolulu was placed under quarantine and, at one point, the local board of health ordered that an
entire city block, facing the trade winds, be burned. The quarantine did not end until May 1900.486
Efforts to challenge state authority on constitutional grounds fell short, with the judiciary
further underscoring its position in Morgan’s Steamship. In 1898, for instance, in the face of a
yellow fever epidemic, the Louisiana State Board of Health issued an order declaring New Orleans
and other parts of the State under geographic quarantine. The board prohibited entry of all persons,
whether “acclimated, unacclimated or said to be immune.”487 Shortly before the order was issued,
the French liner Brittania arrived in New Orleans with 408 passengers and a clean bill of health.



476
Id., at §4797. Similarly, the President, in the face of an epidemic, could order the removal of all public offices “to such other places as
he shall deem most safe and convenient for conducting public business.” Id., at §4798.
477
U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Quarantine Laws and Regulations, Feb. 24, 1893, Regulations under 1893 statute, Article 1.
478
Id.
479
U.S. bills of health required the name of the vessel, nationality, tonnage, iron or wood, the number of compartments for
cargo/passengers, crew members, the names of captain and medical officer, the number of passengers, the port of departure, any
sicknesses during law voyage, the last port of call, sanitary conditions, the source and potability of the water and food supplies, the
nature and condition of the cargo, diseases prevalent at the port of origin and the surrounding country, and the number of cases/deaths
from yellow fever, Asiatic cholera, plague, smallpox, typhus fever, over past two weeks. U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Quarantine
Laws and Regulations, Feb. 24, 1893, Article I, p. 10.
480
Id., at Article III. Quarantinable diseases at the time included cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, plague, and typhus fever. Rules for the
government of national Quarantines, Rt. XI (7), listed in full in U.S. Treasury Department, U.S. Quarantine Laws and Regulations, Feb.
24, 1893, p. 16.
481
Id., at §4.
482
Id., at §5.
483
Id., at §6.
484
Id., at §7. It is not clear how often this power was used. By 1921, however, the authority was viewed as based on unsound science.
See Cumming, supra note 343, at 122.
485
An Act Granting Additional quarantine Powers and Imposing Additional Duties upon the Marine-Hospital Service, Feb. 15, 1893, §8.
486
Wong Chow v. Transatlantic Fire Ins. Co., 13 Haw. 160, 161 (1900).
487
Louisiana Board of Health, Order of September 28, 1898,



43

Before the passengers could disembark, however, the board of health directed the ship to leave
Louisiana—threatening to extend quarantine to any place the ship landed. After days of dispute,
the liner sailed to Pensacola, Florida, and the company brought suit on the grounds that the State
Board of Louisiana had violated the Act of February 15, 1893.488
Compagnie Francaise v. Louisiana State Board of Health reiterated the key findings in
Morgan’s Steamship. Justice White, writing for the court, held that the state had the authority to
enact and enforce laws “for the purpose of preventing, eradicating, or controlling the spread of
contagious or infectious diseases.”489 The Louisiana Board of Health had, with this purpose,
passed a resolution preventing anyone from entering a place in the state where quarantine had been
declared. “[T]hat from an early day the power of the states to enact and enforce quarantine laws
for the safety and the protection of the health of their inhabitants has been recognized by Congress,
is beyond question.”490 But like Justice Miller in Morgan’s Steamship, White left open the
possibility Commerce Clause preemption:
[W]henever Congress shall undertake to provide…a general system of quarantine, or shall confide the
execution of the details of such a system to a national board of health, or to local boards, as may be found
expedient, all state laws on the subject will be abrogated, at least so far as the two are inconsistent.491

Until Congress exercised its power, however, “such state quarantine laws and state laws for the
purpose of preventing, eradicating or controlling the spread of contagious or infectious diseases,
are not repugnant to the constitution.”492
Three years later, the court again underscored state authority to legislate in the realm of public
health. Jacobson v. Massachusetts centered on compulsory vaccination. Justice Marshall Harlan
upheld state authority to enact such laws, explaining, “Upon the principle of self-defense, of
paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease
which threatens the safety of its members.”493 Like quarantine, compulsory smallpox vaccination
was legitimate exercise of state’s police power to protect public health and safety.494 Local boards
of health had been the ones to determine whether or not mandatory vaccination was required.
Their decision had therefore been neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.495
State legislatures and courts continued to regard quarantine law as firmly within the state
domain.496 By 1913, however, the shifting tide had begun to gain momentum. That year, the
Supreme Court recognized that states were free to adopt quarantine regulations that did not conflict
with Federal statutory or regulatory initiatives.497 The subtle undertones of the decision suggested
not that the states had the ultimate authority, but that it was only by leave of Congress that they
could act in this area.
During this period, the Federal government continued to assist the states, while quietly
accepting transfer of authority and equipment in what one mid-20th century scholar referred to as “a
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process of accretion and erosion.”498 In 1921, the last state transferred its holdings and the
authority to regulate them, to the federal government, bringing the total to approximately 100
quarantine stations.499 The Surgeon General reflected:
The transition of a quarantine system, composed of units operated by the municipal or state authorities, to a
compact federal organization has been gradual, but persistent. One after another cities and states have
transferred their quarantine stations to the national Government, so that, with the passing of the New York
Quarantine Station from state to national control on March 1, 1921, the Public Health Service now
administers every station in the United States and in the Hawaiian Islands, the Philippines, Porto Rico, and
the Virgin Islands.500

At that point, the federal government was inspecting some 2 million passengers and crew, and
20,000 vessels each year.501
Centralized control brought with it a number of advantages. As reformers anticipated, it
allowed maritime quarantine to be uniformly administered, so as not to favor one port over another.
It generated a higher quality of quarantine officers, as the United States could now create a trained
corps which could be moved between stations. It also allowed for greater cooperation between
medical authorities, customs, and immigration services. It placed the country in a stronger position
to comply with its international treaties (and to demand that foreign countries reciprocate). It
ensured that the costs would be distributed among the states, all of whom benefitted from
preventing the introduction of disease at the ports of entry. Perhaps most importantly, it pulled
quarantine from the grasp of local politics, and placed it in the hands of qualified medical
personnel.502 Surgeon General Hugh Cumming proclaimed it as the triumph of science over
politics.503
E. Contemporary Quarantine Authorities
In 1939 the U.S. Public Health Service moved from Treasury to the Federal Security Agency.504
Five years later, Congress introduced the Public Health Service Act, which became the first of two
pillars on which current federal quarantine authority rests.505 The other is the 1988 Robert T.
Following Hurricane Katrina,
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.506
Congress passed new authorities, but in the face of strong state opposition, the legislature
subsequently withdrew the new powers.
1. Public Health Service Act of 1944
Consistent with Commerce Clause considerations, the 1944 Public Health Service Act limits
federal quarantine authority to disease introduced at ports of entry or inter-state movement of
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goods or services. The statute gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) the
authority to make and enforce any regulations as in her judgment may be necessary “to prevent the
introduction, transmission, spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the states
or possessions, or from one State or possession into any other State or possession.”507 Quarantine
is limited to the communicable diseases in Executive Order 13295. Since 1983, this list has
included cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox, yellow fever, and viral
hemorrhagic fevers. In April 2003 the Bush Administration added SARS and the following year
influenza causing, or having potential to cause, a pandemic.508 The HHS Secretary has the
authority to apprehend and examine any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a
communicable disease in a qualifying stage and (1) moving or being about to move between states,
or (2) a probable source of infection to individuals who may be moving between states.509 If, after
inspection, an individual is found to be infected, the Secretary of HHS can detain the individual for
such a time, and in such as manner as may be reasonably necessary. 510
In 2000, authority transferred from the Secretary of HHS to the Director of the CDC,
authorizing her to take whatever measures may be necessary to prevent the spread of
communicable disease from one state to any other state where local health authorities have not
taken adequate steps to prevent the spread of the disease.511 (As an institutional matter, foreign and
inter-state quarantine is now generally overseen by the CDC’s Division of Global Migration and
Quarantine). Regulations prohibit infected people from traveling across state lines without explicit
approval or a permit from health officer of the state, if applicable under their law.512 Further
restrictions can be placed on individuals who are in the “communicable period of cholera, plague,
smallpox, typhus or yellow fever, or who having been exposed to any such disease, is in the
incubation period thereof.”513 Regulations also establish CDC control over foreign arrivals.514
The authority claimed in 1921 to be obsolete—i.e., executive power to prohibit persons or
goods from designated areas from entering the United States—continues to be in effect (the
authority has not been delegated to the Surgeon General).515 And special quarantine powers apply
in times of war, whereupon the HHS Secretary, in consultation with the Surgeon General, may
indefinitely detain individuals reasonably believed to be infected or a probable source of
infection.516 Unlike peacetime authorities, it is not necessary for an individual to be in a qualifying
stage of infection.
The Surgeon General exercises control over all U.S. quarantine stations and can establish
additional stations as necessary.517 The consular reporting requirements have been retained under
such rules as established by the Surgeon General.518 U.S. Customs and the Coast Guard must assist
in executing federal quarantine law.519 Bills of health continue to be required for all vessels
entering or leaving U.S. water and air space.520 Violation of general federal quarantine provisions
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is punishable by a fine of up to $1,000, or by imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.521
Violations of specific federal quarantine or isolation orders is a criminal misdemeanor, punishable
by a fine of up to $250,000, or one year in jail, or both. Organizations violating such orders are
subject to a fine of up to $500,000 per incident.522 Federal District Courts may enjoin individuals
and orgs from violation of CDC quarantine regulations.523
Most recently, the Centers for Disease Control have proposed the adoption of new regulations
that would, inter alia, impose stronger reporting requirements on airlines and ships regarding their
passengers. Figure 1, below, outlines the proposed information to be collected from all travelers
prior to embarkation. The proposed regulations also require travel permits for qualifying diseases.
The detention of carriers and the screening of any passengers considered ill are also included, as
are measures for imposing “provisional quarantine”. This last measure targets individuals who
refuse to be quarantined, and would be authorized by the CDC Director of Global Quarantine for a
period of three business days.

Figure 1
The proposed regulations demonstrate the key role science has come to play: the length of
detention is determined by the incubation period of each disease. An opportunity to contest
quarantine would be provided by administrative hearings. These proposed regulations have yet to
be passed; they remain in the consultative phase.
In 1963 challenge to the federal authority to quarantine was brought.524 At that time, the World
Health Organization had declared Stockholm to be a smallpox-infected area. When a passenger
from Stockholm arrived in the United States and was not able to produce documentation proving
prior vaccination, the Public Health Service quarantined the passenger for fourteen days. The
District Court, upholding the detention, noted that the federal government had acted in good faith,
that the individual had had a history of unsuccessful vaccinations, and that detention during the
incubation period was required to determine whether the individual had been infected.
Other judicial challenges to the current federal quarantine provisions have not arisen; however,
there are a number of issues ripe for consideration. The courts, for instance, have yet to rule on
whether federal cordon sanitaire would withstand constitutional challenge. Following United
States v. Lopez, it appears that the courts are willing to recognize some limits on the Commerce
Clause authorities.525 And, as discussed throughout this article, quarantine law has historically
been regarded as at the core of state police powers, reserved through the 10th Amendment. On the
other hand, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Comstock raises question about
whether a necessary and proper claim could equally well uphold federal action in this realm.526
Justice Breyer, writing for himself and four other justices, compared the civil commitment statute
upheld in Comstock to medical quarantine. At least two justices, however, Justice Alito and Justice
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Kennedy, who voted to uphold the law, did not adopt the breadth of Breyer’s decision. Kennedy,
in particular, stated that the majority did not give the Tenth Amendment due weight.
Due process challenges might also surface, particularly in regard to whether the procedures and
the grounds for quarantine are sufficient; for while due process standards have evolved over the
20th and into the 21st century, the legislative framing for quarantine has remained relatively
constant. The proposed regulations would tailor the period of quarantine more carefully to each
disease, as well as provide for an administrative hearing to contest quarantine. Whether these are
sufficient is merely speculative, as they have yet to be adopted. They do improve, however, upon
the system in place since 1944.
2. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relieve and Emergency Assistance Act
The second pillar of federal quarantine authorities is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act.527 This legislation provides federal assistance to state and local
governments in the event of an emergency. The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 amended the
Stafford Act to include to further encourage state, local, and tribal areas to coordinate disaster
management planning and implementation.528 Like the early Congressional initiatives in the
quarantine realm, the legislation places the federal government solely in a supportive capacity.529
There are two main types of Stafford Act declarations: (1) a major disaster declaration under
Title IV, and (2) an emergency declaration under Title V. A major disaster declaration is
predicated upon a formal request by the Governor for federal assistance.530 The type of incident
that qualifies is limited: it may only be used in response to “any natural catastrophe…or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion.”531 In other words, it does not apply to nonnatural incidents (e.g., criminal activity, terrorist attacks, or acts of war). It would, however, cover
any fire, flood, or explosion arising from such incidents. To obtain federal assistance, the state
must have a mitigation plan in place, creating an incentive for increased coordination and
integration of mitigation activities. The President is not required to grant the state’s request, but,
instead, is given the option of responding. Although the statute does not directly mention
quarantine, it authorizes the President to provide health and safety measures (which would,
presumably, include medical detention).532 The statute does not provide a cap for the amount of
monetary assistance available to an affected area under a major disaster declaration.
In contrast to the major disaster declaration, an emergency declaration, which falls under Title
V, may be made either pursuant to the request of a State Governor, or the President may
unilaterally declare an emergency for an incident involving a primary Federal responsibility.533 As
with the major disaster declaration, the President retains the discretionary authority of deciding
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when to act. For an emergency declaration pursuant to a state governor request, “any occasion or
instance” may suffice. The process for making the request is substantively similar to the request
for a major disaster declaration.534 But unlike major disaster assistance, emergency declaration
response is capped at $5 million, unless the President explicitly determines a continuing need. The
emergency declaration is thus both broader (covering a wider range of incidents) and narrower
(owing to financial limits) than a major disaster declaration.535
Where an emergency involves matters of federal primary responsibility, the President is free to
act absent a governor’s request. The statute, though, does not define “primary responsibility”;
instead, it provides a broad category: “subject area[s] for which, under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority.”536 Typically, emergencies declared pursuant to the primary responsibility clause
involve incidents on federal property, such as the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing or the 2001 attack
on the Pentagon (although in both of these cases, later requests from state governors commuted
them to major disaster declarations). Financial and physical assistance is then provided directly
through FEMA, arguably sidelining the DHS Secretary to no role whatsoever in the response.
C. Continued Expansion in the Federal and Military Realm
While the Public Health Services Act and the Stafford Act provide the pillars for the current federal
quarantine structure, the areas continues to be in flux. To a significant extent, these changes have
been influenced by the bundling of pandemic disease and biological weapons—highlighted at the
start of this article. Along with this shift has come growing attention to the role of the military in
enforcing such provisions.
HSPD 10, for instance, considers the military to be central to U.S. strategy.537 In large measure
this stems from the biological weapons component of the threat. In enacting the 2002 Homeland
Security Act, Congress explained,
[B]y its express terms, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a complete barrier to the use of the Armed Forces for a range
of domestic purposes, including law enforcement functions, when the use of the Armed Forces is authorized by Act
of Congress or the President determines that the use of the Armed Forces is required to fulfill the President’s
obligations under the constitution to respond promptly in time of war, insurrection, or other serious emergency.
[…] Existing laws, including [the Insurrection Act and the Stafford Act] grant the President broad powers that may
be invoked in the event of domestic emergencies, including an attack against the Nation using weapons of mass
destructions, and these laws specifically authorize the President to use the Armed Forces to help restore public
order.

Such broad language suggests that the federal government could use the military in response to any
national emergency, including natural disasters.
Congress contemplated a similar role for the federal government—and the military—following
Hurricane Katrina. The storm hit the U.S. Gulf Coast in August 2005 and precipitated the
destruction of the levees surrounding New Orleans. The 2007 Defense Authorization Act
subsequently addressed the role of the military in the event of natural disaster, pandemic, or
biological weapons attack (again, coupling pandemic disease and the biological weapons threat).538
One of the chief criticisms levied against the federal government was that they had dragged their
feet in mounting an appropriate response: thirty-six hours after the hurricane hit, Michael Chertoff,
Homeland Security Director, finally issued a memo declaring it an “incident of national
significance”, shifting the responsibility to FEMA.539 President Bush wanted to federalize the
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Louisiana National Guard, but Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco refused. The President
considered and rejected a proposal to federalize the Guard over her objection.540
To clarify federal authority in the future, in 2006 the Administration convinced Congress to
amend the Insurrection Act for the first time in more than 200 years, re-naming it “Enforcement of
the Laws to Restore Public Order.”541 The new language expanded the statute, almost exclusively
used in the past to restore civil order, to cover instances of “domestic violence” where public order
was disrupted due to a “natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency,
terrorist attack or incident, or other condition.”542 The statute authorized the President to use
federal troops to “restore public order and enforce the laws of the United State” without a request
from the governor or legislature of the state involved, in the event s/he determines that local
authorities are unable to maintain public order where either equal protection of the laws is impeded
or the execution of federal law and related judicial process is obstructed. The legislation required
that the President notify Congress as soon as practicable, and every fourteen days thereafter, until
ordinary law enforcement was restored. Congress passed the bill over the strong objection of all
fifty-one governors.543
The governors objected to giving the President the authority to impose martial law in the event
of a public health crisis or biological weapons attack, without any contact or collaboration with the
states.544 In one fell swoop, the legislation overturned more than two centuries of practice. The
locus of the new powers were both legislative and executive war powers—not commerce clause
considerations. The way in which the provisions had been introduced proved particularly
concerning. The New York Times pointed out that the new powers had been “quietly tucked into
the enormous defense budget bill without hearings or public debate. The president,” moreover,
“made no mention of the changes when he signed the measure, and neither the White House nor
Congress consulted in advance with the nation’s governors.”545
The following year Senators Patrick Leahy (D-VT), Christopher Bond (R-MO) introduced a
bill to repeal the changes to the Insurrection Act, returning it to its original form.546 An impressive
list of state interests lined up in support: the National Governors Association, National Sheriffs’
Association, Enlisted Association of the National Guard, Adjutants General of the United States,
National Guard Association, national Lieutenant Governors Association, National Conference of
State Legislatures, and Fraternal Order of Police all sought a return to the Insurrection Act.547
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Leahy and Bond attached their rider to the National Guard Empowerment Reform Bill, passed by
Congress Dec. 14, 2007 and signed into law by President Bush Jan. 30, 2008.548
Despite the restoration of the Insurrection Act language, use of the military—Title 32 troops
and Title 10 forces—to respond to public health crises has Congressional and academic support.549
Even without the statute, the deployment of military in Katrina was largest military deployment in
domestic bounds since Civil War.550 And the policy documents currently in place support the use
of the military to enforce quarantine.551 Such use of the military feeds into the broader issue of the
role of the military on domestic soil—an area that has attracted increasing attention post-9/11.552
There are practical reasons for the current state of play. At the most basic level, the link
between biological weapons and pandemic disease makes sense: it may be very difficult to
determine, at the outset, whether emerging disease is natural, biologically engineered, or the result
of deliberate attack. Regardless of origin, natural or engineered diseases may have equally
devastating consequences and require similar response mechanisms to limit their spread.
Mitigation measures may equally be required – and effective. Isolation and quarantine, in turn, may
be the only defense the government has against either emerging disease or engineered weapons.
As for the use of the military, biological weapons research has historically been in the purview of
the armed forces, making it perhaps the most prepared and effective entity in responding to such
attacks. It may also be the only agency with the necessary technologies, resources and manpower
to be able to respond in the event of an emergency, regardless of whether it results from an attack
or from natural causes.
But practical explanations aside, these provisions raise troubling questions relating to state
police powers, federalism, individual rights, and the use of the military on domestic soil.553 They
also run directly counter to the experiences of the United Kingdom where quarantine authorities
initially were exercised by the king, using the military. As the Constitutional structure changed,
however, first the Privy Council and then Parliament gained control, at which point commercial
interests lobbied national quarantine law out of existence, pushing it down to a state and local level.
III. THE DEVOLUTION OF QUARANTINE LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
British history is punctuated by devastating bouts with disease, the most feared of which were
referred to as the “three exotics”: plague, yellow fever, and cholera. Of these, plague, caused by
bacillus Pasteurella pestis or Yersinia pestis, is the oldest.554 It also was the most influential in
shaping Britain’s approach to disease. Records show that as early as 1349 plague hit England,
killing approximately one-third of the country’s population.555 Over the next 400 years epidemics
swept through Europe, with profound political, social, and economic effects.556
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The nature of this threat shaped English quarantine law in three important ways. First, plague
was seen as an import, not bred in Britain or, for that matter, on the Continent.557 Resultantly,
maritime provisions, and authorities focused on the ports and borders, provided the country’s
primary defense.558 England placed considerably less emphasis on domestic measures until yellow
fever and cholera appeared. Second, concern about outbreaks abroad encouraged the government
to make extensive use of its international network to obtain advance notice of inbound disease.
The empire thus established global disease monitoring significantly prior to the United States.
Third, and most importantly, although it was not known at time that fleas carried plague, observers
noted that the disease tended to be transferred via porous goods. Orders thus tended to target wool,
silk, cotton, and animal hides, subjecting them to weeks of repeated submersion in ocean water
followed by airing. The shipping industry bore the expense. Individuals, moreover, could come
into contact with others suffering from plague and not contract the disease. The contagion theory of
transfer thus stood in great doubt—creating an opportunity for reformers to replace quarantine with
an improved sanitation regime. A very different situation thus confronted England than that faced
on the American side of the Atlantic.
A. Early English Provisions
English trade with the Mediterranean ports heralded an increased risk for disease. In 1511 England
began trading in the Levant seas.559 Within seven years, the first recorded quarantine orders issued
under Henry VIII—or, more accurately, Thomas Wolsey, the Lord Chancellor of England, in
whose hands the king, at least initially, left matters of state.560
In keeping with the order, local authorities toed the line. Sir Thomas More, for instance,
instituted the king’s orders in Oxford, insisting on street cleaning and forbidding others from using
the clothes and bedding from infected houses. More tried to prevent the transfer of disease by
isolating the sick and marking those who were infected. Other towns followed suit. In provincial
districts, plague houses were established outside town walls or victims were segregated in pesthouses. By 1550, such practices had become widespread.561
In 1576, another plague outbreak took place. Eighteenth century historian George Hadley
attributed the spread of the disease to the authorities’ failure to enforce quarantine laws, suggesting
that such laws, at least, were in place.562 Much attention was drawn to the ports. In 1580 the Lord
Treasurer ordered the Port of London to prevent Portuguese ships from Lisbon, where there was a
plague outbreak, from coming up river until they had been properly aired.563 The Privy Council
requested that the Lord Mayor of London help the port authority to prevent similarly diseased ships
from proceeding into the country.564 More orders almost immediately followed.565
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Such orders must be assessed within their political and constitutional framework. The Privy
Council played a central role in governing the Tudor state. Henry VII, who came to the throne
when Richard III was slain during the Battle of Bosworth, established the Committee of the Privy
Council as an executive advisory board, and the Star Chamber as a means to involve the Crown
more deeply in judicial affairs.566 Parliament may have been the supreme authority, “[b]ut
Parliaments came and went.”567 The Privy Council managed the legislature by influencing
elections and directing parliamentary business.
The Privy Council had direct control over areas central to quarantine. Matters related to
foreign relations, defense, and public safety, were reserved to the Council—as were concerns that
impacted the state’s coffers.568 For “[t]he essential prerequisite for the effective exercise of royal
authority was the improvement of the Crown’s position.”569 The crown’s financial strength was
determined by land, feudal dues, and, most importantly, customs, making the Council’s control
over external trade unquestioned. Monopolies and charters thus came within the Privy Council’s
control. It gradually annexed even internal trade from local merchant courts—leading to friction
with Parliament and common law.570 Added to this, were the Tudors’ interest in maritime affairs
and the declining importance in the 15th century of the Court of Admiralty, which led to the transfer
of maritime matters to the Council.
It was unquestioned that the Privy Council would issue quarantine regulations. Henry VIII,
and later, Elizabeth I, were particularly sensitive to England’s position vis-à-vis Europe, where
quarantine was linked to social and political sophistication.571 To take their place among civilized
nations meant, in part, to have quarantine laws. Elizabeth I thus ordered her chief minister,
William Cecil, to adopt European plague controls and, via the Privy Council, to issue a new set of
orders.572 She similarly directed that the Privy Council issue the first order to compel sick persons
to be confined.573
Proclamations, designed to communicate the monarch’s commands, provided the main device
via which the Privy Council exercised their authority. Issued under the Great Seal, such
proclamations could be used to address deficiencies in common law and statutory law, which were
neither sufficiently strong nor swift enough to address emerging issues faced by the state. The
Privy Council thus supplemented the existing statutory and common law, “using for the purpose a
prerogative which none denied or was concerned to seek limits for.”574 Such proclamations had the
full force of law, and, while they could not contradict an Act of Parliament, the lex regia of
England rapidly expanded and had to be obeyed.575 To the Council thus fell the responsibility of
acting swiftly and directly in the public interest.
During the Tudor reign, only the Privy Council issued quarantine provisions. The
proclamations tended to be inconsistent, in no small measures due to the competing interests
pulling the council in different directions. Such orders reflected the tension between maritime law,
war powers/national security, domestic police powers, and commercial/economic matters. And
these orders had profound implications for distribution of power within the state, as the Privy
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Council’s jurisdiction gradually expanded to include maritime matters, as well as all internal and
external trade.576
The evolution of quarantine measures marks the shift from medieval to modern England. The
use of Royal Prerogative generally—and quarantine in particular—did not just reflect England’s
constitutional structure. It shaped the constitutional conventions. The proclamations undermined
the role of Parliament. They undermined the role of the courts. And they undermined local
administration—which, during the time of Tudor England, was really a function of its judicial
organization. The Privy Council relegated many local bodies “almost entirely to the conduct of
administrative business.” 577 Simultaneously, the Privy Council helped to centralize power. While
the monarch’s authority was at its height when measures proceeded through Parliament, frequently,
in case of quarantine, the Council did not deem it necessary. As the Council persisted in exercising
its authority outside of Parliament, it became stronger, and Parliament was gradually, sidelined.578
In this manner, liberty of action for the public good became preserved outside of common law or
the Parliament via Royal Prerogative—implemented through the Privy Council.579
Under the Stuarts, the conventions changed. During the final years of Queen Elizabeth’s reign,
her Royal Prerogatives regarding monopolies were increasingly called into question.580 James I,
having ruled the northern kingdom almost since birth, came to the Crown with a fully-developed
theory of kingship—a form of enlightened absolutism.581 Under his control, quarantine provisions
became more coercive, codified in statute.
In 1603 a major plague outbreak occurred in England.582 Seen as a threat to social stability, the
disease caused panic and hunger and mass disruption of local communities.583 James I immediately
issued a detailed Order in Council to combat the spread of infection.584 It was clear that, even then,
the contagion theory of disease with respect to plague was being questioned: Article 16 strictly
prohibited “all ecclesiastics, and others, from publishing an opinion that the plague was not
infectious, or that it was a vain thing not to resort to the infected.”585 In concert with the order, the
Privy Council directed that quarantine provisions established by London’s Lord Mayor be
published.586
James I did not stop with the Order in Council. In 1604 he followed it with a new statute,
which marked the first time that royal regulations on quarantine had been supported by an express
legislative instrument.587 The bill passed, following opposition and amendments in the House of
Lords to exempt Universities from being subject to its provisions. The legislation empowered the
head officer of every town within England to confine individuals with plague to their homes and to
set a watchman to guard the ill.588 It indemnified the watchmen should any harm come to the
plague victim if he or she tried to escape.589 And it made it a felony to be found overseas with an
infectious (meaning contagious) sore—although it was not clear what proof was required or who
would judge it to be so.590 The Act required the Justices of the Peace to meet every three weeks
during an epidemic to report on the progress of the disease, and it allowed local authorities to raise
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taxes to take care of the sick.591 All clothes and bedding of the plague victims was to be burned,
and funerals were to take place at dusk (to reduce the number in attendance).592 Any criticism of
orders issued, isolating individuals, was to be punished.593
The Act was initially limited to the first session of the following Parliament; however, it was
subsequently continued and, during Charles I’s reign made permanent “from thenceforth until some
other act of parliament be made touching its continuance or discontinuance.”594 Far from stemming
the advance of disease or quieting the unrest that had swept the country, these provisions
stimulated violent opposition and contributed to increasing disorder.595
B. The Politicization of Quarantine
When James I’s son, Henry, died, Charles I became successor to the throne. He was an ardent
believer in the divine right of kingship.596 Charles responded to mounting opposition by acting
outside the common law and Parliament, and by making more extensive use of Royal Prerogative.
Opponents emphasized that the crown’s authority derived from Parliamentary sanction. The
subtleties of the Tudor era lost, and “[u]nable to agree amicably as to the working of their
government, men began to debate its very foundations.”597
Quarantine provisions during this time became less formalized. At times the Privy Council did
not even issue an order or proclamation; instead, it would simply write a letter directly to the
farmers of the customs, directing them not to land goods, allow people to come ashore, or permit
vessels to land.598 At other times, formal orders in accordance with the Royal Prerogative issued.
It was through such a device that in 1635 the Crown established the first stated period of
quarantine.599 Plague had broken out at The Hague, Amsterdam, and Leyden, prompting the
Council to issue a proclamation regarding vessels from France and Holland, arriving from infected
ports.600 For twenty days, they were to remain isolated.601
At the time, eighty percent of all of England’s foreign trade traveled through London.602
England, moreover, was a key economic player worldwide. This meant that what England did with
its trade restrictions mattered. Equally important was what other ports did to England.
Accordingly, Charles II quickly realized that quarantine could undermine free trade—and be used
as a devastating political weapon. The Spanish, for instance, 1662-63, claimed that plague had
emerged at Tangier, where English ships were trading. Spain subsequently refused to allow
English ships to land in Spain. Afraid that similar steps would be taken in other, more important
ports—like Leghorn and Genoa, England had to work vigorously through its Venetian ambassador
to counter the rumors. 603 Money exchanged hands.604
The Dutch, in turn, considered English quarantine provisions to be an over-reaction—just
another English ploy against the Dutch, with whom England did not have great relations. It is hard
to deny their allegations. On March 30, 1664, for instance, the States General sent a resolution to
Charles asking for repeal of quarantine. The English ended up increasing length of detention from
30 to 40 days.605 The Dutch ambassador protested that the ships were being stopped “under
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pretence” of infection, but actually to obstruct trade: “He insisted that the strictness be relaxed.
Charles replied expressing sorrow for the affliction, but pointed out that England had been the last
neighbor of the United Provinces to make restrictions, and commerce would now have to be
suspended altogether.”606 Diplomatic tension, not medical necessity, drove the decision.
In 1665 another devastating plague epidemic, famously described in the Diary of Samuel
Pepys, again hit England.607 In London alone, more than 70,000 people died—while all other
diseases combined claimed fewer than 40,000 lives.608 The toll eclipsed earlier outbreaks of
plague, with more than twice the number succumbing than died during the 1625 epidemic.609 The
House of Commons appointed a committee to prepare new legislation to close gaps left by the Act
of 1604. The effort failed: although the bill passed the House of Commons, the House of Lords
inserted amendments to protect their special interests. (The Lords wanted to prevent pest houses
and burying grounds from being stationed near their homes, and they sought a special exemption to
prevent peers’ homes from being shut up at the discretion of constables.) The Commons refused to
agree to the changes and, following several conferences between the two houses, the end of the
session terminated further consideration of the bill. In its place, the internal regulations from the
1604 statute remained in force. It was later proposed that the wealthy who took ill should simply
retreat to their country homes.610
Playing on the political power of quarantine, a proposal to create a permanent quarantine
office, from March 1665, began circulating. Arguments supporting it echoed one of the chief
concerns of the Tudors: to adopt procedures that existed in “most other well governed Kingdomes
and Republicks professing Christianity.”611 But the proposal was ultimately about power and
control. Of chief concern was not the medical benefit of such provisions, but the contingent (read:
political and economic) advantages. Good relations between a quarantine office and the farmers of
Customs would help to ensure that duties were paid. Importers would no longer win simply by
being first to arrive; instead, by making it known which ships and cargoes were in detention, the
Crown could control both importers and prices. The measures also would allow the Crown to more
closely monitor individuals arriving in England, giving the state the ability to distinguish more
readily between spies and regular travelers.612
Continental Europe, too, began wielding quarantine as a weapon. The Spanish stopped all
trade with England, Scotland, and Ireland.613 France prohibited all commerce with England.
Britain retaliated in 1668, quarantining ships from parts of France with Plague. As historian John
Booker observes, “the hard lesson was being taught, if not learnt, that in a state of war disease
found various ways to side with the enemy.”614
The manner in which the Crown exercised quarantine reflected and contributed to serious
constitutional questions: Did the law limit the monarch’s discretionary power? Could the Crown’s
authority be abridged by statute? Could the King sidestep the Common Law courts on matters
relating to Royal Prerogative? What were the limits of the crown’s prerogative in regard to foreign
policy, maritime law, and both internal and external trade?615 Sir Edward Coke came to see some
of the most prominent cases of the time as seeking an answer to these crucial questions.616 The
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English Restoration, starting in 1660, fell back upon the compromise that marked the Tudor
regime: “A Crown reinvested at least in its essential prerogatives, a Parliament confirmed in its
sovereignty and its privileges, once more appeared as the indelible marks of the English
governmental system. But the conciliar authority which had so long held the central position in the
State had been irreparably destroyed.”617 English Constitutional historians generally describe this
period a battle between Parliament and the courts of Common Law. But equally repugnant to both
was the discretionary authority of the Crown—perhaps nowhere more apparent than in quarantine.
C. Constitutional Limits
The abolition of the conciliar courts confined the power of legislating by Proclamation within the
limits imposed by the Case of Proclamations: “[T]he King cannot change any part of the common
law, nor create any offence, by his proclamation, which was not an offence before, without
parliament.”618 Sir Edward Coke, then Chief Justice of the Common Pleas explained, “the King
hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him.”619 Constitutional scholars
reflecting on this period conclude that “English constitutional law was therefore bound, sooner or
later, to assume a bias, appropriate to the Common Law tradition, in favour of individual rights and
property, and on the whole adverse to the claims of the State to a freedom of action determined by
considerations of public policy.”620 Indeed, the Bill of Rights of 1689 required that in certain
matters the Crown obtain the consent of the governed through Parliament.621 The Triennial Act of
1694 secured a more active role for the legislature, requiring it to meet annually and hold elections
once every three years.622 And the Act of Settlement of 1701 established Parliamentary authority
over succession to the throne itself.623
Quarantine authorities sat uneasily in this context, and from 1642 forward, the Privy Council’s
unfettered discretion in this realm became more limited. The Privy Council continued to be
involved in the intimate details of quarantine, but it turned to statutory validation.
In 1709, for example, plague erupted in the Baltic region. The disease quickly reached Danzig
(East Prussia), a town with which England had frequent commercial exchange. By the end of 1710
the epidemic extended to Stralsund, with reports that it had broken out on the German North Sea
cost, near Hamburg.624 The Privy Council responded with a series of orders. In August 1709, the
council an order preventing any goods, seamen or passengers from Danzig being landed in London
or in English outports “until they be under the Care of the Officers of the customs who are to take
Care…according to the Intention of this Order.”625 The following month, the Privy Council issued
a second order saying that landing could only occur at places “provided for airing the…Persons and
goods for 40 Days appointed for performing their Quarantain”.626 Nine days later, the council
issued a third order—designating infected area as the “Baltick Seas”.627 A fourth order followed on
September 16, 1709, specifying where ships were to be held, stating that after 40 days, if no disease
had presented itself, passengers could alight at the Customs officers’ discretion, and, after a week,
the goods could be released.628 Suspicious articles had to be reported to the Privy Council to await
further instruction.629 The same day, a fifth order issued.
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It soon became clear that quarantine was not being performed correctly: those who had been
quarantined were ignoring the orders, and local villages and authorities were refusing to allow the
establishment of quarantine stations near their homes and businesses.630 The Privy Council
responded by issuing a proclamation in November 1709, threatening that failure to conform to
orders would be treated with utmost severity of the law. It lamented that some of those detained,
“have Presumed to come on Shoar, and have Appeared in the Publick Streets, and Mingled
Themselves with Our Subjects”—others had been selling the goods that ought to have been aired.
The order threatened that those refusing to conform would do so “upon Pain of being Proceeded
against wth the utmost Severity that the Law will Allow…”
The difficulty with the Privy Council’s threat is that it had no teeth: the law did not carry
severe penalties. Indeed, there was no statute at the time that would have made it an offense to
break Privy Council orders regarding quarantine. The council was thus driven to seek
parliamentary support. The importance of Parliament as a check at the time ought not to be overemphasized: the bill’s passage took but three days, from its introduction in the House of Commons
to Royal Assent.631 In light of the Whig and Tory battles that marked political discourse, though,
and the statute’s provisions—which essentially acknowledged Royal Prerogative—the result was
remarkably swift: quarantine would be “in such…places for such time and in such manner as hath
been or as shall be from time to time be directed…by Her Majesty or her successors.”632 It speaks,
perhaps to the great fear of disease and the newness of limits on royal prerogative.633
The resulting legislation became Britain’s central quarantine statute. It did not address matters
internal to the country, instead expressly relating to cases of foreign infection.634 Writing at the end
of the 18th century, Russell suggested that statute strengthened Privy Council’s hand:
Considering the circumstances under which the bill was drawn up, it is the less to be wondered that it should
have been very defective; but by expressly empowering the Crown, in case of any foreign places being
infected, to issue such orders for quarantine as might appear necessary, it, at least, conferred a sanction in
future on the Royal Proclamations, relating to quarantine, which they had not before; and rendered the breach
of orders more immediately an object of legal punishment.635

Indeed, there were advantages to be gained by leaving the operation of quarantine in the hands of
the Privy Council. Disease might require a swift and efficient response—one more likely to be
gained through the council than through a parliamentary body. The sanctions created in the statute
also increased the likelihood that people would comply with the council’s directives.
But while the legislation, in some ways, placed the Privy Council in a stronger position, its
existence underscored growing parliamentary power in the constitutional evolution of the British
state. It suggested that the Privy Council could not act without legislative sanction. Parliament
held the purse strings. And punishment could not be taken too far: doing so would risk courts
refusing to enforce the measures. The Attorney-General, for instance, wanted to make breaking
quarantine a capital crime, for which the death penalty would be imposed. (Mediterranean ports at
the time had adopted this approach.) The Privy Council strongly objected on the grounds that with
such severe penalties, no one would be prosecuted for the offence. Parliament instead prescribed
imprisonment and a fine for any violation.636 Captains allowing passengers to come ashore would
forfeit the vessel.637 Customs officers fell subject to a fine of £100, with half the amount allocated
to informers.638 Anyone visiting the vessel during quarantine would be required to remain for the
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balance of the time allotted.639 The legislation also required a 24-hour watch system to be
established by the local magistrates, with the airing of goods to be governed by proclamation. 640
D. Commercial Interests Take Hold
Ironically, in strengthening the impact of quarantine orders, the Queen Ann Act heralded an end to
the quarantine regime. The provisions, and their enforcement, earned the enmity of Britain’s
commercial interests as well as its trading neighbors abroad, helping to generate momentum to
dispense with such provisions. Glimmers of this began to emerge soon after the passage of the
statute.
In the Baltic crisis, for instance, merchant adventurers trading with Hamburg began lobbying
the Privy Council to repeal a new proclamation that extended quarantine measures to Hamburg.641
Soon thereafter, the Eastland Company, trading with Danzig, began lobbying the Privy Council
(with the help of some Members of Parliament) to repeal the order. Although plague had
disappeared, the Privy Council issued a new order in August 1713. Finally, in April 1714, after
diplomatic representations to the Queen, and further lobbying, the Privy Council lifted the
restrictions.642
Part of the problem was that the Privy Council was out of its depth: it was not a scientific
body. From 1720 to 1723, the Marseilles Plague, for example, proved devastating. Almost half the
population of Marseilles died from it.643 What made this extraordinary was that Marseilles’
measures were considered amongst the most sophisticated in all of Europe. But French efforts to
establish a cordon sanitaire failed. Disquiet spread. The Privy Council, slow to respond, then
issued frenzy of orders and proclamations, followed by three new statutes.
News of the epidemic hit London on August 10, 1720. King George I, who was in Hanover at
the time, directed customs to give “proper directions” to the outports to stop any Mediterranean
ships from putting ashore.644 This bought time to draft a proclamation.645 With French provisions
having failed to stem the tide of the disease, the Privy Council sought professional advice. The
council consulted with Dr. Richard Mead, a prominent physician.646 The Lords Justice requested
that he publish his thoughts on the history of the plague and make recommendations for the best
means of preventing its introduction into England.
Mead’s writings became a mainstay in the British quarantine system. He posited that porous
and fibrous materials were more likely to carry plague and argued that it could be transmitted
between humans through the air.647 For ships carrying the more virulent form of plague, Mead
recommended burning everything on board, as well as the ship.648 Smuggling presented a
particular concern.649 Once an outbreak occurred, treatment should emphasize “compassionate
care”, not discipline and punishment.650 The worst course of action, Mead suggested, would be to
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shut up houses, thus creating “seminaries of contagion.”651 Cordon sanitaire, on the other hand,
would be acceptable—but not to prevent all people from leaving a city, as it had been exercised in
France. Mead saw this as “an unnecessary Severity, not to call it a Cruelty.”652 Instead, after
twenty days’ quarantine, citizens should be allowed to leave.653
Within a year, seven editions of Mead’s Discourse had been published. The eighth, with
further additions, came out the following year.654 This work proved highly influential. The
advantage of publishing it in conjunction with the Privy Council orders was that it added medical
weight to their decisions. The drawback of basing the quarantine system on it, however, was that
other medical personnel might disagree with Mead. Indeed, the treatise opened an intense and
contentious public debate on contagion that continued for more than a century. George Pye, for
instance, almost immediately responded with his own discourse, announcing that quarantines were
useless, that they gave smugglers an incentive, and that they imposed “a very great Injury to a
trading Nation”.655 Their social impact could hardly be ignored, he noted, for they “propagate and
keep up Fears and Frights amongst the People.”656 Patrick Russell, a prominent 18th century
physician and naturalist, and Gavin Milroy, a well-known, early 19th century physician and
epidemiologist, also were sharply critical of Mead.657 Thomas Hancock pointed out Mead’s many
contradictions.658 Others attacked Mead’s insistence that air, and not contact alone, spread plague,
as well as the role of cotton in carrying the disease—which raised question as to why there had not
been outbreaks of plague previously, with significant amount of cotton coming to England from the
Levant.659
As for the immediate concern, the Marseilles’ plague, consistent with Mead’s analysis, the
Privy Council resurrected the orders issued during the Baltic Crisis and expanded the goods for
which special permission would have to be sought for importation.660 Sufficiently concerned about
the threat posed by this particularly virulent epidemic, the Privy Council issued documents
inveighing that its orders be taken seriously.661 The Council quarantined all ships arriving from the
Mediterranean, the Levant, the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands, announcing that anyone
assisting smugglers would incur the King’s “Highest Displeasure” and severe penalties.662
The incident brought to the surface a gap in the Privy Council’s authority. The Queen Anne
Act only related to infection coming from abroad—not disease on domestic soil. The Privy
Council, however, also wanted to stop plague from spreading once it reached Great Britain. This
gap forced the Privy Council back to Parliament.663
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In December 1720, the Attorney General and the Solicitor-General jointly introduced a new
bill, which temporarily replaced the Queen Anne Act as the main quarantine statute.664 The
legislation extended quarantine authorities to domestic infection, giving the Crown the power to
remove people from their homes and to draw lines around infected areas.665 Neighboring parishes
became equally responsible for patrolling the lines.666 Violence could be used to recover
individuals breaking quarantine, with penalties for violation to include death without clergy
present.667
The merchants, strongly opposed to the bill, lobbied hard against it. The Levant Company
submitted a petition “To the honorable the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled”,
drawing attention to the adverse impact quarantine would have on domestic trade.668 Quarantine
applied to all ships from Turkey, regardless of whether the port from which they departed was
infected.669 The petition suggested that where HM ambassador at Constantinople gave the ship a
clean bill of health, the vessel should not be placed in quarantine—particularly where journey took
a minimum of three months, often even more than that, and sickness had not broken out on
board.670 It further pointed out that the law affected goods of interest to Parliamentarians.671 The
Crown largely ignored the representations as biased: the company was too interested a party in the
outcome.
The Levant Company, though, was not the only opposition. The city of London also petitioned
against the bill.672 The impact on individual rights and the economic costs drew particular
concern.673 The House of Lords, however, rejected the city’s petition by a vote of 63 to 22, leading
to a fight in Parliament.674 That it was a city of London’s stature, whose petition was being
rejected, particularly rankled.675 The rights involved were of great consequence. Such flippant
dismissal of petitions, moreover, might discourage future representations to Parliament, with longterm implications for the rights of British subjects.676 And cordons sanitaire were simply
impractical: they would take too many soldiers to enforce, particularly around London and
Westminster.677
The Lords subsequently introduced a bill to repeal the clauses in the Quarantine Act that
empowered the Crown to impose cordon sanitaire and to remove individuals from their homes.678
Of particular concern was the role the military, not civil magistrates, were to play:
Because such Powers as these are utterly unknown to our Constitution, and repugnant, we conceive, to the Lenity of our
mild and free Government, a tender Regard to which was shewn by the Act Jac. I which took care only to confine infected
Persons within their own Houses, and to support them under that Confinement, and lodg’d the Execution of such Powers
solely in the Civil Magistrate; whereas the Powers by us excepted against, as they are of a more extraordinary Kind, so
they will probably (and some of them must necessarily) be executed by Military Force: And the violent and inhuman
Methods which on these Occasions may, as we apprehend, be practiced, will, we fear, rather draw down the Infliction of a
new Judgment from Heaven, than contribute anyways to remove that, which shall then have befallen us.679
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Worse yet, such methods were being copied from France, “a Kingdom whose Pattern, in such
Cases, Great Britain should not follow; the Government there, being conducted by Arbitrary
Power and supported by Standing Armies.”680 Even in France, the measures had been “as
unsuccessful as they were unprecedented.”681 Removing such authorities would not leave the
Crown without any options; other authorities existed. The offending clauses, however, would do
untold mischief, not least in keeping “the Minds of the People perpetually alarm’d with those
Apprehensions under which they now labour.”682
The Lords ultimately resolved the question in the negative, 39 to 20, leaving the interim
measure intact.683 Within a month, a similar motion was introduced into the House of Commons,
which divided 115 to 95, in favor of giving leave to allow a bill to be brought forward to repeal
portions of the previous act.684 The bill passed in January, receiving Royal Assent on February 12,
1721.685 It recognized that “the execution of the powers and authorities mentioned in the said
recited clauses” had been found “very grievous to the subjects of this kingdom.”686 Concern about
implications of the law for the rights of British subjects endured. A century later, anti-contagionist
crusader Dr. Charles MacLean opined,
The arbitrary power of shutting sick people up in their houses, given by the act of James I., and that of
removing them by compulsion from their habitations, conferred by the 7th of Geo. I., were equally a violation
of the principles of public liberty, and of the British constitution, which would have been unjustifiable if
contagion had been proved to exist, and these measures had been proved to be a remedy. Such a despotism
no circumstances could justify. But, to enact laws so arbitrary, without previous proof of the existence of the
alleged evil, or of the efficiency of the proposed remedy, must be admitted to be the most extraordinary
legislation.687

In his Discourse on the Plague, Richard Mead emphasized not just human-to-human
transmission of the plague, but its transfer via goods. The Crown consequently sought greater
authority in the commercial realm. A statute passed on the same day of the repeal of §§2 and 4 of
the quarantine act gave the King the authority, for one year, to prohibit commerce with any country
infected with plague.688 Its purpose was to allow the country to respond quickly to any resurgence
of plague in France. The legislation was extreme and attracted strong opposition from shipping
interests. It essentially gave the Crown, through the Privy Council, an almost unlimited power over
trade.689 In return, Parliament limited the provision to one year and attached a rider, which shaved
a year off of the general quarantine law that had been passed in 1721, ensuring that the authorities
would cease as of March 1723—a full year before originally decreed.690
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Mead’s emphasis on smuggling also took statutory form. After the House of Lords rejected a
similar bill, the Crown managed to push temporary provisions through the House.691 The new
statute, in addition to increasing the penalties associated with smuggling, increased tonnage duties,
expanded penalties to including burning the ship or selling the products on board, and prevented
the importation of alcohol.692 Its effect was to strengthen the Privy Council’s hand with respect to
Parliamentary sanction.
While this legislation was evolving, the Privy Council took steps to use the powers at their
disposal. The council gave warships to Customs officers to command and stationed guards along
the coastlines.693 When the council ordered two ships from Cyprus to be burned, the matter—
which quickly evolved into a major diplomatic row and threatened trade with the Levant—reached
Parliament.
The Levant Company increased their pressure on the political representatives. Commercial
entities frequently had to petition to get their wares out of quarantine. The administrative burden
on them was not insignificant: the Privy Council required bills of lading, bills of health letters of
advice, invoices, and business correspondence; where such documents could not readily be
produced, the goods would be send to the airing houses where damp conditions often ruined the
cargo.694 Under such pressure, there was little impetus to continue to support the more stringent
provisions. All three of the statutes introduced in response to the Marseilles plague were
temporary. Upon their expiration, Queen Anne’s act came back into force.695
E. The Beginning of the End
Within a few years, the Privy Council again faced the threat of plague. Accordingly, in May 1728
the Privy Council issued an order, requiring 40 days’ quarantine of all ships from the Ionian Islands
and Morea, and within five days, a new bill was before Parliament.696 The legislation revived
many of the same clauses from the Marseilles statutes, with a few alterations: the power of
prohibiting commerce for one year was included directly in the statute, as was the authority of the
Crown to prohibit British subjects from trade with specific countries or regions.697 Violations
would be considered a felony, with ships and goods forfeit and importers fined thrice the value of
the ship or goods received.698 Although intended to be temporary, an ongoing threat of plague
forced their renewal in 1733.699
The hold of the merchants over Parliament was growing. This statute was the last act to insist
that goods be opened and aired for a period of quarantine; it also omitted any mention of
enumerated goods.700 Nevertheless, Privy Council Proclamations and Orders in July of that year
listed quarantinable items.701 It is not clear whether these orders were ultra vires the governing
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legislation, or whether Parliament was simply trying to dodge political bullets—i.e., leaving it to
the council to make unpopular commercial decisions. Merchants were particularly unhappy about
the Privy Council’s orders. Petitions for relief to minimize the length of quarantine and airing of
cargo followed. There was particular concern that British trade was being crippled, leaving its
rivals free to profit. The Levant Company thus petitioned for an end to quarantine for ships with
clean bills of health, so that trade “may be upon as easy terms as that of our Neighbours”—i.e., the
Dutch.702 Despite deep suspicion of the accuracy of such bills of health, the Privy Council caved,
issuing an order in February 1730, allowing all ships with clean bills to be released from
quarantine.703
As for the statutory authorities, the renewal act of 1733 was the last time that Parliament gave
the monarch the authority to prohibit contact with infected regions. The authority was never
used.704 It is notable here that, in contrast, this period coincides with the beginning of the
introduction and use of such authorities in the American colonies.
The following decades witnessed continued outbreaks of plague, in the context of which the
1710 statute provided the base and sporadic Privy Council orders issued.705 In 1752 Parliament
again turned to discussion of quarantine, as the House of Commons resolved to form a committee
“to consider the most proper and effectual manner of performing Quarantine.”706 This was the first
time that quarantine measures had been considered by Parliament outside the demands of an
immediate emergency.707
In January of 1753 Viscount Barrington and five other Members of the House of Commons
were appointed to bring forward a quarantine bill.708 Barrington’s role, in particular, could hardly
be overlooked: as a commissioner of the Admiralty, his interest signaled concern that the Navy
might be less than satisfied with the Privy Council’s actions. The statute focused on the foreign
importation of disease—not its domestic spread.709 It required that infected ships dock in the Isles
of Scilly, whence customs would contact the mainland. The ship would remain there until released
by the Crown, under penalty of death.710 The statute limited the impact on commercial goods,
ensuring that there would be no airing subsequent to quarantine and imposing treble damages, as
well as the full costs, on any officer who “shall embezzle, or shall willingly damage, any goods
performing quarantine under his discretion.”711 Further, the act’s implementation was delayed one
year, to allow companies the time necessary to obtain the documentation required to avoid
quarantine, where applicable.712 Accompanying parliamentary consideration of the bill, moreover,
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was a second initiative, which sought to relax conditions for the Levant Company, without
throwing trade open entirely.713
With the monarch and the Privy Council forced to work more closely with Parliament, it was
perhaps inevitable that British shipping interests—well represented in the legislature—would carry
ever-greater sway in subsequently diminishing the impact of quarantine regulations. By the 1763
Peace of Paris, England had “undisputed command of the seas”.714 Quarantine provisions ran
directly counter to the country’s economic interests. “All that prevented trade from growing,”
merchants argued to the Board of Trade, was “the quarantine imposed in Britain.”715 Subsequent
measures sought to address the problem.716
Parliament was sensitive to the political and economic repercussions of limiting trade. The
advent of free market ideals, promulgated through the writings of Adam Smith and others, brought
ever more attention to trade restrictions. But disease presented a very real threat—one that had
decimated the country in earlier times. Giving the Privy Council full reign, however, raised the
specter of Royal Prerogative. Parliament’s short-term response was to split the difference: to issue
governing statutes, thereby establishing its authority and the limits of Royal Prerogative, while
granting the Privy Council the flexibility necessary to respond to disease—and, in the process,
dodging any political fallout that may ensue.
1. Gradual Transformation of the Quarantine Regime
Quarantine provisions themselves came to reflect the Enlightenment ideals that shaped the 18th
century, as society began questioning the traditional institutions. In contrast to the Tudor age,
when quarantine was seen as the height of European political sophistication, it gradually came to
be seen as backwards. Two treatises in particular had a profound influence. The first, by John
Howard, pointed out how politics interfered with the execution of quarantine.717 His work
underscored the expense and injustice that permeated British trade with the Mediterranean.718
The second, by Patrick Russell, carefully dissected the clinical aspects of plague, the method of
cure, the doctrine of contagion, and operation of lazarettos.719 Russell argued that, as a domestic
matter, the constitutional authorities were unclear: the line between Royal Prerogative for
international ships arriving and Parliamentary control for the spread of the disease blurred. Russell
contemplated the role of the civil magistrate.720 He looked carefully at the police powers to be
exercised in relation to the different stages of plague, calling for the establishment of a Council of
Health, with discretionary authority.721 Such a body would resolve many of the weaknesses of the
Privy Council, pushing the decision to quarantine down to a local level and providing a greater
medical and scientific basis for the decision.722 It also would be superior to the current quarantine
regulations used by shipping companies—who could hardly be considered disinterested.723
Russell’s recommendations reflected the broader movement towards the professionalism of
advice rendered to the government, as well as the growing role of medical personnel in setting
policies affecting public health. In 1799 Parliament passed a statute to allow the Privy Council to


713

An Act for Enlarging and Regulating the Trade Into the Levant Seas, 26 Geo. II, c. 12, May 15, 1753. NB: Starting to see free market
ideas/Adam Smith take hold.
714
KEIR, supra, note 567, at 291.
715
NA PC 1/8/20; communication from British consul at Leghorn, backed by 25 local merchants, to Henry Seymour Conway (successor
to Lord Halifax), 1788, reprinted in BOOKER, supra note 48, at 196.
716
See, e.g., An act to encourage the trade into the Levant seas, by providing a more convenient mode of performing quarantine, &c., 39
Geo. III, c. 99, July 12, 1799.
717
John Howard, An Account of the Principal Lazarettos in Europe, 1789.
718
Id.
719
RUSSELL, supra note 557.
720
Id., 508-509.
721
Id., at 506-507.
722
Id. See also comment on Russell in MACLEAN, supra note 559, at 429.
723
RUSSELL, supra note 557, at 344-350.



65

convene a body of experts to consider and prepare regulations to govern quarantine.724 The body
reported in 1800, recommending that a Board of Health be established, which could consult with
all British consuls in foreign parts and which should have original responsibility for any domestic
measures.725
The Privy Council adopted many of the committee’s recommendations, but it rebuffed the
proposed creation of a board of health to which its quarantine authorities would be transferred.726
Instead, the committee would continue in a consultative capacity. By insulating the committee
from the commercial interests that had provided a check on the Privy Council, though, its
recommendations became heavily weighted towards public health—in effect, prompting even more
extreme measures.727 In 1806, the Board of Health, having had no real authority, dissolved.728
In the interim, Parliament expanded the statutory base for quarantine to include diseases other
than plague. Of chief concern was the advent of yellow fever, occasioned by trade with the
Americas.729 In moving the 1805 bill, George Rose explained that while the 1800 act had been to
impose quarantine on ships coming from plague regions, “other epidemical diseases…might be
dangerous to the health of this county.”730 The Privy Council developed questionnaires to obtain
information from each vessel arriving in the United Kingdom.731 Ships coming from regions where
such diseases raged, even if they carried clean bills of health, would be required to perform
quarantine.732
As in the United States, theories of contagion were not universally accepted.733 Charles
MacLean argued that no disease attack individuals twice—a position formally rejected in 1818 by a
Select committee of the House of Commons, as well as the Royal College of Physicians.734
Undeterred by the Parliamentarians’ skepticism, MacLean began his Remarks on the British
Quarantine Laws, “The code of Quarantine laws in England, and of Sanitary laws in the nations of
the continent of Europe, is, perhaps, without exception, the most gigantic, extraordinary, and
mischievous superstructure, that has ever been raised by man, upon a purely imaginary
foundation.”735
The ensuing debate was fierce. Non-contagion theory was dangerous: it put the nation at
risk.736 Foreign powers would refuse trade with an infected country.737 Pamphlets ridiculed



724
An act to encourage the trade into the Levant seas, by providing a more convenient mode of performing quarantine, &c., 39 Geo. III,
c. 99, July 12, 1799.
725
Report reprinted in MACLEAN, supra note 559, at 431.
726
NA PC 2/153/453-51. See also Order in Council July 29, 1800.
727
See, e.g., Journal of the House of Commons, vol. 55, at 245, 497; Journal of the House of Commons, Vol. 55, pp. 498, 575; and NA
PC 2/154/43.
728
BOOKER, supra note 48, at 303.
729
An Act for making farther [sic] provision for the effectual performance of Quarantine, 45 Geo. III, c. 10, Mar. 12, 1805. Remained in
force until 1822. See printed copy in the British Library at 748.f.13(2) & at Kew at NA PC 2/167/227-68. See also amendments to 1805
statute in An Act for making additional and further Provisions for … Quarantine in Great Britain, 46 Geo. III, c. 98, July 16, 1806.
730
Hansard’s, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 3, p. 222.
731
Order in Council of April 5, 1805, reprinted in DEW’S ON DUTIES OF CUSTOMS, UL Rare Books, Ant.c.28.2309, at 243-4.
732
Id., at 240-3 (reprinting April 5, 1805 Privy Council Order). For a summary of quarantine regulations in place as of 1818, see A
Digest of the Duties of Customs & Excise payable upon all foreign articles imported into and exported from Great Britain: duties
outwards, and countervaluing duties between Great Britain and Ireland, Customs and Excise bounties…Quarantine laws…brought up to
1st Dec. 1818. London: 1818. UL Rare books Ant.c.28.2309.
733
See, e.g., Dr. Anthony White. A Treatise on the Plague; more especially on the police management of that disease, Illustrated by the
plan of operations successfully carried into effect in the late plague of Corfu, with hints on quarantine. London: 1846, p. 2, UL Rare
Books, IX.23.18. See also Ackerknecht, Anticontagionism Between 1821 and 1867, BULL. OF THE HIST. OF MED., 22, 562-93 (1948); R.
Cooter, Anticontagionism and History’s Medical Record, in THE PROBLEM OF MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE—EXAMINING THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF MEDICINE, 87-108 (P. Wright and A. Treacher eds., 1982).
734
MACLEAN, supra note 559, at 439. For thoughtful discussion of MacLean’s contribution to the 19th Century contagion debates see
Catherine Kelly, “Not from the College, but Through the Public and the Legislature”: Charles Maclean and the Relocation of Medical
Debate in the Early Nineteenth Century, BULL. HIST. MED. 2008, 82(3): 545-569.
735
Id., at 416.
736
WILLIAM MACMICHAEL, A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS OF OPINION UPON THE SUBJECT OF CONTAGION: WITH SOME REMARKS
ON QUARANTINE (1825). UL Rare books, VII.25.47.
737
Augustus Bozzi Granville. Letter to the Rt. Hon. W. Huskisson, MP, President of the Board of Trade, on the Quarantine Bill, by A.B.
Granville, M.D., London: 1825, p. 394. UL Rare Books Zz.18.25.



66

MacLean.738 He replied with the none-too-subtle: Evils of Quarantine Laws, and Non-Existence of
Pestilential Contagion. (MacLean’s position was somewhat weakened when, within five days of
arriving in the Levant, he fell subject to the plague.739)
The fact that England was primarily concerned about plague proved crucial. It was not clear
that plague transferred between individuals. Although it was not known at the time, the disease
was carried by fleas (and rodents) and transferred when the animals bit the individual. This
explained why there were various instances in which individuals had come into contact with each
other and the disease had not transferred—incidents sufficient to call into question whether
airborne human-to-human transmission occurred. It also explained why immersing goods in water
and then placing them in the open air diminished their contagiousness: it killed the fleas, thus
preventing individuals who subsequently came into contact with the furs, fabrics, and other
materials from contracting the disease.
Even as contagionists and non-contagionists captured the public debate, a series of works
began to show the connection between dirt and disease.740 The real problem, scientists argued, was
sanitation:
It must surely be manifest, that foreign contagion, now usually considered the substantial germ, without with
the most fearful combination of indigenous causes, famine, filth, misery, corrupt food, vitiated air and sickly
seasons, can never produce a pestilence, dwindles in national important almost to a shadow in comparison.
And it can scarcely be doubted that the attempt to defend ourselves by quarantine regulations, while such
causes existed, would be like binding in chains a ferocious animal at a distance, when another ten-times more
fierce was fondled at our doors, and suffered to roam about at pleasure.741

These scientific positions created an alternative to quarantine: i.e., if quarantine was detrimental to
the economic health of the country, while being questionable in its effectiveness—as highlighted in
the contagionist debate; and if there were alternatives available which might be more effective—
without the detrimental impact on trade—then Parliament needed to consider it.
Accordingly, on March 10, 1825, the House dissolved itself into a committee to consider all
acts in force related to quarantine.742 John Smith, one of MacLean’s supporters, was given leave to
read a petition from MacLean that attacked the quarantine system, calling for a withdrawal of all
quarantine laws—or an investigation into pestilential contagion.743 The House passed a new
statute, which included many of the previous powers, but softened the penalties associated with
violations of the law, commuting, for instance, capital punishment to a £100 fine.744 Most
importantly, it allowed ships with a clean bill of health and healthy crew, upon arriving from
Mediterranean or any African or Turkish ports, to be released immediately upon docking, after
formalities were observed.745
Within five years Britain was to face yet another epidemic, but this time from a new disease:
cholera. Diplomatic intelligence reported that it had swept through the Volga valley. Accordingly,
On November 11, 1830, the Privy Council introduced an order quarantining ships arriving in
Britain from Russia.746 Merchants saw these provisions as troublesome and, instead of petitioning
the Privy Council directly (an act that historically had been a colossal waste of time) they went
straight to Parliament.747 Agitation in the commons was quickly followed by new Orders in
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Council, requiring that quarantine laws be strictly enforced.748 The Privy Council announced the
formation of a new consultative Board of Health to respond to the crisis.
The board, chaired by the President of the College of Physicians, again demonstrated the
insertion of science and medicine into the quarantine debate and the professionalization of advice
provided to the government. But just because scientists were now being consulted did not mean
that the advice they would provide would be accurate. The Lancet, a revolutionary medical journal
launched in 1823, lamented, “It is probable that a set of men more ill-informed on the subject upon
which they will be called upon to report, could not be found in the ranks of the profession.”749 And
the board’s advice, when it did come, was not particularly welcome to the Privy Council: it
recommended the creation of a system, constructed from the Local Boards of Health, by which the
compulsory evacuation of the sick would be carried out, and the isolation of the upper classes
ensured. Historian John Booker reflected,
For the Privy Council, these recommendations were hardly welcome, raising all manner of questions
including constitutional authority, overlap with subsisting parochial and municipal government, social
discrimination, and the liberty of the individual. Furthermore, the council’s own powers of control and
coercion beyond the imposition of quarantine could only legally take effect once an epidemic had erupted.750

In October 1831 British subjects began dying within hours of the onset of symptoms. The
Privy Council immediately issued regulations imposing strict quarantine at the ports—including,
for the first time since the 16th century, between ports within England.751 It determined though that
a cordon sanitaire around North-East England was neither practicable nor judicious.752 Parliament
acquiesced by passing an emergency law to give the Privy Council more leeway.753 The council
went after quarantine with abandon: between 1826 and 1829, there had been 772 ships from
foreign ports quarantined, but in 1831 alone, some 2,556 found themselves so restricted.754
Despite their severity, these measures proved unsuccessful. Upwards of 30,000 British
subjects died in the first wave.755 Their failure put another nail in the coffin of quarantine as an
effective response to disease. William Fergusson, the Inspector General of Hospitals, roundly
denounced the practice: “[W]e might as well pretend to arrest the influx of the swallows in
summer, and the woodcocks in the winter season, by cordons of troops and quarantine regulations,
as by such means to stay the influence of an atmospheric poison.” 756 The solution instead lay
in our moral courage, in our improved civilization, in the perfecting of our medical and health police, in the
generous charitable spirit of the higher orders, assisting the poorer classes of the community, in the better
condition of those classes themselves, compared with the poor of other countries, and in the devoted courage
and assistance of the medical profession every where…757

It would be ludicrous to use quarantine to step epidemic catarrh or influenza; so why should it work
for other diseases?758
Thomas Forster, writing contemporaneous with Fergusson, considered the failure with regard
to cholera to tilt the scales against quarantine writ large:
A question of great importance has for some years divided the opinion of medical as well as commercial
men, respecting the source of Pestilence and the utility of Quarantine. The point at issue seems to be this—
Whether pestilential diseases, such as Cholera Morbus, Plague, and others, be of such a nature that
Quarantine and Sanitary Cordons can constitute a defence against their introduction into any county; or
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whether, on the contrary, they depend on morbidic conditions of the air, which, during particular seasons, and
for certain limited portions of time, visit various countries, like other atmospheric phenomena, and are
incapable of being arrested by any human means? I am strongly of the latter opinion, and though under
certain circumstances diseases may be extended to predisposed persons, by confinement in close apartments
with those who are already infected; yet it seems to me, that facts do not warrant the belief that travelers,
ships, or bales of goods, can convey such diseases into ports or countries where the specific malaria does not
exist.759

Medical treatises began calling for the abolition of quarantine law altogether.760
Outbreaks of the disease in 1832, 1848, 1854, and 1866 followed.761 The last, in particular,
killed seven in every 10,000 people.762 Quarantine again proved ineffective, leading the formal
government report to denounce lazarettos as superstitious—“as contemptible in the eyes of science
as they are injurious to commerce.”763
The government responded to the devastation and what appeared to be a growing scientific
consensus against the use of quarantine by asking John Bowring, a medical doctor, to examine the
operation of quarantine in the Levant—the nexus of British quarantine policy for centuries—and to
consider the impact of quarantine regulations on Britain’s international relationships and
commercial interests.764 Bowring’s findings proved devastating:
The pecuniary cost may be estimated by millions of pounds sterling in delays, demurrage, loss of interest,
deterioration of merchandise, increased expenses, fluctuations of markets, and other calculable elements; but
the sacrifice of happiness, the weariness, the wasted time, the annoyance, the sufferings inflicted by
quarantine legislation—these admit of no calculation—they exceed all measure. Nothing but their being a
security against danger the most alarming, nothing but their being undoubted protections for the public health
could warrant their infliction; and the result of my experience is not only that they are useless for the ends
they profess to accomplish; but that they are absolutely pernicious—that they increase the evils against which
they are designed to guard, and add to the miseries which it is their avowed object to modify or to remove. 765

Even worse was the degree to which quarantine measures had become a tool of diplomacy and
state policy. “Under the plea of a regard for the public health,” Bowring wrote, “all letters are
opened—all travelers are arrested and imprisoned—all commodities are subject tot regulations the
most unintelligible, costly and vexatious.”766 He was not unaware of the threat posed by disease.
Indeed, of the threat posed by the weaponization of disease. He reported information related to
Turkish use of plague as a means of war.767 But transfer of disease by animals also occurred
without any intent behind them. And the power of the lazarettos sat uneasily in a democratic state
dedicated to the rule of law.768
Across Europe, governments were beginning to discuss significant modifications to their
quarantine laws.769 In 1838 the French proposed to Britain to promote the creation of a Congress
of Delegates from Europe, with the Mediterranean port. Like the regional conferences in the
United States, the purpose was to construct a uniform system of quarantine regulations. England
readily agreed.770 Bowring’s conclusion received support from British diplomats in Malta and
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elsewhere.771 The report was not without its critics.772 But it found fertile ground in a Parliament
besieged by commercial interests and doubtful as to the effectiveness of quarantine law.
2. Broader Context
At the risk of gross oversimplification, a handful of factors can be emphasized in looking at the
complex economic and political conditions that helped to shape British quarantine law in the late
18th and early 19th century. A sudden surge in agricultural productivity helped to drive the
industrial revolution.773 This meant the greater movement of people and goods and an increased
emphasis on economic growth. Transportation flows accelerated, and the population flocked to the
cities.774 The resultant population density brought issues of sanitation to the fore. Calls for reform
proliferated.775
Simultaneously, democratic changes swept the country. The reforms of 1832 targeted the
abuse of “influence” and sought to eliminate the Crown’s control over Parliament.776 The king
could no longer choose ministers at his discretion, and the House of Lords lost its ascendancy. The
electorate grew in strength. Personal sovereignty, then parliamentary sovereignty, yielded to the
sovereignty of the people.777 Larger and less manageable constituencies began determining the
outcome of elections. The government was thus increasingly forced to address not just national
defense and foreign relations, but a range of issues that accompanied urbanization.778 New
demands arose for local administration, as well as political equality. Expensive, antiquated
institutions and procedures fell from favor and became the target of critique: “The opinions which
became fashionable in this age required that every institution should justify its existence on
practical grounds.”779
Further influencing the transition were the ideas of Adam Smith, who, in the Wealth of
Nations, emphasized that national greatness required minimum restraints. Thus, under William
Huskisson (President of the Board of Trade, 1825-1827) and then William Gladstone (President of
the Board of Trade, 1841-1845), the board took a leading role in the tariff revisions required for
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free trade. As competition from abroad heightened, Britain needed “plentiful supplies of raw
material, cheap food, and unimpeded access to every part of an expanding world-market where
they might buy and sell as widely as possible…”780 The country had to be able to compete more
effectively.
Quarantine stood in the way.781 And, as already recognized, there was substantial question
about the scientific grounds for using such regulations. Thus Gavin Milroy wrote of the body of
quarantine law in 1846,
The absurdly foolish and most ridiculous principles which they embody, the vexatious and oppressive
restrictions which they impose, the wretchedness and suffering which they almost necessarily give rise to,
and the great increase of mortality which, we have reason to believe, they often occasion, are surely sufficient
grounds for the scrutinizing investigation that is so generally demanded.”782

The government, however, could not just destroy the old quarantine regulations. They had to be
replaced by something that would help the state to counter the threat of disease. The answer came
in the form of sanitary laws. The Registrar-general explained, “internal sanitary arrangements, and
not quarantine and sanitary lines, are the safeguards of nations’ against the invasion of epidemic
diseases.”783 Better sanitation, not archaic quarantine, was befitting of an enlightened age.784
Since the 16th century, there had been calls for better sanitation.785 It was not until the 19th
century, however, that the call for reform took hold. Edwin Chadwick lead the charge: “[T]he
annual loss of life from filth and bad ventilation,” he wrote, “are greater than the loss from death or
wounds in any wars in which the country has been engaged in modern times.”786 Poor water, poor
sewage, and poor ventilation lay at the root of disease.787 The Royal Commission on the Health of
Towns endorsed Chadwick’s account, while reports of the Metropolitan Sewers Commission drew
a bleak picture:
I have…seen in such places human beings living and sleeping in sunk rooms with filth from overflowing
cesspools exuding through and running down the walls and over the floors…The effects of the stench,
effluvia, and poisonous gases constantly evolving from these foul accumulations were apparent in the
haggard, wan, and swarthy countenances, and enfeebled limbs, or the poor creatures whom I found residing
over and amongst these dens of pollution and wretchedness.788

The solution to filth and disease was better sanitation. The General Board of Health, seen as the
solution to the latter, became firmly opposed to the use of quarantine, considering it “a barbarous
encumbrance, interrupting commerce, obstructing international intercourse, periling life, and
wasting, and worse than wasting, large sums of public money.”789 Southwood Smith, a prominent
voice in the sanitation movement, similarly rejected quarantine. In 1866 he wrote:
The sanitary regulation of the ships themselves—a measure of the utmost importance to the seafaring classes
of the community—would accomplish far more than could be hoped for or pretended to be accomplished by
any known system of quarantine, and would have, moreover, a beneficial effect upon popular opinion by
removing the fallacious appearances which favour the belief in imported disease, while they divert attention
from the true causes of disease, the removable and preventable causes that exist on the spot.790
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Thus, in 1868 when a severe smallpox epidemic and a renewed threat of cholera swept the
country, the government appointed a Royal Sanitary Commission to look into public health. The
Commission recommended a complete overhaul of the country’s administration, and the formation
of a responsible public health authority in each district, controlled by a central department under a
minister. Eventually, the Local Authorities would take over quarantine responsibilities in the
ports.791 Legislation in 1866, 1871, 1872, and 1875 defined the constitution of the central and local
authorities—the last laying down the rules that still form the foundation of public health law in the
United Kingdom.792 The 1871 Act established a “phantom” board, called the Local Government
Board and provided a salary for its president.793 Its purpose was to place the supervision of all the
laws relating to public health, the relief of the poor, and local government, into one body. The
1872 act created an alternative system of port prophylaxis; quarantine would be maintained for the
“exotics”, while the new sanitary system extended to endemic diseases.794
The statutory authority of the Privy Council in regard to quarantine continued. But as a
practical matter, dual policies had evolved: quarantine could either be administered via the central
government through the Privy Council, or it could be conducted by medical inspection run by local
authorities with the support of the Local Government Board.795 The Privy Council had
substantially reduced its footprint: by 1878, all but one of the quarantine grounds had been
abandoned.796 At times it acted, but it did so to much derision. In March of 1879, for instance, the
council, having wind of a fresh outbreak of plague, suddenly issued an Order imposing quarantine
on all arrivals from the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Sea of Azoff, and the Sea of Marmara. The
Lancet crowed that the “epidemic lunacy” of Europe had resulted “in reviving obsolete methods of
quarantine, maritime and inland, against the compromised country [Russia], and against the
uncompromised countries of each other.”797 It announced the proposal “absurdly impracticable.”798
However archaic and impractical the authority might have been, as a legal matter, the Privy
Council still had jurisdiction over the United Kingdom and the Local Government Board
maintained domestic authority in England and Wales. The question was one of overlapping
authority at the ports. The Law Lords ruled in November 1887 that the Local Government Board
had no power over customs functions. The question would have to be put to Parliament. The
resulting Public Health Act of 1896 repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825 and removed the Privy
Council’s involvement in the same.799 In its place, Westminster retained authority in the Local
Government Board—in part to head off criticism from abroad that Britain had left itself without
any defense.
F. Rejecting Quarantine: 20th Century
Britain’s concern about the impact of quarantine law on trade did not end with the elimination of
domestic provisions. At the turn of the century, English ships still ruled the seas. Approximately
64% of all pilgrims arriving in the Hedjaz by sea were carried on British vessels.800 The ships
carried Indian, Afghan, Turkish, Chinese, Persian, Somali, African, Yemeni, Arab, and other
pilgrims, thus gaining for Britain insight into the happenings at many ports.801 When plague broke
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out and Jeddah imposed quarantine, the British shipping industry balked. Such provisions were
considered “senseless.”802 British emissaries made repeated representations to the Ottomans,
protesting the use of quarantine.803 At the same time, diplomats sent dispatches to the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, describing the state of the disease in each port; he who would forward the
dispatches to the President of the Local Government Board.804 The system kept even the local
authorities abreast of global health developments.
Quarantine, rejected for plague—which had been its raison d’etre—was viewed as even more
inapposite for other disease. Thus the leading medical doctor, Arthur Hopkirk, wrote in 1913,
There is really but little to be said as to the possibility of preventing influenza epidemics, because experience
has shown that the disease invariably starts from some mysterious and undiscoverable nidus, and also that,
once started, little can be done to prevent is dissemination, partly on account of the general predisposition of
human beings to the malady, and partly because of the rapidity with which the infection is carried along all
available lines of human intercourse.”805

The solution instead would be to focus on teaching schoolchildren about personal and domestic
cleanliness.806
When the Spanish Flu hit English shores in 1918-19, the United Kingdom did not resort to the
use of quarantine.807 The decision did not depend upon the disease being a civil, not a military
concern. Indeed, Lord Hankey, the Cabinet Secretary, initially suspected that the disease was a
biological weapons attack.808 And the death toll was substantial: within 46 weeks, some 3 ½
million cases had erupted.809 According to the Registrar General, in the course of the epidemic
nearly a quarter of a million died; many were young adults. Even these statistics are considered
low.810 But quarantine was eschewed as impractical and ineffective.811
Throughout the inter-war period, the United Kingdom continued to be extremely concerned
about Russian and German development of biological weapons. The threat prompted the political
establishment to generate its own weapons program, enlisting the aid of senior scientists. But the
National Archives yield no evidence to suggest that at any point in the 20th century the political
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establishment contemplated the re-introduction of broad national quarantine authority as a way to
respond to either to naturally-occurring disease or to biological weapons.812
G. Current Quarantine Law
Britain removed an explicit quarantine power from its public health laws in 1896, when the Public
Health Act of 1896 repealed the Quarantine Act of 1825.813 The law remained largely unchanged
until the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 and the Public Health (Infectious Disease)
Regulations of 1988. These provisions emphasize the local nature of quarantine. They allow for
local authorities to obtain orders from a Justice of the Peace to order the medical examination of an
individual or group of persons, and the removal of an individual or group to a hospital, if that
individual is reasonably believed to have a notifiable disease, or, if not ill from the disease, to be
carrying an organism that causes the disease.814 The Justice of the Peace can then order that
person to be involuntarily detained where permitting him to leave would endanger public safety.815
The Public Health (Control of Diseases) Act of 1984 initially included six notifiable diseases:
cholera, plague, relapsing fever, smallpox, typhus and food poisoning.816 The Public Health
(Infectious Diseases) Regulations 1988 added 25 more.817 Under the 1984 statute, a local officer
can request that an individual refrain from going to work, require that children exposed to infection
to be excluded from school, and place restrictions on places of child entertainment. Criminal
offences apply for exposing others to the risk of infection.818 This legislation does not include
detention powers for new or emerging disease.
For health laws at ports of entry, three sets of regulations issued under the 1984 legislation.819
Here again, local authorities—not the central government—bear the main responsibility.820 In
March 2006, a major review of ports, airports, international train stations led the Health Protection
Agency (HPA) to agree to take the lead to provide medical input into arrangements for port
health.821 The costs are shared by local authorities, the National Health Service, and HPA, with
audits conducted by the Healthcare Commission.
Additional medical examinations are possible under the Immigration Act of 1971, which
allows the government to refuse entry on medical or public health threat grounds.822 Where entry is
granted, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides a statutory basis for
information regarding sickness to be transferred to the NHS or HPA.823 HM Customs’
longstanding policy is to refer individuals for medical examination whenever they seem unwell,
give health as a reason for coming to the UK, claim asylum, or come from a country that is highrisk for tuberculosis (TB) and are seeking entry for more than 6 months.824 Approximately 270,000
people per year fall within the last category, which has prompted at least two airports (Heathrow
and Gatwick) to install x-ray machines to check for TB at the time of arrival.825
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1. Health and Social Care Act of 2008: England and Wales
Recently, the Public Health Act of 1984 was subjected to extensive review.826 In 2008, Part 2
of the statute was repealed/replaced by the Health and Social Care Act of 2008.827 The changes
suggest that there may be some movement with regard to quarantine, but the fundamental control
of domestic measures remains in local hands.
This statute amended the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act of 1984, by authorizing the
creation of regulations that designate how and when the quarantine of persons may be conducted.
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of State created Regulation #9 of The Health Protection
(Part 2A) Regulations 2010, which briefly mentions quarantined persons.828 In regard to
international travel, regulations can relate to preventing danger to public health from vessels
arriving in or leaving England or Wales. The Secretary has the authority to include provision for
medical examination, detention, isolation, quarantine of persons, provision of information from
those persons, inspection/retention, destruction of things.829 On the domestic side, regulations can
impose duties on registered medical practitioners and others to record certain illnesses and to notify
the government as to their appearance.830 With regard to the domestic realm, regulations can
restrict persons, things or premises where public health is threatened.831 Such acts may include
excluding a child from school, prohibiting events or gatherings.832 The Secretary can further
impose special restrictions, such as requiring an individual to undergo decontamination, wear
protective clothing, or undergo health monitoring.833
Unlike the provisions that apply to international travel, however, the regulations may not
require that an individual submit to medical examination, be removed to or detained in a hospital or
other suitable place, or be kept in isolation or quarantine absent an Order from a Justice of the
Peace on application from a Local Authority.834 Such orders are referred to as Part 2A Orders,
enforceable by criminal prosecution.835 In other words, Part 2A orders are grounded in the local
domain, and they reflect more than a century of placing such authorities in the hands of local
government.
Where considered “necessary”, Part 2A orders may be issued without notice.836
The statute establishes the standard required: the Justice of the Peace must be satisfied that (i) the
person/thing in question is infected/contaminated; (ii) infection or contamination presents/could
present significant harm to human health; (iii) risk of infection or contamination to other humans
exists; and (iv) it is necessary to make the order to remove or reduce the risk.837
Parliamentary scrutiny of the Regulations takes place either via affirmative resolution or
annulment by negative resolution; but prior Parliamentary approval is not required where the
person making the instrument considers it necessary to make the order prior to a draft having been
laid. Such orders are subject to annulment after 28 days, unless approved by each House of
Parliament for England or the National Assembly for Wales.838
The statute broadly defines the diseases to which Part 2A Orders apply: “Any reference to
infection or contamination is a reference to infection or contamination which presents or could
present significant harm to human health.”839 Commentators suggest that this does include
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pandemic influenza.840 The statute adopts a flexible approach for amending the list of diseases in
the future.
While the scope of the provisions is considerably wider than what Britain previously
maintained, it is also more complex. The statute also focuses on response once the threat has
become clear, not prior to threat. As one scholarly article explains, “While there are provisions for
monitoring and notifying outbreaks, there is far less consideration for joined-up working beyond
the very local response.”841
2. Public Health Etc. (Scotland) Act 2008
The Health and Social Care Act of 2008 does not apply to Scotland, which passed its own
Public Health Act prior to Westminster’s adoption of the statute.842 The main purpose of the
Scottish statute was to modernize the legislative framework governing health protection, since most
of the statutory authorities dated back to late 19th century.843 The Scottish Executive convened the
Public Health Legislation Review Group to consider the legislation and whether new provisions
were necessary. The review group released its proposals in October 2006, with an analysis
subsequently published in March 2007.
The legislation clarifies the roles and responsibilities of Scottish Ministers, the NHS boards,
and local authorities.844 It also devises a new system of statutory notification for diseases
(notifiable diseases, notifiable organisms and health risk states—including offences in regard to
notifiable organisms).845 The act provides a framework for public health investigations, giving
health officials powers related to entry to premises, the power to ask questions, the authority to
issue public health investigation warrants.846 As perhaps would be expected, given the long and
contentious history of quarantine, debate during consideration of the bill focused on how such
measures would be given effect. Transparency in the issuance of compulsion, exclusion, and
restriction orders,847 mechanisms for appeal in the case of compulsory medical examinations,848 and
the manner in which orders could be altered all received heightened scrutiny during the debates.849
Much of the statute’s focus is administrative: it clarifies, for instance, the public health
functions of the health boards, specifying their duty to give explanation, medical examinations,
exclusion orders and restriction orders, quarantine, removal to and detention in hospital, quarantine
and detention, variation and extension of orders, review of orders, compensation, recall of orders
granted in absence, appeal, and breach of orders and offences.850 It also lays out the public health
functions of the local authorities.851 Other sections deal with mortuaries, international travel, sun
beds, and statutory nuisances.852
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3. Civil Contingencies Act of 2004
It might be possible for the British government to implement quarantine under its more general
emergency powers. The Civil Contingencies Act of 2004 provides the main vehicle for managing
emergencies. The legislation repealed previous civil defense measures and replaced them with
modernized provisions meant to take account of contemporary threats, such as terrorism,
environmental degradation, and pandemic disease.853 Recourse to this legislation, however, is
considered a last resort.854
The first part of this statute addresses domestic preparedness concerns, creating a framework
for local responders’ roles and responsibilities. The second part establishes a framework for the
use of special legislative measures. The trigger is what constitutes an “emergency”, defined as:
(a) An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in the United Kingdom or in a
Part or region
(b) An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of the United Kingdom or of a
Part or region, or
855
(c) War, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom

The scope of the emergency contemplated by Parts 1 and 2 differs. For the former, the event must
threaten “serious damage to human welfare or the environment in a place in the United
Kingdom.”856 This provision is designed for first responders. For the latter, the language “of the
United Kingdom or of a Part or region” refers to Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland. This is a
higher threshold to meet, as it applies not just to any town or city, but to a larger geographic area.857
Both Parts 1 and 2 consider an event to threaten damage to human welfare where it involves,
causes or may cause: loss of human life; human illness or injury; homelessness; damage to
property; disruption in the supply money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of systems of
communication; disruption of facilities for transport; or disruption of services related to health.858
For Part 2 powers, the Queen, or in extraordinary situations a Senior Minister,859 has an almost
unrestricted power to make emergency regulations provided that it would not be possible without
serious delay to arrange for an Order in Council, and that s/he is satisfied that certain conditions are
met: (a) an emergency has occurred or is about to occur, (b) the regulation is necessary to prevent,
control or mitigate an aspect of the emergency, and (c) the provision be urgent.860 A Senior
Minister of the Crown includes the Prime Minister, any of her Majesty’s Principal Secretaries of
State, and the Commissioners of her Majesty’s Treasury. In defining the scope that these
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emergency regulations can take, the Act provides as non-exclusive examples that regulations can
restrict movement to or from specified places or restrict travel at specified times.861
Current government policy is to rely in the first instance upon voluntary compliance with
governmental advice, with recourse to emergency powers only if necessary. It is unlikely that the
act would be used to impose quarantine. Not only would it be a stretch of the current legal
authorities, but, as discussed in the introduction of this paper, government policy documents
repeatedly make it clear that quarantine itself is not a viable option.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMING
The United States and United Kingdom frame the threat posed by pandemic disease and biological
weapons within a national security rubric. For both countries, the threats are linked in terms of
institutions and response. But the United States and the United Kingdom have very different
approaches, as a matter of law and policy, when it comes to the central government’s imposition of
quarantine and isolation in response to the twin threats.
This article has suggested one explanation for this divergence is deeply historical. And it
reflects important constitutional differences that continue to shape the two countries’ approaches.
American colonists routinely employed quarantine provisions to respond to epidemic and pandemic
disease. Such measures tended to be temporary, reactive, and local in nature. At times they ran
afoul of England’s commercial interests, in which case the Privy Council simply disallowed them.
The colonies nevertheless persisted. Following the Revolutionary War, states integrated quarantine
authorities into their statutes and (in some cases) constitutions. Some measures were so local that
they authorized towns to exclude individuals and goods from anywhere in the United States. Those
who fell ill could be forcibly kept in their homes (or removed) by local authorities. Congress and
the Supreme Court, in turn, considered quarantine well within the police powers of the state. Interstate and U.S. foreign relations commerce might be implicated, but more important were the states’
ability to defend its citizens from disease. The failure of some states to ensure the health of vessels
leaving U.S. ports, however, earned America the enmity of key European trading partners.
Congress began to pay more attention to what states were doing—or failing to do—and the
consequent economic effect on the country as a whole.
Smallpox proved devastating during the Civil War, in the course of which Confederate soldiers
and sympathizers used the disease as a weapon. But in the aftermath of the war, authority did not
immediately shift to the federal government. Instead, Congressional initiatives expanded federal
power within narrow limits—namely, the Marine Hospital Service, and consular reporting
overseas. In a critical innovation, the legislature empowered the federal government to assume
control of ports, where states were willing to sell. Quarantine facilities were expensive. Thus
began the quiet transfer of state ports and, with them, state authorities, to the federal domain.
Immersed in their new role, the federal government appeared to do a better job of stemming disease
than the states. Regional initiatives, seeking uniform standards between states and along the U.S.
border, broadened the call for a national approach to quarantine. In concert with the regional
meetings, the medical and industrial fields began to call for federal regulation.
Into this mix stepped the courts: while quarantine fell firmly within state police powers,
Congress might have room to preempt state law where commerce bore the cost. Encouraged by
Morgan’s Steamship, the legislature gave the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to develop
rules and regulations to prevent the interstate spread of disease. An important Solicitor General
determination spurred Congress to act not just inter-state, but, where state or local measures were
deemed ineffective or non-existent, at a state or local level. New measures required bills of health
to be obtained by all vessels sailing for the United States from abroad, and a stronger
epidemiological surveillance program required U.S. consuls abroad to make weekly reports. By the
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early 20th century, while the federal government had made advances in the realm of quarantine, it
had yet to preempt the states. Indeed, states still regularly exercised their quarantine authorities.
Direct confrontation, however, proved unnecessary. The Spending Clause paved the way for
federal control of local ports. In 1944, Congress empowered the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to make and enforce any regulations to prevent the introduction of disease into the United
States, or the transfer of disease between the states. Broadly conceived, these provisions have yet
to fall subject to Constitutional challenge. The Stafford Act, in turn, empowers the federal
government to act subject to a Governor’s request. Efforts to continue to expand federal authority
continue, with the discussion now contemplating the precise manner in which the military could be
used to impose quarantine in the event of either pandemic disease or terrorist attack.
The United Kingdom has followed almost the opposite trajectory—one deeply influenced by
the constitutional structure of the state and the realities of responding to plague. The Tudors issued
orders through the Privy Council, using the military to enforce them. Under the Stuarts,
conventions changed, with quarantine provisions becoming both more coercive and increasingly
political. The abolition of the conciliar courts restricted the broader contours of Privy Council
proclamations, tilting English common law towards greater protection of individual rights and
increased skepticism towards the exercise of Royal Prerogative—a context within which the Privy
Council’s exercise of quarantine became more constrained. It had to first obtain Parliamentary
imprimateur, via statute, before being considered a valid exercise of the Crown’s authority.
Parliamentary authorization, however, brought with it a greater impact—which, ironically, helped
to bring about the demise of the Privy Council’s involvement. Commercial interests, increasingly
organized and displeased with the Privy Council’s orders, began making their case to Parliament.
They were considerably helped in their efforts by medical treatises that began questioning the
contagion theory of disease—specifically in relation to plague. The broader context also played a
role: the increasing professionalization of the British civil service and the deference granted to
science proved critical. Simultaneously, the greater attention played to sanitation offered a viable
alternative to quarantine. By the late 19th century, the country had eschewed the use of the same.
Current British emergency measures might be extended to quarantine, but they do not overtly
recognize such powers and the use of quarantine is rejected in the country’s policy documents.
The current state of play in both countries, and the potential historical explanation raise myriad
questions: Should pandemic disease and biological weapons be treated in like manner? Ought
both types of threats fall within a national security rubric? To what extent are the legal changes
merely cosmetic? What constitutional concerns are raised by the most recent measures? These and
further questions remain rich for further discussion.
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